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 In the years 1964 and 1965 Oklahomans learned the shocking details of 
corruption in the Oklahoma Supreme Court.  At least three justices had accepted 
substantial bribes in exchange for their votes.  In the case of at least one justice, 
this practice had been ongoing for a generation, and rumors of corruption had 
stained the Court's reputation for years. 
 Oklahoma's judicial framework had been established at statehood and had 
remained unchanged since that time.  All judges were elected in partisan 
elections, running as members of their political party, which made them political 
as well as judicial officeholders.  No system existed to hold judges accountable 
for their conduct, other than the ballot box or the unlikely threat of impeachment.  
At the lowest level of the judiciary, unqualified justices of the peace worked 
under a system which gave them a vested interest in the outcome of the cases they 
heard.  Oklahoma judges were therefore vulnerable to public pressure yet immune 
from personal accountability.  
 I argue that Oklahoma's domination by one political party and the control 
of the legislature by conservative rural legislators helped to prevent reform of 
Oklahoma's judicial system, even after the graft had been exposed.  It was only 
after the Republican Party began to establish a foothold and the legislature had 
been reapportioned that meaningful changes to the court structure became viable.  
Oklahoma's governor and legislators displayed considerable political acumen in 
vii 
 
presenting a court reform proposal acceptable to the state's voters. These reforms 





 Between 1963 and 1967, Oklahoma experienced a catastrophic bribery 
scandal at the highest level of the state's court system.  Oklahomans learned to 
their horror that, in exchange for large amounts of cash, justices of the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court decided cases in favor of the highest bidder.  Exposure of the 
scandal led to the successful prosecutions of those responsible and, after 
considerable skillful political maneuvering, to significant reform in Oklahoma's 
judicial system.  These events have not yet received full historical study. 
 As time has passed, the judicial scandal and reform have faded from 
political memory.  To the extent they are remembered at all, the events bring a 
picture of the outrageous, brazen nature of the crimes and the enormous, long-
standing criminality committed by men who were equally outrageous and brazen.  
In this dissertation I propose to analyze the impact of the scandal and evaluate the 
nature of the reform which resulted from it.  Looking past the surface drama of 
the scandal, the corrupt events conform to a narrative of corrupt politics which are 
a part of Southern history in the mid-twentieth century.  Large personalities and 
extravagant demonstrations of theatrical skill are important in one-party systems 
where issue debate is seldom heard and many important policy decisions are made 
by an economic and political elite behind closed doors and with little connection 
to voters.    
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 At the time the crimes were committed, Oklahoma had been a state for 
only a half-century.  White immigration to Indian Territory  had commenced only 
after the Civil War, while Oklahoma Territory had been open for white settlers for 
less than twenty years before statehood came in 1907.  Like all frontiers, 
Oklahoma reflected the backgrounds and cultures of its new inhabitants.  Its 
political leadership particularly reflected influences of the West, the South, and 
Native Americans. 
 We nostalgically think of early Oklahoma as a western frontier but 
overlook its position as a geographic, political, and cultural borderland of the 
South.  Despite the presence of the distinctive feature of a Native American 
population involuntarily assigned to federally designated "Indian Country", many 
of the new white settlers, natives of the South, envisioned the new state in which 
"white over black" was the strongest assumption.  Early Oklahoma was also a 
place in which people of energy and intelligence could improve their lot in life.  
However, the absence of established governmental rules offered opportunities for 
devious, outsized personalities to exploit others for their own benefit.  Thousands 
of Native Americans and freedmen lost their allotments to hucksters and 
embezzlers.  A generation later O.A. Cargill, Hugh Carroll, N.S. Corn, and others 
would continue this practice of exploiting innocent workers and governmental 
weakness.   
 For the most part, Oklahoma's constitution was written by white men with 
Southern roots.  In writing Oklahoma's constitution, the drafters  relied 
enormously on the advice of populist Democrat William Jennings Bryan.  
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Populism, a political movement which was fading in other sections of the country, 
still thrived in Oklahoma in 1907, and the constitution reflected that school of 
political thought. Oklahoma's judicial framework also reflected this.  One of 
populism's features, the long ballot with many elected officials, played a 
significant role in the scandal which came a half-century later.  To this we must 
add an attitude toward public institutions and public spending on them. The great 
Southern historian C. Vann Woodward described the propensity of Southern 
Reconstruction-era political leaders to pay public employees penuriously, thus 
being penny-wise and pound-foolish.   This occurred in Oklahoma as well.    
 The judicial scandal and subsequent reform had a permanent effect on 
Oklahoma's political and legal landscape, and they deserve serious historical 
attention.   First, this work will explore the weaknesses of the political and legal 
system which allowed the scandal to occur.  Secondly, I will explore the efforts to 
expose graft in the highest level of Oklahoma's court system, the resistance to the 
enactment of reform, and the demonstration of extraordinary political skill and 
leadership in the eventual passage of the constitutional amendments achieving 
judicial reform. 
 Lawyers dominated the state's political structure.  Many of the legislators 
who championed and ultimately enacted judicial reform were attorneys, who 
comprised the largest single occupation in the legislature.  Reform was led by 
Oklahoma lawyers, hundreds of whom acted bravely and capably in fixing a 
corrupt and broken system.  However, this work will also discuss the inherent 
potential conflict between being a part-time legislator and a full-time lawyer.  
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Most lawyer-legislators served their districts honorably and capably, using their 
legal training to draft and pass legislation which benefited the state and their 
districts.  Some, certainly not most, lawyer-legislators abused their state office for 
the gain of their clients and themselves, blurring or obfuscating the line between 
representing their clients and representing their constituents. 
 The magnitude of the bribery scandal gradually became clear during the 
years between 1963 and 1965.  By the time the scope of the corruption was 
known, the men who had committed them had become elderly and infirm.  The 
bribery scandal involved five central figures: Justices Nelson S. Corn, Earl Welch, 
and N.B. Johnson; attorney O.A. Cargill; and businessman Hugh Carroll.  All five 
men had come to maturity in the challenging frontier world of statehood-era 
Oklahoma.  All were self-educated and had, through intelligence and 
perseverance, achieved positions of power, public respect, and responsibility.  All 
five, however, descended into the ugly business of influence peddling and bribery, 
betraying those who had trusted them.  This study will discuss some of the defects 
in Oklahoma's political and judicial systems, which helped provide the 
opportunity for these men to perpetrate these offenses. 
 Although corruption certainly occurred in many other Supreme Court 
cases of the time, officials conclusively proved bribery in only three cases: 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Selected Investments, Marshall v. Amos, and 
Oklahoma Company v. O'Neal.  Marshall and Oklahoma Company both involved 
oil and gas production; in the latter case, O.A. Cargill's daughter and son-in-law 
were litigants with an enormous stake in the outcome.  A fourth case, the Meadors 
5 
 
will case, almost certainly involved misconduct as well.  Of these cases, the most 
spectacular and egregious was Selected Investments, which involved financial and 
legal misconduct on a monumental scale.  
 Reform came in 1967.  The changes were far-reaching and completely 
changed Oklahoma's court system.  Voters narrowly approved  the establishment 
of the Judicial Nomination Commission and the creation of the Court on the 
Judiciary to deal with judicial misconduct.  It also centralized the state's court 
system, placing district courts under the control of the Supreme Court and a 
statewide court administrator.   
 The reforms also greatly changed judicial selection.  Like many states, 
Oklahoma elected its judges on a partisan ballot, in which the candidate identified 
himself by political party.  In a one-party state like Oklahoma, this meant the 
winner of the Democratic Party's nomination nearly always won the election.  
This was particularly true in judicial elections, which had few issues and 
generated little voter interest.  The 1967 constitutional amendments changed the 
electoral process, initiating a referendum for appellate judges in which the 
electorate decides whether or not an appellate judge should be retained in office 
but does not have the choice of another candidate for whom to vote.  The reforms 
also significantly modified the electoral process for trial judges.  Post-reform trial 
judges now ran in contested elections, but with their appearances on the ballot 
nonpartisan, without disclosing party affiliation. 
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 Structurally, the reform also abolished the obsolete and ineffective office 
of justice of the peace and replaced the antiquated county attorney system with 
the district attorney system.  Oklahomans replaced justices of the peace with the 
position of special district judge, a nonelected professional jurist with 
considerably more power, prestige, and professionalism than the JPs.  With a few 
changes, this system remains in place today.  As of this writing, however, some of 
these reforms, especially Oklahoma's retention system for appellate judges and 
the Judicial Nomination Commission, are under fire from critics.  A strong 
























 In 1967 Oklahoma's voters approved an ambitious and far-reaching reform 
of its court structure, whose basic framework remains in place today.  The reform 
came as a result of a shocking scandal, in which at least three justices of the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court accepted substantial bribes in exchange for their votes 
on cases before the Court.  After some halting attempts at reform failed, skeptical 
Oklahoma voters finally enacted the changes to the court structure. The purpose 
of this dissertation is to explain this sequence in a historical context; the specific 
events will be discussed in detail in later chapters.  However, in order for the 
reader to understand the historical perspective and the importance of some 
historical works, a brief outline of events is necessary. 
 In 1964 and 1965 Oklahomans learned the gravity of the Supreme Court 
scandal.  At least three justices, N.S. Corn, Earl Welch, and N.B. Johnson, had 
accepted bribes in exchange for their votes on at least three cases.  For thirty years 
Corn, the judicial leader of the bribery scheme, had carried on a corrupt 
relationship with Oklahoma City attorney O.A. Cargill, in which Cargill would 
telephone Corn and instruct him how to vote on cases identified by Cargill.  One 
of the cases in which bribery was proven involved an Oklahoma-based investment 
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company called Selected Investments, in which Corn accepted the then-staggering 
sum of $150,000 from Hugh Carroll, the company's president, in order to change 
the result of the case.   
 Oklahoma's judicial system had been established at statehood and had 
remained unchanged since then.  All judges were elected in partisan elections, 
running as members of their political party.  Other than the ballot box or the 
unlikely event of impeachment, no system was in place to hold judges 
accountable for their conduct.  Appellate judges were nominated from specific 
geographical districts but subject to statewide general elections, thus tilting the 
wheel in favor of the dominant political party. Trial courts consisted of district 
judges with wide jurisdiction, county judges, who normally handled probate and 
juvenile cases, and justices of the peace.  The justice of the peace system was a 
particularly weak link; non-lawyer JPs were compensated in part by the revenue 
they generated, giving them an inherent conflict of interest. 
 The movement for court reform came in the mid-1960s, a time in which 
Oklahoma, along with the rest of the country, was rapidly evolving politically and 
demographically.  Oklahoma was beginning to develop a viable Republican Party, 
including the election of the state's first two Republican governors.  Additionally, 
the federal courts forced Oklahoma's legislature to reapportion itself on the basis 
of population, greatly diminishing rural Oklahoma's ability to control legislation.  




LEADING WORKS ON SOUTHERN POST-WAR HISTORY 
  The development and reform of Oklahoma's courts, like its other political 
issues, must be viewed through the prism of a larger fact of life:  both Oklahoma 
Territory and Indian Territory were born and matured in the midst of a clash of 
cultures among Native Americans, African-Americans, and whites.  The state 
reflects these influences today.   As historian David A. Chang, whose work will 
be discussed later,  has said, "Here, just as cotton fields abutted ranchlands, 
southern history collides with western history."
1
  The accuracy of this observation 
is undeniable.  I argue, however, that the state's political system borrowed more 
from the South than from the other surrounding political cultures. 
 Oklahoma's racial makeup differed from the Old Confederacy.  Thousands 
of Native Americans, many of whom had been forcibly exiled from the South, 
lived in the state.  Oklahoma's African-American population comprised only 
about eight percent of the state's population, a fraction of the numbers for states in 
the Deep South.
2
  Despite this, the state's political leaders in the early statehood 
years, many of whom came from the South, had the racial attitudes of post-Civil 
War southern whites.  Fear of "takeover" by blacks was alive and well.  
 For this reason it is important to keep the facts of Southern history, 
especially Reconstruction and its Redeemer aftermath, close at hand.  Looking 
back now, it is clear that, like the rest of the South,  Oklahoma developed a one- 
party political system in which public institutions were weak and could be 
                                                          
1
 David A. Chang, The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in 
Oklahoma, 1832-1929, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2010), Introduction.  
2
 1910 United States Census, Oklahoma, p.7.  
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manipulated for private gain.  Until the 1960s, even though the state was 
becoming more urban, rural interests held a disproportionate amount of political 
power, especially in the legislature.   
 The work of C. Vann Woodward is especially useful here, because 
Woodward first identified the economic motives and interests behind the creation 
of a weak and dysfunctional state government.  To Woodward many of the 
South's issues had to do with economic class.
3
 In Oklahoma, as well as the rest of 
the South, the real fear was of democratic participation with a broad base and the 
inclusion of African-Americans and lower-class whites into the decision-making 
process.
4
   The illusion of a robust democracy was facilitated by politics in which 
personality and showmanship were particularly valued, and scandal and self-
dealing came with the territory.   
 Joel Williamson, another historian of the South, sees Oklahoma as "the 
most curious of Southern states in race relations.  In some aspects of racial 
activities, it is also the most revealing precisely because of its peculiarities."  In 
particular, Williamson notes the large number of settlers who entered northern 
and western Oklahoma from the North, especially Kansas, and that federally-
                                                          
3
 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1951, 1971, 1997).  C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel, (New 
York: Oxford University Press,  1948, 1955, 1963). 
4
 For the first half of the twentieth century, events of the post-Reconstruction period had been 
interpreted by the Dunning theory of Southern history, which taught that the region had been 
victimized during the Reconstruction years by scheming Southern whites and out-of-state 
charlatans who, combining with newly freed and unprepared African-Americans, created a 
disorderly society whose integrity was saved by white Redeemers.  This theory was furiously 
refuted by African-American historian and journalist W.E.B. Dubois in his 1935 book Black 
Reconstruction in America.  Unfortunately,scholars did not take Dubois' work seriously until the 
1960s and 1970s.  See also Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-
1877, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988). 
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appointed Republicans had governed Oklahoma Territory, although the majority 
of its population had immigrated from the South, especially Mississippi, 
Arkansas, and Texas.  In that respect, according to Williamson, Oklahoma was a 
"Southern state with a large Yankee colony" and, in that sense, was "the last state 
to be redeemed from Reconstruction."
5
  The fact that Oklahoma did not become a 
state until 1907 allowed the state to "make up an official position on race relations 
out of materials already formed, to utilize the ready-made fabric that painful 
experience had woven in states east and south of them.  Oklahoma had only to cut 
and sew, and then slip smoothly into its racial garments."
6
 
 As later chapters will demonstrate, advocates of Oklahoma court reform 
had to travel a very tangled route, meeting resistance every step of the way.  In 
this respect Oklahoma politics closely resembled the backwater Southern politics 
described by political scientist V.O. Key, Jr. in 1949.  Key's extensive comments 
on the pitfalls of one-party states are extremely important and apply to the 
Oklahoma of the 1950s and 1960s.  To Key, the lack of a viable two-party system 
led to factionalism, lack of interest by the electorate, and disposition toward 
                                                          
5
 Joel Williamson, The Crucible of Race, (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984), 
pp. 241-245. 
6
 Ibid., p. 241.  For one influential writer's view of Southern thinking in the Depression Era, see 
W.J. Cash, The Mind of the South, (New York: Vintage Books, 1941, 1991).  For a more optimistic 
view of the South in general, acknowledging its problems but also stressing the development of 
literature and music in the region, see Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After 
Reconstruction, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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 Finally, I found Robert A. Caro's multi-volume biography of Lyndon 
Johnson useful because it demonstrates remarkable similarities between the 
political cultures of Texas and Oklahoma during the mid-twentieth century.  The 
second book in the series, Means of Ascent, particularly describes an environment 
of favoritism and underhanded friendliness to moneyed interests, a theme which 
runs throughout this study as well.
8
  As we shall see, a number of Oklahoma's 
leaders were very familiar with this style of governing: decisions were made 
behind closed doors, with little or no sense of where private interests ended and 




LEADING WORKS ON OKLAHOMA HISTORY 
 We must now turn to the history of Oklahoma as it evolved as part of the 
American borderland between the West and the South.  In their 1924 text A 
History of Oklahoma, former University of Oklahoma president James Shannon 
Buchanan and prominent Oklahoma historian Edward Everett Dale provided an 
explanation of the complicated post-Civil War events which occurred  in 
                                                          
7
 For an account of the effect of the one-party system on the preparation of Oklahoma's 
Constitution, see Danney Goble, Progressive Oklahoma: the Making of a New Kind of State, 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). 
8
 Robert A. Caro, Means of Ascent, (New York: Vintage Books, 1991). 
9
 For an description of the use of favoritism in Alabama politics during this time period, see Dan 
T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the 
Transformation of American Politics, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995, 2000). 
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Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory.  Despite the fact that the book is nearly 
a century old, their version of the sequence of events of the Oklahoma land runs 
remains quite sound.   Dale was a Harvard student and close friend of Frederick 
Jackson Turner, whose "Frontier Theory" argued that the lure of free land led to 
constant white settler movement which promoted individuality and led every 
American generation to "primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier 
line."
10
  This concept of advancing in the face of "primitives" is similar to the way 
Southern Redeemers saw their mission.  Turner's influence is evident in Dale's 
explanation of the Dawes Act.  Both Dale and Oklahoma historian Grant Foreman 
argued that the Dawes Commission, which abolished common ownership of tribal 
land and allocated individual allotments of land to individual tribal members and 
their freedmen, became necessary because of corruption in tribal governments and 
inequities in tribal land occupation.  The Turner thesis also appears in Grant 
Foreman's 1942 work, also entitled A History of Oklahoma.
11
   
 In his 1965 survey of Oklahoma history, Oklahoma: a History of Five 
Centuries, University of Oklahoma professor Arrell M. Gibson argued that 
Congress deemed the Dawes Act as a necessary condition to preparing Indian 
Territory to join Oklahoma Territory as a state.  Gibson also provided insight into 
the influences of big business into both territories in the pre-statehood years, 
especially railroads, coal and cattle.  Gibson emphasized the differences in the 
                                                          
10
 James Shannon Buchanan and Edward Everett Dale, A History of Oklahoma, (Evanston, Illinois: 
Row, Peterson and Company, 1924. 
11
 Grant Foreman, A History of Oklahoma, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942), pp. 
273-309.  "Grant Foreman," Encyclopedia of Oklahoma History and Culture, Oklahoma Historical 
Society, www.okhistory.org.  
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politics and infrastructure of the two territories, with Oklahoma Territory 
developing businesses, roads, and schools far more quickly than Indian 
Territory.
12
  The reader senses Turner's influence on Gibson as well.  More recent 
historians now argue that the allotment system constituted a successful attempt to 




 In 2000 Murray R. Wickett  published his study of the tension among 
whites, Native Americans, and African-Americans in Oklahoma between the 
Civil War and statehood.
14
  As pressure for opening territory for settlement 
increased,  the greatest source of racial conflict was the ownership of land, 
especially after four of the Five Civilized Tribes reluctantly granted tribal 
citizenship to their freedmen.   Oklahoma African-Americans encouraged 
Southern blacks, increasingly suffering under Jim Crow laws, to emigrate to 
Oklahoma in sufficient numbers to make a political and economic impact, a 
prospect which panicked many whites.  In the end, the massive African-American 
immigration did not occur; Wickett attributes this to the probability that destitute 
Southern blacks lacked the financial means to come to the new state.
15
  Wickett 
also documents conflicts between whites and Native Americans on issues such as 
education and the legal system.  Whites, who often saw Indians simply as Indians, 
                                                          
12
 Arrell Morgan Gibson, Oklahoma: a History of Five Centuries, (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1965). 
13
 Patricia Nelson Limerick, "What on Earth is the New Western History?", Trails Toward a New 
Western History, ed. Patricia Nelson Limerick, Clyde A. Milner II, and Charles E. Rankin, 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991), pp. 81-88. 
14
 Murray R. Wickett, Contested Territory: Whites, Native Americans, and African-Americans in 
Oklahoma, 1865-1907, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).  
15
 Ibid., pp. 54-59. 
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could not understand the reluctance of the relocated Plains tribes to embrace 
agriculture, as the Five Civilized Tribes had done.  Many Indians were completely 
mystified by the white concept of private ownership of land, an idea totally 
contrary to their experience. 
 In 2010 David A. Chang published his account of the conflict among the 
races in the Creek Nation, The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics 
of Landownership in Oklahoma, 1832-1929.
16
  Chang describes the brutal 
relocation of the Creeks to present-day Oklahoma, their becoming established in 
the new land, their alliance with the Confederacy, and the trauma of allotment.  
To Chang the most important divisive issue among the races was land, which 
became a raw contest for power.   Chang argues, "Washington made land a 
divisive force in the nation: not something Creeks had in common but something 
to be fought over."
17
  The result was that everyone lost.  As Chang says, "In the 
first decade of statehood, rural east-central Oklahoma became a society 
dominated by landlords and landless tenant farmers.  This outcome resulted 
largely from the workings of American federal, state, and local government 
policy--the law, the way it was applied, and even the way it was broken in 
swindles that benefited from official complicity, corruption, and neglect."
18
   
                                                          
16
 David A. Chang, The Color of Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in 
Oklahoma, 1832-1929, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
17
 Ibid., p.67. 
18
 Ibid., p.94.  This may be contrasted with the compromises between whites and Native 
Americans described in Richard White's The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Whites in the 
Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 2011).  In the 
Great Lakes the parties were in relatively equal bargaining positions, a circumstance not present 
in 1890s Oklahoma.   
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 Chang points out an inherent conflict in the political philosophy of the 
allotment.  As he says, "The reformers who had initiated allotment were attached 
to two contradictory ideals: the profit-seeking liberal individual and the 
Jeffersonian yeoman farmer. ..The liberal individual was the central figure in the 
mythology of Gilded Age capitalism, a free actor in the 'free market.'  As such, 
he..had the right to sell his allotment and spend or reinvest the proceeds as he saw 
fit.  Creating yeomen, however, required tying allottees to the land.  After all, the 
yeoman emerged from a different, agrarian strand of American mythology and 
was defined by his relationship to the land he owned and worked."
19
 
   The Congress felt pressure from white leaders to allow the sale of 
allotments; future Oklahoma governor Robert Lee Williams, for example, argued 
that if allottees could not sell or mortgage their land, it would be, in Chang's 
words, "impossible to create a class of autonomous, landowning white yeomen."
20
  
In 1904 the government solved the issue in a peculiar way.  Congress created 
three tiers of allottees: those "not of Indian blood," those of at least half but less 
than three-quarters Indian ancestry and no Indian ancestry, and full-blood Indians. 
Blacks were allowed to sell their allotments first, then Indians of mixed blood, 
then full-bloods.  As Chang argues, "The legislation presumed that the higher the 
degree of one's indigenous heritage, the less capable one was of looking out for 
                                                          
19
 Ibid., Chapter 3. 
20
 Ibid., Chapter 3.  
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one's own interests in property, and the longer one needed to retain one's 




OKLAHOMA POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
 Oklahoma's entry into the union in 1907 came from the combination of 
Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory.  Indian Territory consisted of land 
owned by what were then known as the Five Civilized Tribes: the Cherokee, 
Choctaw, Creek, Seminole, and Chickasaw nations.  After the Civil War, which 
divided and devastated the tribes, the United States government punished the 
tribes for their assistance to the Confederacy by forcing them to sell nearly half 
their land in the western half of what is now Oklahoma.  The federal government 
then used this land, which constituted most of what became Oklahoma Territory,  
to relocate other tribes and, beginning in 1889, opened it to white settlement.  
Since the occupants of the White House in the late nineteenth century were 
Republicans, the territory's appointed governmental posts were Republican 
patronage positions.  Many of those seeking new opportunities in Oklahoma 
Territory came from the North; many more were African-Americans seeking 
opportunity which had been previously unavailable to them.     
 The quest for land brought thousands of white settlers into Indian 
Territory as well.  The construction of the railroad, the discovery of minerals, the 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., Chapter 3.  For an account of the disgraceful theft of Native American and African-
American allotment land by businessmen, lawyers, and judges, see Angie Debo, And Still the 
Waters Run, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940). 
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availability of grazing land, and the prospect of cheap land provided opportunity.  
Although the tribes still owned the land, by the 1880s and 1890s the number of 
white immigrants greatly outnumbered the Indians.  In 1860, for example, forty-
three white residents lived in the Cherokee Nation.  By 1890, thirty years later, 
the population of Indian Territory consisted of about 110,000 whites, 50,000 
Indians, and 19,000 African-Americans.   The influx of outsiders continued; by 
statehood in 1907 only nine percent of the residents of Indian Territory were 
members of Indian tribes.
22
   
 Those who came to Indian Territory entered a place unprepared for the 
huge increase of population, governed in what one historian called a "crazy-quilt 
manner among various federal bureaus, fading tribal regimes, and scattered town 
governments," resulting in a "fractured, incoherent political system."
23
  Land 
being communally owned by tribes, new arrivals could own neither farms nor 
town lots.  The only public schools existed for tribal members.  In the early 
postwar years, law enforcement was virtually non-existent; even after the 
establishment of courts in Muskogee, Ardmore, and McAlester, it was spotty and 




 Under pressure from white settlers and despite fierce opposition from 
Indian tribes,  Congress passed the Dawes Act and the Curtis Act, abolishing the 
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tribal practice of communal land ownership, establishing allotments for individual 
tribal members, and setting the stage for abolishing tribal governments.
25
  As 
historian Angie Debo proved in her classic 1940 work And Still the Waters Run, 
over the next years the Oklahoma legal system allowed hundreds, if not 
thousands, of Indians and freedmen to be swindled out of these allotments 
through such mechanisms as fraud, embezzlement, and specious guardianships.
26
  
For others the one hundred sixty acre allotments proved to be too small for 
profitable farming in Oklahoma's climate, and they moved on.   Pressure was 
mounting for statehood, and by 1907 it became clear that Oklahoma Territory and 
Indian Territory would be admitted to the Union as one state. 
 The delegates of Oklahoma's 1907 constitutional convention shaped the 
state's government in the mold provided by the Southern Progressive movement.  
In the election for delegates to the convention, Democrats trounced the 
disorganized and fractious Republicans, electing ninety-nine Democratic 
delegates to twelve for the stunned Republicans.
27
   Led by the convention's 
president, William H. Murray of Tishomingo, and heavily influenced by William 
Jennings Bryan, the delegates passed a constitution remarkable for its length and 
its hostility to corporations, including railroads.  The article regulating 
corporations was longer than the entire United States Constitution.  Nearly every 
state office, including such routine positions as assistant mining inspector and 
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clerk of the supreme court, became elective, making Oklahoma's ballot 
burdensomely long.
28
    
 Culturally, the delegates also made statements on social issues.  Unlike 
some states in the West and Midwest, the delegates voted not to recognize 
women's suffrage, although they made an exception  for school board elections.  
The constitution also prohibited the sale of alcohol, a ban which remained in place 
for fifty years.  The framework of the judiciary, which will be discussed later in 
this chapter, was largely drafted by Ardmore attorney W.A. Ledbetter, and seems 
to have generated little controversy at the convention. 
   Racial segregation was another theme of the convention.  The constitution 
provided for the segregation of schools.  Although the body's overwhelming 
sentiment was in favor of segregation of transportation and disenfranchisement of 
African-Americans as well, fear of a veto by President Theodore Roosevelt forced 
them to defer that issue until the constitution had been adopted, and Oklahoma 
was in fact a state.  The state's first legislature, still overwhelmingly Democratic, 
submitted a constitutional amendment requiring a literacy test for voting, which 
had the effect of depriving blacks of the franchise, and mandating segregation of 
transportation through "separate but equal" trains and waiting rooms in stations. 
29
  
By this point, of course, such a policy was not only an article of faith among 
white southerners, it was backed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Finally, the fact that 
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southern oriented Democrats predominated as the political architects of the new 




OKLAHOMA'S POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT AFTER FIFTY YEARS OF 
STATEHOOD 
 For the next fifty years certain common themes recur in Oklahoma's 
political history.  First, Oklahoma was a one-party state, with the Democratic 
Party dominating the political landscape.  Until Republican Henry Bellmon's 1962 
election, every Oklahoma governor had been a Democrat.  Three Republicans 
were elected to the United States Senate, each of whom served only one term.  
With the exceptions of setbacks in 1920 and 1928, in which the Democratic ticket 
was led by unpopular Presidential candidates, Democrats dominated lesser down-
ballot offices as well.  While Republicans were competitive in northwestern 
Oklahoma and, in later years, in Tulsa, Democrats outnumbered Republicans 
overwhelmingly.   
 Writing at approximately the same time as Oklahoma's court scandal 
occurred, political scientist V.O. Key, Jr. discussed the effect a one-party system 
has on the party in power.  Key argued, "Lacking opposition, no external pressure 
drives the party toward internal unity and discipline. ..The party organization, 
therefore, becomes merely a framework for intraparty factional and personal 
22 
 
competition.  It has the usual complement of conventions, committees, and 
officials, but the resemblance to genuine party organization is purely formal."
30
  
This occurred in Oklahoma in its first half-century.  Democrats, the dominant 
party, fought bitterly with each other.  Being a Democrat meant little in terms of 
sharing a political philosophy or a common platform. 
 Some of the tension came from conflict between the legislature and the 
governor.  In their 1982 study of Oklahoma's first half-century, James R. Scales 
and Danney Goble analyzed each gubernatorial administration.
31
  Governors, 
legally limited at that time to one term in office, invariably entered office with 
great voter popularity and ambitious agendas.  With very few exceptions, the 
governors met vociferous resistance from the legislature, whose members were 
not term-limited; most left office disappointed.  Two governors, Jack Walton and 
Henry S. Johnston, were impeached and removed from office by legislators.  
Walton, who fell victim to a combination of his own abusive and bizarre behavior 
and a legislature dominated by the Ku Klux Klan, was removed in 1923 after less 
than a year in office.  Johnston, who had unnecessarily created enemies in the 
capitol by ignoring  legislators, was removed in 1929 by a combination of 
Democratic enemies in the legislature and an unusually high and effective number 
of Republican legislators, elected as a reaction to Al Smith's wildly unpopular 
1928 Democratic presidential nomination.  Although Johnston was indeed a poor 
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governor with little executive ability, his removal from office was unnecessary 
and is an example of the excessive power of Oklahoma's legislature.
32
 
 The membership of the legislature itself was disproportionately rural.  
Although the state constitution required the legislature be reapportioned every ten 
years, in fact the House of Representatives had not reapportioned itself since 
1921, and the Senate had never done so.  Each county, regardless of population, 
was guaranteed one representative.  Although  the state became considerably 
more urban in the post-World War II years, rural legislators retained a power far 
disproportionate to the population of their districts.  By 1962, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Baker v. Carr, only three state legislatures 
were apportioned more disproportionately than that of Oklahoma.
33
  In the state's 
voting patterns, the disparity between rural and urban manifested itself again and 
again. 
 A high percentage of legislators were lawyers.  Most of these lawyer-
legislators were young attorneys seeking to serve the public, gain experience, and 
increase name recognition in their communities.  For some, however, a seat in the 
legislature provided an opportunity to craft and enact legislation favoring their 
private legal clients, thus creating an incentive for private companies desiring 
some assistance from the legislature to hire lawyer-legislators as their attorney.    
 Oklahoma's demographics were indeed changing drastically, as its citizens 
abandoned agriculture for the cities.  In 1910 Grant County, located on the Kansas 
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border, had a population of more than 18,000 people.  By 1950 the number had 
dropped to 10,461; by 1970 only 7,117 people lived there.
34
  Statewide, the 
percentage of people employed in agriculture plummeted from 33 percent in 1940 
to five percent in 1970.  During the 1950s alone, the number of family farms 
dropped from 142,000 to 95,000.
35
  By contrast, Oklahoma's cities were growing 
exponentially.  Between 1920 and 1950 the population of Oklahoma County grew 
from 116,307 to 325,352; over the next twenty years, the county's numbers 
increased to 526,805.  Tulsa County, Comanche County, and Cleveland County 
all experienced similar increases. 
36
 
 Scholars have described the brutality, inequities, and humiliations of 
segregation, a practice which Oklahoma adopted and maintained.  As we have 
seen, the constitution mandated segregation of schools, and the first legislature 
had ordered separate public facilities, and transportation, "which shall be equal in 
all points of comfort and convenience."
37
  Courthouses were segregated, making 
the iconic symbol of the blindfolded Lady Justice ironic.  In the 1920s the Ku 
Klux Klan became a leading force in Oklahoma politics, dominating the state's 
legislature and leading to the impeachment of a governor.  In 1921 an attempt to 
lynch a black rape suspect in Tulsa led to the bloodiest riot in state history.  
During the 1950s, when most of the scandal occurred, segregation still gripped 
Oklahoma.  By the mid-1960s, when the corruption in the courts was exposed and 
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reform enacted, the federal government had abolished segregation throughout the 
country, and the insidious practice was beginning to fade in Oklahoma as well.  
The issues of segregation and disproportionate legislative representation would 
help lead to closer federal oversight of Oklahoma's political climate. 
 
 
FRAMEWORK OF THE COURT SYSTEM 
 Consistent with early-twentieth century Southern practice, the state's 
constitutional authors had structured the courts in a way designed to minimize the 
expenditure of tax dollars, especially at the level closest to the average citizen, the 
trial  judges.  The state government had three levels of trial judges: district judges, 
county judges, and justices of the peace.  The JPs, as justices of the peace were 
known,  were the lowest rung of the judicial ladder and eventually became the 
most controversial part of the trial court system. 
 JPs were hardly unique to Oklahoma. The office of justice of the peace 
had been established in fourteenth century England and had been an important 
part of the English legal structure.  Although the higher-ranking assize judges in 
Elizabethan and Stuart England sometimes questioned the competence, integrity, 
and work ethic of the local justices of the peace, they performed necessary day-to-
day routine work of the courts.  This allowed the assize judges, who travelled a 
26 
 




 Britain's American colonies inherited the JP system, which initially 
worked well enough that into the early twentieth century every state had adopted 
some form of the system.
39
  In a world where travel was limited and 
communication was primitive and slow, the office of justice of the peace provided 
a low-cost, quick method of settling minor disputes and keeping the public peace.  
Especially in rural areas, a capable justice of the peace, regardless of his lack of 
legal training, could use common sense and good judgment to keep and restore 
order in the community.  When Oklahoma became a state in 1907, the drafters of 
its constitution established the office, apparently without serious controversy or 
debate.   
 In Oklahoma JPs adjudicated traffic offenses, low-level misdemeanors, the 
early stage of felony cases, and, unlike their English predecessors, very small civil 
suits.  Despite their judicial function, JPs were not lawyers and were primarily 
responsible for the collection of fees, a portion of which they then paid to the 
state.  The JPs also received part of the fines and fees as their compensation, 
which meant the person deciding the guilt or innocence of the accused had a 
vested interest in the outcome; if the accused were found not guilty, no fine would 
result, thus less income for the JP.  The JP, after collecting the funds, was 
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responsible for deducting his portions and paying the balance to the county, a 
system which occasionally led to embezzlement charges when the JP failed to pay 
the county the funds which it was due.
40
 
 JPs also performed marriages, a source of significant income, especially 
for JPs living in counties bordering other states.  One JP in Bryan County, which 
borders Texas, became well-known for performing weddings at all times of the 
day and night and on every day of the year.  Procedurally, a disgruntled litigant 
had the right to a new trial, which meant that no decision from a JP was final 
unless the parties agreed it would be final.
41
 
 One of the advantages of the JP system was in the collection of small 
debts for local businesses, who could collect unpaid accounts through the JP 
courts with minimal cost.
42
  A legal scholar of the 1920s described this aspect of 
the JP's job, stating "If the reader were to attend a session of these courts, he 
would probably observe the disposition of a run of cases somewhat as follows: 
first, there would be an attorney representing a merchant or a collection agency, 
who would present in rapid succession the claims of his clients for merchandise 
sold and delivered, and the amounts of the various claims would be $2.75, $12.50, 
$65.10, and $99.50.  Next, there would be a landlord suing for a month's unpaid 
rent; then, a housewife demanding satisfaction from a cleaner for ruining her 
evening dress; then, the neighborhood capitalist asking for judgment on a 
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promissory note; and, finally a man demanding the value of his lawn mower from 
a neighbor who had borrowed it and failed to return it."
43
  With the exception of 
the amounts of money in controversy, this procedure was similar to Oklahoma's 
small claims court as it exists today.  
 By the 1920s, serious legal scholars were questioning the desirability of 
the JP courts, especially the fee system.
44
  The advent of the automobile and, in 
particular, the traffic ticket greatly diminished the office.  Traffic fines and small-
town speed traps often led to a hapless driver being brought before a JP, who had 
a financial stake in fining the driver.   In the words of one historian of the office, 
"this practice created a public conception of the Justice of the Peace as a small-
town tyrant and sharp dealer whose only purpose was to harass the motoring 
public, or preside over the marriage of couples eloping from jurisdictions where 
more stringent regulations governed entrance into the state of marital bliss."
45
  
 By the 1960s, the existence of JPs had drawn fire nationwide, and states 
were beginning either to modify the office or to abolish it altogether.
46
  Nearly 
every state which still had JPs began to take a skeptical look at the office.  A 
study conducted by the New York University Law School outlined the system's 
shortcomings, which, according to its writers, made the system "notorious."  
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These included lack of legal training, part-time service, compensation by fee, 
inadequate service, archaic procedures, and makeshift facilities.
47
   
 All of these deficiencies applied to Oklahoma. In both 1963 and 1965 the 
Oklahoma House of Representatives had passed legislation lowering the JP civil 
jurisdiction to one dollar; in both cases the measure was rejected by the Senate.  
In short, by the time of the exposure of the Oklahoma Supreme Court scandal, the 
office of JP was seen nationwide as obsolete and as part of a system with dubious 
ability and integrity.  Although justices of the peace had nothing to do with the 
bribery scandal, the enactment of court reform would sweep justices of the peace 
out of existence in Oklahoma.  
 In addition to JPs, Oklahoma's judicial framework guaranteed to each 
county one county judge, who usually decided probates, adoptions, juvenile cases, 
and other routine matters.  County judges rarely heard hotly contested criminal or 
civil matters.  These officials were paid from county funds and were considered 
county employees. Often, especially in rural counties, the county judge's 
workload and pay were minimal.
48
 
 Serious disputed cases were reserved for district judges, who adjudicated 
felonies, large-scale civil cases, and divorces.  In rural areas district judges sat in 
more than one county, which meant that important judicial business often had to 
wait for the judge to come to town.  District judges and county court clerks also 
set the budgets for the local courts, which gave them enormous power over 
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personnel and courthouse improvements.  Neither the Supreme Court nor any 
other agency had oversight power over district court spending, which spent local 
funds as they saw fit.
49
  While district judges received their paycheck from the 
supreme court office, they actually received part of their salary from the state and 
the rest from the counties they served.
50
 
 Each of the seventy-seven counties had a county attorney, who was 
responsible for criminal prosecutions and legal advice for the county government.  
Low pay for county attorneys and county judges made the offices attractive 
primarily to young lawyers seeking to establish a community reputation or to gain 
courtroom experience; lawyers in mid-career simply could not afford to serve.  
County attorneys therefore routinely ceded courtroom experience to opposing 
lawyers.  The county attorney system was so unsatisfactory that even the 
Oklahoma Association of County Attorneys recommended the office's abolition, 
arguing the establishment of a district attorney system would provide more 
efficient law enforcement, especially in rural counties.
51
 
 Courtrooms were busy places, but whether the litigants routinely received 
justice is debatable. 
52
  With few discovery rules, the parties learned, often for the 
first time, the relative strengths or weaknesses of their cases in the courtroom 
itself.  The legal system encouraged only minimal pretrial discovery or pleadings; 
without meaningful discovery, many cases which should have been resolved 
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outside the courtroom went to trial.   Without adequate pretrial procedures and 
strong, enforceable court rules, the system was subject to manipulation by 
argumentative, forceful attorneys who relied as much on the strength of their 
personalities as the facts and the law.  Trials often became a spectator sport more 
notable for their entertainment value than the achievement of justice. 
 Unlike most states, Oklahoma had two appellate courts of last resort: the 
Court of Criminal Appeals, which heard only criminal cases, and the Supreme 
Court, which heard all other appeals.   The Court of Criminal Appeals, until 1959 
unfortunately named the Criminal Court of Appeals,  had been created by the first 




 The Supreme Court consisted of nine justices, each elected from a 
geographically designated district.
54
  No intermediate appellate courts existed, so 
every non-criminal appeal, regardless of size, importance, merit, or legal 
complexity, went to the Supreme Court.  Even with the Court of Criminal 
Appeals hearing criminal cases, this created a high workload for the Supreme 
Court.
55
  Except for the extremely rare case involving interpretation of the United 
States Constitution, the decision of the Supreme Court (or the Court of Criminal 
Appeals in criminal cases) was final; a party losing its case at that level had 
nowhere else to go.  The final winners and losers of civil litigation in Oklahoma 
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were therefore determined by its Supreme Court.  Both the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals also set precedent; its published decisions were 
binding authority for lower courts.  
 Justices and judges were elected officials, answerable only to the will of 
the voters.  Appellate justices and judges ran from specific nominating districts as 
representatives of their political parties, as Democrats or Republicans.  Since they 
were secondary officials on long ballots in issueless races, to a great extent the 
judge's job tenure depended on his political affiliation.   Usually, although not 
always, this meant the Democratic nominee won.  In 1928, however, the 
unpopularity of Democratic presidential candidate Al Smith doomed many 
Democratic judges to defeat, even though they had nothing to do with Smith.  In 
the 1930s the strength of Franklin Roosevelt's candidacy swept Democratic 
judges back into office, even though they likewise had no affiliation with the New 
Deal.  
 As James R. Scales, a future president of Oklahoma Baptist University 
and Wake Forest University, noted in his University of Oklahoma doctoral 
dissertation, the nominating district was a very peculiar political creation.  A 
judge ran for his party's nomination from his own geographic district, but the 
nominees were then subject to a statewide general election.   This allowed every 
voter in the state to cast a ballot for a candidate representing a different district, a 
practice which clearly benefited the majority party. 
56
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 Although it is impossible to determine with certainty, Justice N.S. Corn 
probably benefited from existence of the nominating district.  Corn, a Democrat, 
came from Republican-oriented northwest Oklahoma.  In 1934, as Democratic a 
year as can be imagined in Oklahoma, Corn ran for his district's Supreme Court 
seat against the incumbent Republican.  He obtained the nomination and was 
elected in the statewide election, then was reelected, still as a Democrat in a 
Republican-leaning district, in 1940, 1946, and 1952.  
 Since judges were partisan elected officials, they felt comfortable and, in 
some cases, obliged, to make partisan political speeches and to endorse other 
candidates.  A judicial candidate had the possibility of facing the electorate in 
three elections: the primary, the runoff, and the general election.  Some judges 
campaigned for non-judicial office without leaving the bench.  A judge, therefore, 
not only represented the judicial system; he also represented his political party.
57
 
 The experience of Justice Harry Halley illustrates this point.  In 1946 
Halley, a Democrat, occupied the post of district judge in Tulsa County.  In the 
postwar election that year, Tulsa County voters swept all Republican candidates 
into office, and Halley therefore lost his post.  Two years later, in 1948, Halley 
was elected as a Democrat to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, where he served until 
1967.  Halley, who became a strong proponent of court reform, later remarked on 
the irony of his apparent improvement as a judge in his two years out of office.
58
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 The ballot box constituted the only means for the public to express 
approval or disapproval of judicial performance.  Other than the cumbersome and 
impractical legislative impeachment process, no mechanism existed for removing 
corrupt, incompetent, or infirm judges.  Judicial retirement did not exist, so once a 
judge left office, his income stopped.  Judges therefore had every incentive to 




DISTRUST OF THE COURT 
 By the late 1950s, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had become a focus of 
public suspicion.  Both members of the legal community and of the general public 
have a natural, innate reluctance to speak badly of the courts.  Despite this, in his 
successful 1958 campaign for a seat on the court, William A. Berry constantly ran 
into voters and officials who expressed distrust of the Supreme Court.  One of his 
personal friends, whose father had been a successful highway contractor, worried 
about Berry's becoming contaminated by the "crooks on that thing."  Among 
lawyers, a highly publicized will contest in which the judges had reversed their 
own ruling, In Re Meadors Estate, had created considerable controversy and was 
35 
 
the source of rumors.  A newspaper publisher showed Berry a cartoon which 
depicted the justices in the hands of a puppeteer.
59
 
 One of the few scholars of the court scandal is former University of 
Oklahoma law professor Judith Maute.  In her article about Peevyhouse v. 
Garland Coal Company, an Oklahoma Supreme Court case of the time which 
became notorious among scholars of legal remedies for its poor legal reasoning, 
Maute discusses the Court's questionable reputation.
60
  In addition to suspicions 
about the financial integrity of the justices, Maute also outlines the system's 
tolerance of unprofessional practices, particularly the tendency of judges to 
engage in ex parte discussions of cases with attorneys and to decide cases based 
on the identity of lawyers, not the facts of individual cases.   
 At the time of the scandal, Oklahoma had been a state for only two 
generations, and it still retained much of its rural, informal flavor.  It was common 
practice for lawyers to drop by a judge's chambers to discuss a case with him; 
many lawyers considered this to be good practice, not unethical or inappropriate 
behavior.  Judges had limited support staffs, and stopping in to see the judge was 
a simple affair.  Although this practice was common knowledge in the legal 
community, lawyers were reluctant to complain.  Since no mechanism existed for 
investigating or removing a judge, any complaint would have been futile; nobody 
had the authority to receive or investigate a complaint, much less act on it.  
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 Professor Maute closely investigates the relationship between Ned 
Looney, a prominent and well-connected Oklahoma City attorney whose firm 
represented Garland Coal in Peevyhouse, and Justice Earl Welch.  While she 
doubts any financial impropriety in Peevyhouse, where the financial stakes were 
relatively low, she is able to track a remarkably close voting correlation between 
Welch's judicial vote and the cases in which Looney's firm was involved.  In 
Peevyhouse, for instance, Welch did not participate in the original opinion, which 
reversed a district court in Looney's firm's favor.  However, when another justice 
changed his mind about the case, Welch cast the deciding vote to leave the 
decision alone.  Using Welch's voting pattern, Professor Maute concludes that 
Welch's close relationship with Looney's firm made him available to the firm 
when he was needed.
61
  While Peevyhouse has been criticized by scholars for its 
poor legal reasoning, Maute argues the decision had as much to do with 
favoritism as with legalities.  
 The judicial habit of allowing ex parte discussion of cases gave the 
advantage to lawyers who violated the rules.  Justice Berry wrote that the practice 
had become so accepted that lawyers came to expect it and were surprised if 
judges refused to participate.  Lawyers who played by the rules ran a risk; if the 
lawyer failed to discuss the case with the judge outside the courtroom, the other 
side might have done so and defeated him before the trial even began.  Litigants 
also had a choice to make.  If they did not hire a lawyer with political 
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connections, the other side might.  Litigation therefore often became a race to the 
politically-connected lawyer's office. 
 In 1937 the Judicial Administration Section of the American Bar 
Association published the results of its work on minimum suggested standards on 
efficient judicial administration in state courts.  While the ABA obviously could 
not mandate anything to the states, their guidelines set out the feelings of scholars, 
judges, and attorneys on how state courts could most fairly and efficiently 
administer justice.  In 1951, fourteen years after the study, the students of the 
University of Oklahoma's law review studied the ABA recommendations and 
compared them to Oklahoma's practices.  With one exception, the fair selection of 
jurors, Oklahoma's court system failed all the standards.  Oklahoma's practices of 
judicial selection,  judicial partisanship, the lack of a judicial retirement program, 
the judiciary's lack of organization and supervision, its failure to keep meaningful 
statistics, the existence of justice of the peace courts, and the lack of meaningful 
pretrial conferences all fell woefully short of ABA recommendations.
62
 
 In the pages that follow, I introduce and analyze the major players in the 
court scandal.  This review demonstrates that the court scandal did not simply 
arise out of the corruption of a few greedy and politically connected people.  The 
conduct and environment which encouraged such double dealing extends back to 
the state's earliest years and exposes the corruption which was integral to the 
developing political culture of a new state.  The details and personalities of the 
scandal should cause us to reflect back on what Oklahoma politics owed to its 
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southern influences, best expressed in the domination of a Democratic Party 
whose members freely opposed reforms, such as the New Deal, which were key 
to the national Democratic Party's reputation and agenda.  It should also 
demonstrate the state's unfortunate tendency, also inherited from the South's 
political tradition, of looking the other way while important decisions are being 




 One of the most important factors in explaining Oklahoma's judicial 
scandal is an explanation of the deep-seated relationship between powerful private 
interests and public figures.  The largest and most notorious example of this is 
Selected Investments, a company founded in 1929 by Hugh A. Carroll, a 
businessman and former schoolteacher from northwest Oklahoma.   For the most 
part, Selected Investments began with small consumer loans; its advertisements 
during the 1930s urged customers to "borrow to save money" and advertised loans 
"from $50 to $350" at the company's office in downtown Oklahoma City.  
Selected routinely lent on "diamonds, cars, furniture, or other personal property" 
and asked its customers to "get rid of money worries--use our loan plan."
63
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 By the 1940s Selected Investments had become wildly profitable and had 
begun to diversify.  Taking advantage of the Roosevelt-era programs of VA and 
FHA financing, Selected opened a real estate office in growing northwest 
Oklahoma City, selling and renting "good homes, all northwest."
64
  In 1948 the 
company opened a new corporate headquarters across the street from the 
Oklahoma County courthouse, inviting potential investors to visit. 
 While Selected advertised its small loan and real estate businesses heavily, 
the company's most profitable and controversial enterprise involved its investment 
bond program for small investors.  Charging a two per cent per year management 
fee, the company's offer to potential investors was simple:  Selected guaranteed a 
six per cent return on the investment.  Regardless of war, depression, market 
variances, or other economic calamity, a participant who invested $10,000 was 
guaranteed an annual dividend of $600, plus immediate return of the full 
investment on demand. 
 In hindsight, the idea that an investment company could offer guaranteed 
profits at no risk to the customer seems preposterous; one could wonder why 
anyone would fall for such a proposal.  However, a reading of Selected's 
advertising  helps explain the company's appeal.  As the advertisements pointed 
out, by 1947 Selected had delivered on its promises for seventeen years without 
any investor losing a penny.  Selected falsely claimed that all funds were held in 
trust, they were subject to regular audits by public accountants, and that all their 
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bonds were collateralized.  The company emphasized the security of the 
investment, claiming "it's safe--it's cashable--it earns 6%."
65
 
 However, not everyone was enamored with Selected Investments.  Under 
Oklahoma's regulatory system securities were regulated by the office of the bank 
commissioner, which had only two investigators to cover the entire state.  One of 
those investigators was Herschal K. Ross, a former Greer County court clerk who 
had been employed by the banking department for only a few months and lacked 
regulatory experience.  Ross would later become entangled in the affairs of 
Selected Investments.  The other investigator, unfortunately for Selected, was 
Milton B. Cope, a stubborn and persistent lawyer who had worked at the agency 
for several years and was, according to his boss, an "experienced analyst of values 
of securities."
66
  Cope intensely distrusted Selected Investments and, to the extent 
of his limited resources, made it his mission to get to the bottom of the company's 
financial affairs.  
 In February of 1950, the banking commissioner, at Cope's urging, 
suspended Selected Investment's authority to sell securities.  Selected, represented 
by State Senator James Rinehart, immediately went to Oklahoma County district 
court and obtained a temporary restraining order preventing the commissioner 
from acting.  For a year the case simply sat dormant with the restraining order in 
place.  Selected Investments retained its ability to sell securities, but the 
company's position remained precarious. 
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  One of the candidates to succeed outgoing Governor Roy Turner was 
Johnston Murray, the son of Oklahoma's eccentric and controversial former 
Governor William H. "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, a man whose style and politics 
symbolized the strength of Southern political culture in Oklahoma.  William H. 
Murray had chaired the Oklahoma constitutional convention, served as the first 
Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, served in Congress during 
the Wilson administration, founded a failed colony in Bolivia, and become a 
folksy national figure during a term as governor during the Great Depression.  
With his appeal to rural white voters, his odd mannerisms, his unpredictable and 
volatile behavior, and his hatred for big business,  Alfalfa Bill Murray became the 
best-known Oklahoma political figure of his time.
67
 
 Alfalfa Bill's son, Johnston, had taken a circuitous route to the 1950 
governor's race.  After he graduated from what was then known as Murray School 
of Agriculture (named after his father), Johnston and his family joined his father's 
colonial expedition to Bolivia.  After the colony failed, he returned to Oklahoma 
and pursued business ventures in newspapers, cattle, and oil.  In 1946 the forty-
three year old Murray graduated from the Oklahoma City University School of 
Law.
68
  Although he lacked political experience, he entered the field as a 
candidate for governor. 
 Although Murray began as a dark horse, he captured the voting public's 
imagination as the son of Alfalfa Bill and as "just plain folks."  As in other states 
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on the southern part of this borderland, Murray's campaign also drew strength 
from conservatives, anti-New Deal Democrats, and forces opposed the 
legalization of alcohol.
69
  After a bitter and ugly runoff, Murray won the 
Democratic nomination and then narrowly defeated his Republican opponent in 
the general election. 
70
 
 Murray's campaign had needed money, and Selected Investments, under 
attack from the banking commissioner, had helped provide it.  In exchange for 
Murray's promise to get rid of Milton B. Cope, Hugh Carroll had put "four 
figures" into Murray's campaign through William Doenges, a Bartlesville auto 
dealer and former Democratic national committeeman. 
71
  Once in office, Murray 
did not directly fire Cope; instead, that spring Senator George Miskovsky of 
Oklahoma City, who was also an attorney for Selected Investments, introduced a 
bill establishing an Oklahoma Securities Commission and stripping the banking 
commissioner of his securities regulations responsibilities.
72
  Carroll, given the 
chance to address the legislative committee considering the bill, argued that Cope 
was a director in a building and loan company and was therefore prejudiced 
against Carroll.  The solution, therefore, according to Carroll and his supporters, 
was to legislate Cope out of state government.
73
  Miskovsky, who had senatorial 
privilege over appointments in his Oklahoma County district, increased the 
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pressure by refusing to move to confirm his constituent O.B. Mothersead, Cope's 
boss, as head of the state banking department.
74
  Senator James Rinehart, 
Selected's lawyer in the litigation with the banking department, continued to back 
the bill eliminating Cope's job, which of course would end the lawsuit in 
Rinehart's client's favor.  Dissenters pointed out the troublesome promises made 
in Selected's advertising, with one representative comparing the literature to an 
advertisement for patent medicine and arguing, "no banking institution in the 
world can pay six percent as advertised here...This company could go busted."   
Senator Roy Grantham, later the presiding officer in N.B. Johnson's impeachment 
trial, prophetically warned that passage of the bill would "return to haunt the 
senators in a decade."
75
 
 The securities bill became the last bill considered by the 1951 legislature, 
and it was the object of bitter debate.  For unclear reasons, Miskovsky suddenly 
withdrew from the discussion and unsuccessfully moved to kill his own bill.  
Governor Murray publicly took a hands-off approach but strongly supported the 
bill behind the scenes.  Although Doenges denied sponsoring the bill, he and 
Carroll were seen together in Murray's office after the bill passed.  Led by 
Representatives J.D. McCarty and Paul Harkey in the House and Rinehart in the 
Senate, the bill passed both houses in the legislature's last act before adjourning.  
Cope was out of a job, and the investigation of Selected Investments died on the 
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  Herschal Ross assumed Cope's duties; within a few years, Ross's son was 
an employee of Selected Investments, an entity his father regulated. 
 Selected Investments had successfully thrown its money around.  By 
buying influence with the governor and employing lawyer-legislators to represent 
the company, Selected had used the power of the legislature and governor to end a 
governmental investigation into its finances.
77
  Very few people seemed to have 
asked the appropriate questions: how was the company paying a guaranteed six 
per cent return, and had Cope correctly smelled a rat?  Selected continued to do 
business as usual, expanding into real estate and other areas, creating so many 
subsidiary corporations that eventually even Carroll could not keep track of 
them.
78
  The company's corporate interests included ventures in real estate, 
mortgage lending, apartments, home furnishings, automobiles, publishing, variety 
stores, farm stores, a dairy and a factory.
79
  By the time of its fall, Selected itself 
had about ten thousand investors, most of them Oklahomans, with a declared 
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 O.A. Cargill was born in 1885 in rural northern Arkansas. Cargill spent his 
early years living the challenging life of the child of a subsistence farmer.  When 
he was sixteen, Cargill left Arkansas for Stroud, Indian Territory.
81
  A huge and 
physically imposing young man, Cargill worked variously as a muleskinner, ranch 
hand, and storekeeper for a general store which catered almost exclusively to 
members of the Sac and Fox tribe. He also became a justice of the peace, which 
made him interested in the study of law.  He and his wife moved to Oklahoma 
City, where he worked as a streetcar conductor and a police officer until he passed 
the bar in 1916.  
 Sixteen months after becoming a lawyer, Cargill was appointed to the 
office of Oklahoma County Attorney.  While Cargill served as Oklahoma 
County's chief prosecutor, he participated in a horrific lynching.  In August of 
1920, two Oklahoma County police officers , who were outside of their 
jurisdiction, and the owner of a whiskey still were killed in a gun battle in 
neighboring Logan County.  The still owner's son, a young African-American 
man named Claude Chandler, was arrested for the murder of the officers.  
Although his office had no jurisdiction over homicides which had occurred in 
another county, Cargill, claiming the Logan County officials were treating the 
bodies of the deceased officers inappropriately, forcibly seized control of the 
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scene, probably at gunpoint.
82
 He allegedly claimed that a jury composed of 
Logan County residents, which had a higher percentage of African-Americans 
than Oklahoma County, would have acquitted Chandler.  He then ordered 
Chandler placed in the Oklahoma County jail, even though the crime had 
occurred elsewhere.   
 That night Claude Chandler was forcibly taken from the Oklahoma 
County jail and lynched.  The jailer claimed to have been overpowered by three 
armed, unidentified men after the employee had mistakenly unlocked the outside 
door.  A modern-day journalist who has studied the Chandler lynching concluded 
that the person who removed Chandler from the jail was actually a deputy sheriff, 
and Ned Looney, then an Assistant Oklahoma County Attorney and later to be 
Cargill's lifelong friend, colleague, and sometime rival, provided the deputy with 
a phony alibi.  After the disappearance, someone entered the words "N***** lost" 
on the jail log.
83
  The journalist also located a postcard photo of the lynching; the 
card was signed by a person named Ned. 
 Cargill's tenure as county attorney occurred at a terrible time for race 
relations in Oklahoma.  In the 1920s the Ku Klux Klan was one of the leading 
political forces in the state; the organization  had an enormous influence on the 
legislature and the governor's office.  Vigilante justice occurred frequently; the 
day before Chandler's murder, a white man accused of murdering a cab driver had 
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been lynched in Tulsa.  The next year saw the horrendous Tulsa race riot, which 
killed at least 79 people and destroyed the Greenwood neighborhood of the city.
84
  
In Claude Chandler's case, no one was ever brought to justice for his death.  
Claude Chandler's murder was an awful episode in an ugly time; the evidence 
shows Cargill allowed it to happen.   
 In 1923 Cargill was elected mayor of Oklahoma City.  Three years later he 
entered the race for the Democratic nomination for governor.  Although his 
gubernatorial campaign began well, Cargill alienated voters with his heavy-
handed, personal style and his flip-flopping on issues, especially on the subject of 




 Cargill became an extremely successful and wealthy attorney, handling 
important and highly-publicized civil and criminal litigation.  He retained his 
reputation for bombastic behavior in the courtroom, once earning himself a one 
day jail sentence from his future ally Judge Ben Arnold.  He purchased a large 
ranch north of Oklahoma City, which he enjoyed with his family.  The ranch 
produced oil, from which he acquired substantial income.   
 Although he was extremely successful financially, his standing among his 
peers was shaky.  Cargill's reputation took a serious blow in 1939, when he 
accused a shadowy acquaintance, Roy Alford,  of using a false name to break into 
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Cargill's safety deposit box and steal $5,000.  Alford testified at trial that Cargill 
claimed to have bribed two of the three members of the Criminal Court of 
Appeals to hold the state's liquor permit unconstitutional.  Alford also claimed to 
have copies of checks implying Cargill had bribed five Oklahoma City 
councilman to approve settlement of a pollution case.  Although Alford was 
acquitted, he obviously was not very credible, and no investigation ensued.  
However, both the judge and prosecutor indicated they agreed with the jury's 
verdict, which showed that neither of them believed Cargill's testimony.
86
  They 
did not know that by the time of this incident, Cargill had already developed an 




 Nelson Smith Corn was also a product of the frontier.  In 1894, when Corn 
was ten years old, his family moved to Taloga in what is now Dewey County, a 
place which at that time had been open to white settlement for only about ten 
years.
87
  Corn taught school for a few years, then was elected Dewey County 
Clerk in 1922.
88
  Corn wanted to become a lawyer, and through the use of 
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borrowed books and an extension course he passed the bar examination, a method 
of becoming a lawyer which was common at the time.  In 1926 he became Dewey 
County Attorney, an experience which did not go well.  Soon thereafter Corn 
resigned and entered private practice in Taloga.
89
 
 In 1934 Corn announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court from the state's fourth district.  State law allowed 
each party to nominate a candidate for each of the nine Supreme Court seats, 
which were divided into geographic districts.  The candidate was required to live 
in that district.  Voters from the entire state then voted on the nominees in the 
general election.  Justices were elected for six year terms, with the terms 
staggered so that three seats were open each election.   
 Corn's qualifications for the job were questionable.  Although he was fifty 
years old, he had been a lawyer for only about eight years, and he had never been 
a judge.  His experience as a public official included only short periods as Dewey 
County Clerk and Dewey County Attorney.  Nonetheless, Corn won the 
Democratic nomination in a runoff.
90
  In the general election, Corn faced 
Republican incumbent Charles Swindall, who had defeated the Democratic 
incumbent six years earlier in the backlash against the unpopular presidential 
candidacy of Al Smith.
91
  The Supreme Court race drew little public interest and 
had no legal or political issues.  This did not matter; in 1934 the Democrats won 
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every single statewide race, including Corn's.
92
  The Great Depression, so terrible 
for so many, had provided an opportunity for Corn.   
 A year after he assumed the bench, Justice Corn and O.A. Cargill began a 
corrupt business relationship.  As Corn later testified, Cargill called Justice Corn 
and asked him to come to Cargill's law office in downtown Oklahoma City.  At 
the meeting Cargill told Corn he wanted to win his appellate cases by a "fair 
margin" and wanted Corn to act as the sixth vote on opinions.  From that point on, 
according to Corn, Cargill routinely called Justice Corn and told him to "get your 
pencil out."  He then told Corn what case he was calling about and then told him 
to "follow the crowd."   In the early years, Cargill routinely gave Corn $1,000, 
especially at campaign time; Corn later estimated the total amount he received 
early in the relationship to be about $4,500.
93
  In one case, American Savings Life 
v. Loomis, Cargill remarkably called Corn and instructed him to vote against 
Cargill's position.  According to Corn, Cargill explained that he had an agreement 
with the lawyers for the opposing side for the opponents to win.
94
 
 Corn's shocking testimony about his experience with Cargill raises 
questions which will almost certainly never be answered. Why would Cargill call 
Corn, whom he apparently did not know well, and demand that he come to his 
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office to discuss bribery?  When he needed only five votes out of nine, why would 
Cargill risk exposure and imprisonment to get a sixth?  Why would Cargill spend 
money just to get an unnecessary sixth?  On the cases in which he only wanted a 
sixth vote, how did he know he already had five?  How did Cargill know when 
the Court would hear cases and to whom they were assigned?  The conclusion is 
inescapable that Cargill had sources other than Corn inside the court.  
 In the 1940s, in addition to his work as a justice on the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, Corn also operated short-term small loan companies, similar to 
those run by Selected Investments.  These businesses charged what Corn himself 
later termed "usurious interest."  Corn did not publicly disclose his interest in 
these businesses, the propriety of which was very questionable for a full-time 
judge.
95
  Corn also displayed considerably more cash than would seem 
appropriate for a salaried state employee.  From World War II until the banker 
changed jobs in 1952, Corn's banker broke large bills for Corn as often as three or 
four times per month; the source of the money is unclear.
96
 
 Corn successfully ran for re-election in 1940 and 1946, easily defeating 
Republican opponents in the overwhelmingly Democratic general elections.  In 
1952 he survived a scare in the Democratic primary, in which two of his 
colleagues were unseated, before beating his Republican opponent.  Even though 
he won four statewide elections, Corn's work ethic was questionable.  After the 
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exposure of the scandal, Corn's former judicial colleagues discussed his office 
habits.  According to them, Corn "never worked and appeared never to know 
where he was headed."  This is consistent with his later testimony to authorities; 
Justice Corn, despite more than two decades on the state's highest court, seemed 
to have only vague concepts of legal issues and to have little curiosity about the 
cases he was deciding.
97
 
 In April of 1957, N.S. Corn announced his decision to retire from the 
Court.  He had health problems; in early 1957, Corn had undergone surgery for 
colon cancer and had spent three weeks in the hospital, then a substantial period 
of time recovering at home.
98
  At age 73, he faced a re-election fight the next year 
against a younger candidate.  His DUI arrest and other negative publicity he had 
received over the years were problematic.  His re-election campaign would have 
been grueling, with a very good chance that Corn would lose.   
 Corn's decision not to run was made easier by a recent change to the law.  
Until the previous year, a retiring or defeated judge, regardless of age or years of 
service, was simply out of a job and therefore without income.  In 1956, however, 
at Justice Earl Welch's urging, the legislature created a position called 
supernumerary judge, in which a retired judge could accept a reduced salary and 
an office in return for part-time service.  The supernumerary position was 
available only to judges who voluntarily retired from office, not to those who had 
been defeated for re-election.  Had Corn lost his re-election bid in 1958, he 
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therefore would not have been eligible for supernumerary  status.
99
  Corn 
accepted the supernumerary position, and his term expired in January of 1959.  So 
far as the public knew, Corn had ended a long, if unspectacular, career as a jurist.  
His involvement with Selected Investments, which had suffered a very public fall 
the previous year, went temporarily unexposed.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 For its first sixty years of existence as a state, Oklahoma's political 
framework closely traced those of the American South. Although the constitution 
was billed as Progressive, it was the rural, Southern Progressivism of William 
Jennings Bryan that its authors, influenced by the previous decade's Populist 
movement, sought to achieve.  The more urbane version of Progressivism offered 
by Theodore Roosevelt had little appeal for the delegates to the convention.  By 
allowing itself to fall into the ugly trap of segregation, the state's constitutional 
delegates and early legislators squandered an opportunity to create a more modern 
and responsive state government.   
 For the six decades after statehood, the legal system had failed to progress.  
Although the office of JP had long since become obsolete, Oklahoma continued to 
employ JPs; the fee system and lack of professionalism created a black eye for the 
entire judiciary.  Poor pay for county judges and county attorneys led to constant 
turnover for a job with little appeal for experienced lawyers. The system of down-
ballot election of justices and judges provided little or no accountability, making a 
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seat on the bench just another political position, in which the judge owed his 
loyalty to the political party and campaign supporters.  The lines between routine 
legal behavior and favoritism became blurred.  This made the state ripe for 
corruption and its legal system easily exploited by men like Cargill and Corn.   
 The rigid nature of the state's constitution and the conservative nature of 
its officeholders and electorate made reform difficult.  As we shall see in later 
chapters, even after it became obvious that Oklahoma's court system had serious 
flaws, efforts at reform repeatedly failed, despite the fact that the proposals were 
hardly drastic.  Eventually, both parties provided united leadership which led the 
electorate, however grudgingly and hesitantly, to approve needed, meaningful 






THE STATE OF THE COURT 
 
CARGILL, CORN, AND THE INFLUENCE-PEDDLERS 
 
 By the 1950s the Oklahoma Supreme Court had become a center of 
institutionalized corruption.  It was widely believed in the legal community that 
favorable rulings went not to the litigant with the better case but instead to the one 
who had bribed the court.  Most, but by no means all the rumors, involved Corn 
and Cargill in some aspect.  The common thread of the cases was not simply the 
identity of the actors; instead, it was the general atmosphere of illicit, backdoor 
influence on the court by lawyers willing to pay for inappropriate access and 
judges willing to sell it. 
 In 1954 the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. Johnson, a will contest 
involving the large estate of Oklahoma City attorney Dexter G. Johnson.
1
  
Johnson had left a sheet of paper, partly typed and partly in his handwriting, in 
which he had apparently disinherited his brother.  Oklahoma law interprets wills 
strictly.  Written wills must be signed and dated in front of witnesses; holographic 
(handwritten) wills must be entirely in the hand of the person writing the will and 
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must be dated and signed.  Johnson's will did not meet either requirement, and the 
Oklahoma County probate court denied its admission to probate.   
 The Supreme Court had unanimously affirmed the trial court's decision 
and had denied a petition for additional review.  However, in February, 1954, 
after the time for rehearing should have expired and the case final, Justice Ben 
Arnold presented a substitute opinion reversing the trial court and admitting the 
will to probate.  Three months later Fred Suits, the attorney representing the 
family members opposing the will, received a disturbing call from Justice Harry 
Halley.  Halley told Suits that he would lose the Johnson case, explaining that 
O.A. Cargill, who had not previously been involved in the Johnson matter, had 
been "hanging around" Arnold's office on most mornings.  On October 15th a 
substitute opinion admitting Johnson's will, approved by Arnold, Corn, Welch, 
and Johnson was released; on that same day, Arnold, accompanied by his friend 
O.A. Cargill, purchased a new Cadillac at an Oklahoma City dealership.
2
  That 
same week Corn also bought a used Cadillac at a dealership in Coffeyville, 
Kansas.
3
  Only one thing had changed from the time of the opinion denying the 
admission of the will to the release of the revised opinion admitting it eight 
months later: the undisclosed, private involvement of O.A. Cargill.   
 An earlier example of Cargill's way of doing business had occurred in 
1948.  Laura Fleming and her husband had become involved in a dispute over an 
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oil and gas lease with D.L. Kelly, who claimed to be a silent partner of Cargill's 
on the lease.  The Flemings lost their case at the trial level.   After the trial, Kelly 
approached the Flemings, saying that Cargill, who had not participated as an 
attorney in the case, wanted to speak to them without their lawyer being present. 
When they attended the meeting alone, Cargill told them he had "fixed" the 
district judge and also had the supreme court fixed.  Cargill offered the Flemings 
$1,200 for their lease.  The Flemings filed an affidavit detailing the conversation 
with Cargill, then repudiated their own affidavit.  After they repudiated their 




 Cargill was by no means the only influence-peddler doing business at the 
Supreme Court.  Oklahoma City attorney Wayne Bayless, a former justice who 
had been defeated for re-election in 1948 by N.B. Johnson, also took advantage of 
chances to make money for judicial votes.  In 1953 Bayless and Tulsa attorney 
John Wheeler approached Font Allen, a Tulsa lawyer representing a plaintiff in a 
medical negligence case.
5
  Bayless and Wheeler told Allen that he and his client 
needed help with Justices Corn and Arnold.  After the case was affirmed and the 
defendant paid the $73,000 judgment, Bayless and Wheeler demanded $10,000 
from Allen, which Allen paid with $500 bills.
6
   In another instance five years 
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later, Bayless paid Cargill $10,000 for a favorable result in an oil and gas case, 
which Cargill apparently split with Oklahoma City attorney Ned Looney.
7
 
 In 1955 the Court considered the confusing Meadors will case, officially 
styled Battle v. Mason.
8
  In the 1890s, C. F. Meadors, a father of two young 
daughters, had divorced in Arkansas.  Meadors later moved to Oklahoma, 
remarried, and became wealthy.   In 1950, in failing health, Meadors signed a will 
which left $75,000 each to his two daughters, leaving most of his estate to his 
brothers and sisters.  The issue before the court was whether Meadors was 
competent at the time he signed the will.  Ned Looney's firm, which had a close 
relationship with Justice Welch, represented the Meadors brothers and sisters , 
while Cargill represented the Meadors daughters.  At trial Oklahoma County 
District Judge W.A. "Lon" Carlile, later to be on the Supreme Court himself, 
ruled Meadors had been incompetent and refused to admit the will.  Looney 
appealed. 
 As it had the previous year on the Johnson will case, the Court made a fool 
of itself.  Early in 1955, the justices issued an opinion affirming the trial court.   
Later that year, however, the Court reconsidered.  In the meantime, two new 
justices, including Justice Floyd Jackson, had joined the Court.  Cargill drove to 
Purcell to visit Jim Nance, a newspaper publisher and state legislator, and offered 
Nance $10,000 for Jackson's vote.  Nance declined, but for some reason did not 
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tell Jackson or anyone else about the conversation for several years.
9
  Ten years 
after the case was decided, Justice Ben T. Williams testified an unnamed person 
had offered his father, a Stratford mail carrier, a $25,000 "campaign contribution" 
for Williams' vote.   
 Williams and Justice Harry Halley also noticed an inordinate interest in 
the case from both Corn and Justice Ben Arnold.
10
 At approximately this time, 
Arnold and Corn became involved in a physical altercation during a Supreme 
Court conference, an event which became well-known at the capitol. 
11
 Arnold 
had complained that someone was "trying to do something to a friend (Cargill)."  
In the event, Jackson's swing vote changed the result, and, to considerable public 
disgust, the Court reversed its own ruling.  Cargill got the votes of Corn, Welch, 
and Johnson, but lost the case to Looney. 
 
MARSHALL V. AMOS AND THE WESTCOTTS 
 At approximately the same time, the Court was considering Marshall v. 
Amos, a Cleveland County case which involved eight producing oil wells worth 
several million dollars.   H.G. Marshall, an unsavory Nocona, Texas oil promoter, 
had lost his case in the trial court.  Through Cargill's daughter and son-in-law, 
Marshall had become casually acquainted with Cargill, who convinced Marshall 
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he needed "insurance" with the Supreme Court.
12
  Through Titus Haffa, a Chicago 
oilman who was Marshall's financial backer, Marshall and Cargill arranged a 
$30,000 fee for Cargill, payable to Cargill only upon reversal by the Supreme 
Court.  On April 20, 1956, Haffa wrote a letter to Cargill confirming the 
arrangement.  On July 13th Haffa wrote a second letter, stating the $30,000 was to 
be paid in cash.
13
  Cargill's interest in Marshall v. Amos was not disclosed; he 
made no court appearance, nor did he write a brief or do any other legitimate legal 
work. 
 Cargill called Corn at his office and told the justice he had $25,000 to be 
divided six ways if Corn would vote for an opinion reversing the trial court.  
Cargill told Corn he already had the votes of "the two Indians" (Welch and 
Johnson), Davison, Halley, and Blackbird.  According to Corn, Cargill claimed he 
had an attorney from Tulsa taking care of Halley, a lawyer from Bristow for 
Blackbird, and that Cargill himself would take care of Davison, Welch, and 
Johnson.
14
  If Cargill indeed made this statement to Corn, he was lying; no 
credible misconduct claims were ever raised against Justices Blackbird, Halley, 
and Davison. On June 5, 1956, the Court issued its opinion reversing the trial 
court and awarding the oil and gas interests to Marshall.
15
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 Shortly after the release of the opinion in Marshall v. Amos, Harlan 
Grimes, a lawyer who had not been involved in the case to that point, published a 
pamphlet claiming Cargill and Marshall had conspired to bribe various members 
of the Court.
16
  In 1959 Grimes filed a $5 million federal court suit on behalf of 
Amos, alleging Haffa and the Marshalls had paid Cargill $30,000 for the bribery.  
Cargill responded by calling the case an "unfortunate joke," adding that he hoped 
the Court would not get any unfavorable publicity from Grimes's claims.  
Although his allegations later proved to be relatively accurate, Grimes had no 
evidence with which to support his claim, and within six weeks U.S. District 
Judge Ross Rizley had dismissed it, deeming it frivolous.
17
 
 Within four months, Grimes found himself the subject of a highly 
publicized disbarment proceeding, in which the final decision on whether Grimes 
would keep his law license would be made by the same Supreme Court Grimes 
had accused of bribery.  At first Grimes seemed to be going down fighting; he 
demanded a public hearing and vowed to resist disbarment.  However, Grimes 
apparently changed his mind before the hearing; on August 1, 1959, he failed to 
appear at the hearing, instead offering his resignation by phone.  On March 8, 
1960,  the Supreme Court, disregarding the proffered resignation, disbarred 
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 In 1958 Cargill also became involved in an appeal involving his daughter, 
Otha Westcott, and her husband Harold.  The Westcotts owned Oklahoma 
Company, an oil company through which Harold had allegedly defrauded his 
investors by overcharging for drilling and leasing expenses.  The credibility of the 
company and its officers deteriorated so badly that a Washington County judge 
appointed a receiver to take over its management.  Florida law enforcement were 
also investigating the company's business practices.  
 Cargill intervened, once again calling Corn and offering him $7,500 for a 
reversal of the trial court's order.  Corn, in separate conversations with Welch and 
Johnson, agreed to buy their votes for $2,500 each.  The embattled but indiscreet 
Westcott offered to sell a lucrative oil and gas lease to a family friend, saying he 
needed the money to purchase votes from Justices Welch, Johnson, and Carlile.
19
  
On December 2, 1958, just a month before the terms of Corn and Carlile expired, 
the Court reversed the trial judge.
20
  The Court's vote was five to four; the 
majority consisted of Corn, Welch, Carlile, Johnson, and Davison.  After the 
ruling became final, Cargill again phoned Corn, who had moved to a 
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supernumerary judge office in the state capitol.  Corn picked up the money from 





BRIBERY AND THE SELECTED INVESTMENTS DECISION 
 Although Governor Murray had ended the banking commissioner's inquiry 
into the affairs of Selected Investments, the company continued to battle another 
state agency, the Oklahoma Tax Commission, over the corporate status of the 
companies.  Selected claimed the primary company consisted of two different 
entities, one for the management of the trust and a separate company managing 
the rest of the company and its income.  The commission took a different view, 
contending Selected Investments was in truth only one company.  The financial 
stakes were tremendous; a loss in the Supreme Court would cost Selected about 
$560,000.  Oklahoma County Judge Albert Hunt ruled in favor of the tax 
commission, a result which threatened ruin for Selected.
22
  The Internal Revenue 
Service was also watching the case; if Selected lost, it would also face a 
backbreaking debt to the federal government.   
 Selected appealed Judge Hunt's ruling to the Supreme Court.  After the 
appeal was filed, Hugh Carroll called Justice Corn, whom he had known from 
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their years in Taloga, and told the justice he wanted to discuss something, a 
comment Corn undoubtedly took to mean his pending case.  Corn and Carroll 
went to dinner at Glen's, a steakhouse in northwest Oklahoma City.  After dinner 
they returned to Corn's house and discussed Carroll's problem in Carroll's car.  
When Justice Corn asked Carroll how much a favorable result meant to him, 
Carroll told him it was worth $150,000.  Corn expressed interest in fixing the 
case, telling Carroll he would "see some of the other boys."  Corn declined 
Carroll's offer of a down payment.
23
  Corn was so staggered by the amount of 
money Carroll had offered that a few days later he wrote the $150,000 down on a 
piece of paper, went to Carroll's office in downtown Oklahoma City, and showed 




 The offer was indeed astounding; $150,000 in 1956 was worth more than 
$1,300,000 in 2016.
25
  Corn had not told Carroll how he proposed to accomplish 
the reversal, nor did Carroll ask.  Corn agreed to commit this serious crime with 
no down payment from Carroll; both men agreed to act entirely on faith.  Corn 
had no way of knowing if Carroll even had access to that amount of money.  The 
conspirators never offered an explanation regarding why Carroll approached Corn 
in the first place; the public record shows Corn and Carroll had only been casually 
acquainted from their mutual Taloga ties many years previously.  As we have 
seen, however, the word was out regarding corruption in the Supreme Court. 
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 Having accepted Carroll's proposal, Corn visited N.B. Johnson at 
Johnson's office in the capitol.  Corn told Johnson that he had known Carroll for 
many years, and that he could get Johnson $7,500 in exchange for his vote on an 
opinion favorable to Selected.  Johnson told Corn that he did not know if an 
opinion reversing the trial court could be written, but Johnson indicated he would 
go along if he could do so.
26
  Corn then called on Justice Welch separately and 
had a similar conversation with Welch, who also agreed to the scheme.  At no 
time did Corn, Welch, and Johnson discuss the plan together; all of Corn's 
conversations were one-on-one talks with the other participants.  Corn did not tell 
the other justices the amount of money he was to get from Carroll, implying that 
he was to get $7,500 as well. 
 Still unsure of how many votes he had, Corn called O.A. Cargill, who had 
not been involved in the Selected Investments case up to that point.  Corn believed 
Cargill could influence the vote of Justice W.A. "Lon" Carlile, who had been 
appointed to the Court's Oklahoma County seat after the deaths of Justice Ben 
Arnold and, shortly thereafter, Justice Albert Hunt.  After Hunt's death, Ned 
Looney had recommended to Governor Raymond Gary that he appoint Carlile to 
fill the vacancy.   
   William A. Berry, who defeated Carlile in 1958, described Justice Carlile 
as a "nice old man, genuine and outgoing, well-liked by everybody, but not really 
much of a factor on the court."  According to Berry, Carlile's major weakness as a 
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judge was his tendency to be loyal to old friends, which colored his objectivity.
27
  
Corn offered $2,500 to Cargill if he could persuade Carlile to vote for reversal.  
Cargill told Corn that Carlile would vote any way Cargill told him to vote.
28
 
 A few days after their conversation about Carlile's vote, Cargill phoned 
Justice Corn and told him Carlile would vote for reversal.  Corn and Carlile never 
discussed Selected Investments privately.  No hard evidence exists of any 
financial irregularity by Carlile; it is likely that Cargill duped Carlile into voting 
for reversal, then pocketed the $2,500 for himself.  Carlile apparently did not 
become curious why Cargill had contacted him about a case in which he was not 
representing anyone; Cargill certainly would not have told Carlile he was being 
paid by, of all people, another justice.  Carlile's conduct is a textbook example of 
the dangers of the then-common practice of judges allowing ex parte discussion of 
cases pending before them.  Although he violated judicial rules, it is unlikely that 
Carlile committed a crime.  Nevertheless, Corn now was assured of four votes; on 
a court of nine justices, he only needed five. 
 Carroll and Corn had concocted a lucrative scheme.  For the promise of 
$17,500 ($7,500 each to Johnson and Welch and $2,500 to Cargill for Carlile's 
vote), Corn stood to receive $150,000, a profit of $132,500.  Carroll also expected 
a profit.  Having paid Corn nothing before the Court's opinion, Carroll had 
nothing to lose.  If he lost the case, Selected owed the tax commission what it had 
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already been ordered to pay.  If Selected won, Carroll had promised $150,000 to 
save $560,000. 
 Selected's appeal remained undecided for several months.  Although no 
witness specifically said so, this time frame coincides with Corn's hospitalization 
and recovery from colon cancer.
29
  As the Chief Justice, Earl Welch would have 
set the court's calendar.
30
  It therefore seems probable that Welch held the case 
until Corn's return.  
 On March 12, 1957, the Oklahoma Supreme Court handed down its ruling 
on Selected Investments v. Oklahoma Tax Commission.  The majority opinion 
was written by Chief Justice Earl Welch and was supported by five other justices, 
including Corn, Johnson, and Carlile.  While the opinion is very difficult to 
understand, the author and the concurring justices held that Selected Investments 
Corporation and Selected Investments Trust Fund were separate, although closely 
related entities, and therefore should not be treated as one large taxpaying 
company.
31
 The Tax Commission requested a rehearing, which was denied on 
April 2nd.  Selected Investments had won.   
 On April 20, 1957, Corn called Hugh Carroll at his office and told him the 
mandate to the district court ordering the reversal was coming down.  Carroll told 
Corn he was unprepared to pay the entire $150,000.  Corn asked Carroll if he 
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could pay $25,000, which Carroll agreed to pay from his personal account.  Corn 
then called Johnson and Welch and asked them to remain at the capitol after 
working hours.  Corn drove to Carroll's office; Carroll entered Corn's car, then 
placed $25,000 in Corn's glove compartment.
32
   Corn then drove directly back to 
the capitol, went to Johnson's office, and handed him $7,500 in $100 bills, which 




 On April 24th Carroll, without corporate authorization, borrowed 
$200,000 from the Selected Investments trust fund, the fund which had the duty to 
pay investors.  A vice-president of the First National Bank wrote to Brinks, 
authorizing them to deliver $200,000 cash to Carroll's office; Carroll signed a 
receipt from the Brinks driver that morning.
34
  Carroll then called Corn and told 
him to come to his office, where he paid the remaining $125,000 to Corn.  Carroll 
then used the rest of the investor money to repay himself the $25,000 he had 
previously paid Corn and retained $50,000 for himself.
35
 
 Thanks to O.A. Cargill, Corn had been illegally supplementing his income 
for years.  However, he had never handled anything approaching this amount of 
money, which created a new problem.  The $132,500 he had cleared from the 
Selected bribery was nearly ten times his annual salary; what could he do with the 
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money without raising suspicion and exposing his own graft?  For obvious 
reasons he could not pay cash for a home, a car, or other tangible personal 
property.  Corn therefore stashed the money in all sorts of unusual places; he hid 
some in his locker at the Lincoln Park golf course, some in filing cabinets in his 
home and his office, and still more in a fruit jar in his backyard.
36
 
 Corn gambled  much of the money away.  He also lent at least $6,000 to 
his son Lonnie.  He went to Las Vegas, where he lost about $10,000, and to a 
racetrack in Phoenix.  In the summer of 1957, Corn returned to Las Vegas with 
his family and lost about $15,000 on that trip.  The next winter he went to Hot 





THE BANKRUPTCY OF SELECTED INVESTMENTS 
 The expensive and illegal resolution of its litigation with the Oklahoma 
Tax Commission did not end the financial problems of Selected Investments.  The 
federal tax court was about to rule against the company, making it liable for 
indebtedness to the IRS.
38
  The combination of the impossible promises the 
company had made, the lavish lifestyles the executives maintained, and 
embezzlement took their toll.  On December 8, 1957, only eight months after he 
had paid the bribe money, Carroll wrote his investors a letter notifying them the 
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company would not be able to honor its pledge of six percent return and 
proposing an unspecified "reorganization."  Carroll's letter put certificate holders 
on the defensive, giving them until January 8th to accept or reject the company's 
vague plan.  In the meantime the dividends were not paid, and certificate holders 
were in peril of losing their entire investment.
39
 
 Besieged by calls from panicked constituents and alarmed by Carroll's 
arbitrary January deadline, the Oklahoma legislature, which had previously turned 
a blind eye to the shortcomings of Selected Investments, sprang into action with a 
vengeance.  On December 23rd, disregarding the holiday season, a hastily 
convened legislative committee met to discuss the matter.  Although they had 
promised to appear at the meeting, Carroll and two of the company's top 
executives, J. Phil Burns and Linwood Neal, did not show up.  Carroll sent Paul 
Washington, his attorney and son-in-law, to appear in his stead, leaving the 
hapless Washington to try to explain the absence of the corporate officers by 
claiming they were waiting on an audit and, of all things, processing an 
application with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to sell securities 
throughout the country. 
 At the December 23rd meeting, legislators concentrated their fire on the 
beleaguered Herschal K. Ross, the director of the Oklahoma Securities 
Commission and the man who had replaced Milton Cope six years previously.  
Under Ross's leadership the securities commission had become the epitome of a 
regulatory agency captured by those it was charged with regulating.  Claiming 
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lack of investigators, Ross had simply sat on his hands.  Ross's son Ronald 
worked for Selected's small loan department, and Carroll and Ross were social 
friends.  Although Ross claimed his agency had little authority, legislators pointed 
out that he had never complained to them about this problem.  To make things 
worse, the securities commission's attorney member had resigned several years 
previously, but Ross had not reported this fact to Governor Gary, so the post had 
remained vacant.
40
  Ross was on his way out, as he had obviously not done the job 
of protecting Oklahoma investors from unsound or unscrupulous business 
practices. 
 However, there was something disingenuous about the criticism Ross was 
receiving from the legislature.  Ross had seen what had happened to M.B. Cope 
six years earlier; Cope's active and aggressive criticism of Selected Investments 
had bought him a one-way ticket out of state government, courtesy of the 
legislature.  On the Selected Investments case, Ross had done what he 
undoubtedly thought the legislature had expected him to do--very little. 
 Although its authority to issue subpoenas was questionable, the legislative 
committee issued orders to appear on January 2nd to Carroll, corporate sales 
executive J. Phil Burns, trustee Linwood Neal, and corporate auditor Harold 
Hedges.  Governor Gary appeared at the meeting, but the corporate officers did 
not, claiming the legislature lacked authority to issue subpoenas outside of a 
regular legislative session.  Washington tried to buy time, suggesting his client 
would give its investors more time to decide on how to vote on the company's 
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  The next day, at Gary's insistence, the securities 
commission suspended Selected Investment's authority to sell securities.
42
  Ross 




 With Selected's legal situation deteriorating daily, Corn had been talking 
separately with Cargill and Carroll.  At Corn's insistence Carroll hired O.A. 
Cargill, whom he had never met, as the company's attorney.
44
  Carroll also asked 
Corn to return the bribe money, presumably to help cover up the shortage to 
investigators.  The next day Corn returned $33,000 in $100 bills, explaining to 




 When the securities commission hearing convened on January 7th, Cargill 
accompanied Carroll and Linwood Neal to the hearing.  Cargill told the two 
commissioners, one of whom was Herschal Ross, his clients needed more time to 
prepare their testimony.  When the commissioners refused, Cargill and his clients 
walked out of the hearing.  At Governor Gary's insistence, the commissioners 
then cited Carroll and Neal for contempt, an action the commission would be 
required to urge in Oklahoma County district court.  
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 Cargill beat them to the punch.  He walked directly to the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court and urged them to order the district court to give him more time.  
Although Cargill had not even filed his appeal until after 3:00 p.m., Chief Justice 
Welch called an immediate hearing, which occurred late that afternoon.  Ignoring 
the inconvenient fact that the shareholder certificates had already been dishonored 
by his client, Cargill told the Court the commission's actions would cause panic, 
comparing it to a run on a bank.  After a short recess, the Court granted Cargill 
ten days in which to file a brief and the opposing side five days to respond.  
Cargill had thus, without any testimony, achieved from the Supreme Court what 
he wanted--delay.
46
   
 The next day an Oklahoma City couple who were investors in the 
company filed a suit in Oklahoma County district court, asking the court to 
appoint a receiver for the company.
47
  An order granting receivership would have 
legal significance in two ways.  First, it would take control of the corporation 
away from Carroll, Burns, and the other top executives and replace them with 
someone appointed and supervised by the judge.  Second, under federal 
bankruptcy law the appointment of a receiver constituted an act of involuntary 
bankruptcy.  Once a receiver had been appointed, the company's creditors could 
force Selected Investments into federal bankruptcy, regardless of whether the 
corporate directors agreed with the decision.  There were two advantages for 
creditors to be in bankruptcy court: the greater likelihood of some return on the 
creditors' investments under court control, and, with federal courts having priority 
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over state courts, the ability to bypass state courts, including state appellate 
courts.  If Selected Investments went into bankruptcy, neither the district court nor 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court could protect the company any longer. 
 On January 9th an Oklahoma County judge appointed Oklahoma City 
attorney George Shirk as receiver for Selected.
48
  Shirk's appointment infuriated 
the plaintiffs, as he had represented Selected at one time; the next month Shirk 
disclosed that Selected  was also financing a proposed shopping center in which 
Shirk held stock.  The judge appointed three additional receivers, who hired 
Luther Bohanon, a future federal judge, to represent them.
49
  Bohanon remained 
in the case throughout and proved to be a capable match for Selected Investments.   
 On Thursday, February 27th, the other shoe dropped for Selected 
Investments.  Six creditors filed a petition in involuntary bankruptcy.  The case 
was assigned to U.S. District Judge Stephen Chandler, who scheduled a hearing 
for the following Monday, leaving Selected one business day and the weekend to 
prepare for federal court.  At the hearing on March 3rd, attended by numerous 
contentious attorneys representing angry investors, Chandler declared the 
companies bankrupt and appointed Oklahoma City attorney Paul Duncan as 
trustee of the companies.  Because federal courts have priority over state courts, 
the bankruptcy brought the state district court litigation to a halt.  At the hearing, 
Judge Chandler expressed great concern for the investors, worrying openly about 
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certificate holders who were "widows and orphans" and about investors who 
needed the money to buy food.
50
 
 Cargill and Carroll had excellent reason to be leery of Judge Chandler. 
Even in the eccentric Oklahoma legal world of the 1950s, Chandler stood out.  
Chandler had been nominated to the federal bench in 1940 to fill one of three 
Oklahoma federal judgeships which happened to be open at the same time.  The 
Justice Department took exception to Chandler's nomination; he had little 
courtroom experience, he had a shaky reputation as a business operator, and he 
had settled a civil assault case leveled against him by a stenographer.  When the 
objections to Chandler threatened the other two nominations, A.P. Murrah, who 
had just been promoted to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, intervened and 
persuaded U.S. Senator Elmer Thomas to consider Chandler's candidacy 
separately.  This caused a delay of nearly two years in Chandler's confirmation 
and led to a bitter, lifelong feud with Murrah.
51
 
 By the time of the Selected Investments case, Judge Chandler had 
developed a perpetual and irrational fear for his life.  He was convinced his 
enemies were tapping his phones, trying to poison his water carafe, or bomb his 
car.  The only person allowed to have Chandler's personal phone number was the 
U.S. District Court Clerk.  A caller wishing to contact Chandler would call the 
clerk, who would then call Chandler's phone and allow the phone to ring a 
predetermined number of times.  She would then call back, tell Chandler who was 
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calling, and Chandler would return the call.
52
  In later years Chandler would bar 
the United States Attorney and his assistants from practicing in the Western 
District, have his caseload temporarily removed by the Tenth Circuit, and be 
unsuccessfully prosecuted for conspiring to build a private road with public funds 
for a subdivision he was building.  Chandler's behavior took him to the highest 
levels of the federal government; the U.S. Supreme Court considered and 
overturned his suspension by the Tenth Circuit, and his feuds with his fellow 
judges brought investigation by the U.S. House Judiciary Committee.
53
 
 After the exposure of the Supreme Court scandal, Chandler became 
convinced that W.H. "Pat" O'Bryan, one of Selected Investment's attorneys, had 
tried to perpetrate a fraud on the court in submitting a claim in excess of $1 
million for services rendered.  Chandler denied the claim, disbarred O'Bryan from 
practicing in the Western District of Oklahoma, and began a campaign to 
persuade prosecutors to indict O'Bryan.   In August of 1965, Chandler, a sitting 
judge, inaccurately told a newspaper that O'Bryan was "an accomplice if not the 
mastermind" of the Selected Investments bribery.  O'Bryan retaliated with a libel 
suit against Chandler, which resulted in a judgment in favor of O'Bryan.  The 
parties battled each other in a succession of federal and state appellate courts for 
years, until the Tenth Circuit eventually ruled in Chandler's favor.
54
   
 Carroll and Cargill now had serious problems.  The company was in 
bankruptcy court with an unpredictable, volatile, and vindictive judge who had 
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already publicly expressed his disdain for them.  Bad news kept coming.  On 
March 7th, at trustee Paul Duncan's request, Chandler froze all the assets of the 
corporate officers, including Hugh and Julia Carroll, and ordered them into a 
hearing on March 17th.  Duncan also fired all the corporate officers. 
55
 
 Cargill and Carroll faced court on March 17th.  Over the weekend, Hugh 
and Julia Carroll went to Cargill's ranch north of Oklahoma City to discuss the 
case.
56
  Carroll told Cargill about the $150,000 bribe to Justice Corn the previous 
year.  Cargill, without telling Carroll about his role in obtaining Carlile's vote, 
simply told his client that Cargill could have handled the bribe for less money.  
 Somehow Carroll would have to explain the $200,000 expenditure in 
court.  Cargill refused to allow Carroll to consider taking the Fifth Amendment on 
the subject and instead insisted that Carroll testify to a different, more creative 
version of the facts.  Apparently after discussing a vacation home the Carrolls 
owned in Canada, Cargill and Carroll concocted a lie about Carroll's lending the 
money to Pierre Laval, a fictional French-Canadian oilman who then disappeared 
with the money.  Julia Carroll, who had taken a serious dislike to Cargill, strongly 




 At the hearing on March 17th, Carroll indeed testified that he gave the 
money to one Pierre Laval, an oil speculator whom he had met at Lake of the 
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  Because the transaction took place in Canada, according to 
Carroll's testimony, a check was not acceptable, so he had cashed a check in 
Oklahoma and then flown to Canada to meet with Laval.  Laval did not sign a 
promissory note, and no paperwork was exchanged.  Carroll testified he did not 
get an address or phone number for Laval; he had given the Canadian man the 
money, and Laval had simply disappeared, leaving Carroll to feel he had "bought 
the Brooklyn Bridge."  At the same hearing, Selected's sales director admitted that 
he had withdrawn his own money from Selected Investments the previous July, 




 The next week the public heard more about the financial affairs of 
Selected Investments.  Paul Duncan, the bankruptcy trustee, subpoenaed Robert O. 
Cunningham, an Oklahoma City legislator who had opposed the company in the 
1951 dispute with Cope.  Things had changed, however, in the subsequent years; 
Cunningham had borrowed over $600,000 from the company to finance a 
telephone directory business.  The business had failed, and Selected  had written 
off about $400,000 of Cunningham's debt without making a serious effort to 
collect it.  The trustee also established that Carroll and his son-in-law William 
Rigg, who was a vice-president of Selected, had pocketed payments from the City 
of Oklahoma City intended for Selected on a residential development.   
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 By March 27th the bankruptcy hearings had confirmed what everyone had 
suspected.  The corporate officers of Selected Investments had taken investor 
money and not invested it at all.  Instead, they had paid the promised returns with 
money from new investors, squandering hundreds of thousands of dollars on 
exorbitant compensation for employees, personal expenses, and ill-advised and 
sleazy business ventures.  By the next year Carroll and Burns were in a federal 
penitentiary.  Even while incarcerated, Carroll stuck to the Pierre Laval fiction 
and kept the secret of the bribery.  Fortunately, through the efforts of the 
bankruptcy attorneys, the investors of Selected Investments recovered about two-





 The shocking corruption in the Oklahoma Supreme Court reveals critical  
problems with Oklahoma's governmental structure in the 1950s, which originated 
in the weak architecture provided in the state's constitution.  The delegates of the 
constitutional convention, who had provided such detail in the regulation of 
railroads and corporations, had created a governmental structure which was 
minimal in its design and substance.  This made it all too easy for private parties 
to manipulate or avoid public institutions vested with oversight responsibility.   
 At the Supreme Court level, cases were decided by who was the higher 
bidder, not who had the better case.  As the Selected Investments case illustrates, 
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the trial courts allowed unreasonable delay; in the face of investigation, Selected  
had only to go to the district court.  The case would just stop, and Selected would 
proceed with business as usual.  The Supreme Court scandal reveals the worst 
aspects of Oklahoma's government of the time, where corruption, indolence, and 






PROSECUTION AND THE SEEDS OF REFORM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The years 1965 through 1967 were a period of shock for Oklahoma's body 
politic, especially its legal community.  The Supreme Court scandal gradually 
came to public light.  With each new disclosure, the magnitude of the corruption 
became more and more obvious.  Although proposals for large-scale reform 
initially met with vociferous resistance from the legislature, it gradually became 
obvious that something must be done.  In 1967, through imaginative and 
politically astute legislating, voters approved judicial reform.  The next three 
chapters will describe the slow, contentious, and halting process through which 
Oklahoma finally improved its judicial system.   
 
REFORM GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATIVE RESISTANCE 
   After the late 1950s, the controversy over Selected Investments gradually 
fell out of the public eye.  Hugh Carroll and Phil Burns went to federal prison and 
served their sentences; so far as the public knew, the case was over.  Although the 
82 
 
Selected Investments case itself no longer occupied the public's attention, 
Oklahomans had become disillusioned and dissatisfied with the insider-friendly 
nature of their state government.  The state also became more urban, and residents 
of the more populous areas resented the control rural politicians exhibited at the 
capitol. 
 In 1958 thirty-three year-old J. Howard Edmondson, astutely and 
effectively employing the new medium of television, swept into office on a 
reform platform.  Edmondson advocated modernization in nearly every aspect of 
state government, including reform in highway administration, a merit system for 
selection of state employees, central purchasing of state equipment and supplies, 
the abolition of prohibition, and removal of secondary offices from the ballot.
1
  
The new governor's platform and the election of a young outsider like Edmondson 
constituted important breaks with the rural Southern populism which had 
dominated the state for its first half-century.  In addition to his platform, 
Edmondson's urbane style contrasted greatly with his immediate two 
predecessors, Raymond Gary and Johnston Murray.  
 Surprisingly, Edmondson's gubernatorial papers show little or no 
discussion of judicial reform.
2
  Edmondson was an attorney and would have been 
aware of the rumors regarding the Supreme Court.  However, the scandal would 
not be exposed until after Edmondson left office, and Edmondson already had a 
lot on his plate.  Edmondson was only able to achieve the repeal of prohibition by, 
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among other things, well-publicized raids of country clubs, which were illegally 
selling alcohol to members and their guests.  This and his battle for passage of a 
merit system for hiring state employees took an enormous political toll.  It 
therefore seems likely that Edmondson allowed court reform, which had not yet 
captured the public imagination, to take a back seat to his other proposals.  
 Although Edmondson had entered office with high hopes and riding a 
wave of public approval, neither he nor the electorate had anticipated the 
Oklahoma legislature's power to resist his plans.
3
  While Edmondson was able to 
enact the repeal of prohibition, central purchasing, and the merit system, he 
quickly lost control of the Democratic party to the rural, conservative majority in 
the legislature.  Edmondson could blame himself for part of the problem; he and 
his aides had unnecessarily alienated legislators and others with their brash style, 
youthful arrogance, and disregard for tradition and protocol.  By the end of his 
term, the conservative legislature had completely overwhelmed Edmondson, who 
survived the repeal of the newly-passed merit system only with the assistance of 
House Speaker J.D. McCarty.
4
  Despite his overwhelming election victory and 
early successes, Governor Edmondson could not overcome the resistance to 
reform in the legislature.  However voters felt about Edmondson's administration, 
they remained restive and receptive to the possibility of major change.   
 In 1962, traditionally Democratic Oklahoma voters again expressed their 
dissatisfaction with their state government by electing Billings farmer Henry 
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Bellmon as the state's first Republican governor, providing another chink in the 
armor of the dominance of rural Democrats.  As the state chairman of the 
Oklahoma Republican party, Bellmon had energized his troops by naming new 
leadership and appealing to younger, urban voters.  Bellmon exploited hostility 
and contention among the Democrats, swamping W.P. Bill Atkinson, the 
millionaire developer of Midwest City, who had narrowly defeated former 
Governor Raymond Gary in a bitter runoff for the Democratic nomination.
5
  In his 
term Bellmon would also encounter frustration with the Democratic legislature 
and clash bitterly with Speaker McCarty. 
 
PROSECUTION OF N.S. CORN 
 Although the public controversy had died down as a public issue, the 
federal government had not forgotten about Selected Investments, the missing 
$200,000 at the hands of the mysterious and elusive Pierre Laval, and the 
Supreme Court's bewildering and suspicious decision in favor of Selected.  
Spurred by a tip that two justices were evading federal income taxes, B. Andrew 
Potter, the United States Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma, and the 
IRS continued to investigate.
6
  Although he originally had insufficient evidence 
with which to justify a prosecution, Potter continued to pursue Hugh Carroll, who 
had been released from federal prison.  In March of 1964, enticed with the 
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possibility of a pardon from the Justice Department, Carroll finally spoke with the 
IRS.  Potter began to present his case to a federal grand jury the next month.
7
 
 N.S. Corn and Earl Welch were feeling pressure from the IRS and Potter.  
Corn had quietly dealt with the IRS since at least 1962, and had privately 
indicated to the authorities that, if indicted, he would not contest criminal charges.  
Between the summers of 1962 and 1963, Corn, still serving as a supernumerary 
judge for the Oklahoma Supreme Court, paid the government nearly $20,000 in 




 In the meantime, the relationship between Corn and Cargill finally 
ruptured.  At Cargill's suggestion, Corn had retained Oklahoma City tax attorney 
John Speck to represent him in his troubles with the IRS.  According to Corn, 
Speck and Cargill contacted Corn and indicated his problems with the IRS would 
go away for $20,000, implying they had bribed an IRS agent.  Corn concluded 
Speck and Cargill were trying to scam him.  Corn later claimed he had angrily 
refused the offer and ended his attorney-client relationship with Speck.  Whatever 




 U.S. District Judge Roy Harper of St. Louis presided over the grand jury.  
Harper, a former small-town lawyer, was a veteran of Democratic Party politics in 
Missouri, where he had been the chairman of the state party.  In 1947 President 
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Truman, a fellow Missourian, appointed him to the federal bench.  After the local 
judges recused themselves, Harper was sent to Oklahoma in January, 1964, to 
hear what he thought would be one case:  W.H. "Pat" O'Bryan's libel suit against 
Judge Chandler, which had arisen from O'Bryan's claim for a million dollar fee in 
the Selected Investments bankruptcy.  As it happened, Harper was assigned to 




 On April 6, 1964, the federal grand jury began hearing from witnesses 
who knew about the financial affairs of Corn and Welch, including Hugh Carroll 
and Welch's ex-wife Fern.  The next day Welch himself appeared and testified for 
about two hours, then continued his testimony for most of the next day.  After 
Welch's testimony concluded, the grand jury indicted both Corn and Welch on 
five charges each of income tax evasion.  The next day Welch released a 
statement strongly denying his guilt and any inappropriate involvement with 
Selected Investments.
11
  Two weeks later, Corn and Welch appeared in Oklahoma 
City federal court; Welch pleaded not guilty and successfully demanded his trial 
be moved to the Eastern District of Oklahoma, where he officially lived.  When 
Justice Corn's turn came before the bench, Corn and his attorney attempted to 
plead "no defense," citing concerns for the eighty year-old defendant's health.
12
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Judge Harper refused to hear Corn's plea of "no defense", and Corn's attorney then 
entered a not guilty plea for his client.
13
 
 On July 1st, Corn reappeared before Judge Harper, this time pleading nolo 
contendre to evading taxes for the years 1956, 1958, and 1959 and to filing false 
returns for two of those years.  Corn's lawyer, James Eagleton, insisted to the 
judge that Corn was guilty only of technical violations of the law.  Eagleton stuck 
to Corn's statements to the IRS agents: that he had earned his undeclared income 
from winnings on poker with players he declined to identify and from gambling 
on horse races.  According to Eagleton, the only reason for his client's no contest 
plea was his ill health and his physical inability to stand trial.
14
  This was too 
much for U.S. Attorney B. Andrew Potter; after clearing the action with U.S. 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Potter responded by telling the Court that 
Corn had taken a $150,000 bribe.
15
 This bombshell announcement was the first 
notice to the general public of corruption allegations against the Supreme Court.  
After Potter's statement Harper immediately sentenced Corn to a term of eighteen 
months but set another hearing to determine whether Corn was physically able to 
withstand incarceration. 
 N.S. Corn was now a convicted felon sentenced to prison.  He was also a 
supernumerary judge for the Oklahoma Supreme Court, drawing a salary of 
$9,374 per year from the Oklahoma taxpayers.  This fact illustrated a glaring 
weakness in Oklahoma's political structure which would be exposed in the cases 
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of all three justices: the inability to discipline or terminate corrupt or incompetent 
officials.  N.S. Corn, no longer an elected justice, was a salaried supernumerary 
judge appointed by the governor with case assignments determined by the 
supreme court.  Nevertheless, neither the governor nor the justices had the power 
to terminate him.  Only the legislature, which would not convene until the next 
year, could remove Corn by the expensive and time-consuming avenue of 
impeachment. 
 Chief Justice W.H. Blackbird telephoned Corn on the day of his plea and 
demanded his resignation.  Corn stalled Blackbird, stating he would think about 
the subject for a few days.  Blackbird admitted to an interviewer that he did not 
know what the court would do if Corn refused to resign.  In the meantime, Potter's 
disclosure, with the implication that other justices, still unnamed, may have been 
involved in a bribery scheme, cast an intolerable shadow on the reputation of the 
Supreme Court and those justices who were innocent of any wrongdoing.
16
 
 Even before Corn's plea, reform groups had been calling for greater 
judicial accountability.  In November of 1963, a group led by lawyers and 
University of Oklahoma law professor Maurice Merrill formed Oklahoma 
Institute for Justice, Inc., a nonprofit corporation dedicated to the enactment of a 
court on the judiciary and judicial selection reform.
17
  By April the group had 
hired an Oklahoma Baptist University professor as its fulltime director and had 
prepared State Question 415, a constitutional amendment directing the 
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establishment of a court on the judiciary.
18
  The movement gained momentum 
after Corn's highly publicized plea and sentencing.
19
 
 On July 4th, Corn finally resigned his position as supernumerary judge.
20
  
His failure to resign from the Oklahoma Bar Association led to a chaotic and 
hastily-called meeting of the leadership of the bar association and the Supreme 
Court.  Wielding a cigar, Justice Welch, who had himself been indicted the 
previous week, attended the meeting, claiming it was "best to lay these things on 
the table."
21
  Justice Johnson, whose involvement in the scandal was not yet 
public knowledge, also attended. 
 After the meeting ended with a general agreement that the OBA should 
begin disbarment proceedings against Corn, Justice Welch called Floyd Rheam, a 
Tulsa attorney who had chaired the meeting, and told Rheam that Corn would 
resign from the bar.  Rheam went directly to Corn's home.  When Rheam entered 
the residence, he noticed Earl Welch standing in a back room.  Corn handed 
Rheam a handwritten resignation letter.  In a voice that Welch could easily hear, 
Corn then told Rheam "to tell the Executive Council (of the OBA) that I never 
gave money to a judge or any member of the Supreme Court for any purpose."
22
 
 Investigations of judicial misconduct now came from everywhere.  In 
addition to Welch's criminal case scheduled for trial in October, Governor 
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Bellmon, calling Corn's plea "sickening and despicable corruption in the highest 
judicial court of our state," directed Dale Cook, his legal aid and a future federal 
judge, to undertake his own inquiry.  Oklahoma County Attorney James Harrod 
announced the possibility of a grand jury probe into the matter.  The Oklahoma 
Bar Association appointed a committee of three attorneys to investigate the case 
as well.
23
  Over the Harrod's objection, who pointed out the inconsistency of the 
Supreme Court granting subpoena power to investigate itself, the Supreme Court 
granted subpoena power to the OBA investigators.
24
  In September Governor 
Bellmon appointed still another panel, this one composed of non-lawyers and 
charged with serving as a watchdog over the bar committee.
25
 
 On July 29th, having received an inconclusive medical report on Corn's 
physical ability to withstand incarceration, Judge Harper ordered the defendant 
transported to prison.  A veteran of the tough world of Missouri politics, Harper 
seemed not to be particularly shocked by Corn's crimes and demonstrated 
considerable sensitivity to Corn's medical condition.  Even though he admitted he 
had no judicial authority to select where Corn would be incarcerated, he did it 
anyway.  Judge Harper arranged for Corn to be housed at the federal facility for 
infirm inmates in Springfield, Missouri, and ordered the federal marshal to bypass 
transporting Corn to the county jail, having the marshal pick up his prisoner at 
Corn's home.  Harper also told the parties that if there was any change in Corn's 
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medical condition within the next sixty days, that the parties should let him know 
and he would "return this man to his home... Because as I said, this isn't the death 
penalty."  He also authorized the federal parole board to parole Corn at any time it 
deemed appropriate.  Corn cryptically told a reporter that the result of the hearing 
was "the best thing."
26
  The marshal took Corn to Springfield,  and he began his 
term on that day. 
 It was true that Corn was eighty years old.  He was also frail, having 
survived a serious heart attack and colon cancer.  Nevertheless, the undisputed 
facts were that an Oklahoma Supreme Court justice had drastically understated 
his income to the IRS, then failed to disclose the source of the money.  Corn 
neither confirmed nor denied the government's alarming assertion that he had 
received a large bribe; instead, he remained silent.  Under these circumstances, 
Judge Harper's solicitous attitude toward Corn, the chief suspect in a huge bribery 
case, seems unusually accommodating.  Had Harper pressured Corn harder, the 
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THE TRIAL  OF EARL WELCH 
 Judge Harper's next Oklahoma assignment was the trial of Justice Welch, 
which began on October 5, 1964, in Muskogee.
27
  Born in 1892, Earl Welch had 
grown up in small towns in the Choctaw Nation, in what is now southeastern 
Oklahoma.  Welch's father and grandfather had been lawyers, and Welch spent 
much of his childhood around their small town law offices.  Although he had 
attended law school at the University of Oklahoma, financial reasons forced him 
to leave prior to graduation.  Instead, he read for the bar privately at his father's 
and grandfather's offices, then successfully sat for the bar examination.  In 1911 
Welch became a lawyer and established his practice in his home area of Antlers, a 
small town in southeastern Oklahoma.
28
 
 During his years in private practice, Welch became involved in the murky 
and morally questionable business of trading in Indian land.
29
  Much of this 
business was conducted in cash, a practice which, along with Welch's excessive 
spending financed through mysterious infusions of currency, would become an 
issue at Welch's trial fifty years later.
30
  Despite his claims many years after the 
fact, Welch and his wife Fern lived frugally during their twenty years in Antlers. 
While Welch was in private practice, he did his own janitorial and stenographic 
work.  The family lived in a modest, sparsely furnished home, where they raised 
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their own vegetables.  For several years, especially in the 1920s, they did not own 
a car.  They never entertained.
31
  It seems clear that during Welch's private 
practice years in Antlers, he was only moderately financially successful. 
 In 1926 Welch was elected district judge for his district in southeastern 
Oklahoma.  Six years later, he announced his candidacy for the Democratic 
nomination  for the Oklahoma Supreme Court, opposing incumbent Earl Lester 
for the southeastern Oklahoma seat.  The 1932 campaign proved to be an 
exception to the rule that judicial races were issueless: the issue in this election 
was Governor William H. Murray, whose megalomania, eccentric behavior, 
intolerance of dissent, and misuse of martial law had exhausted his goodwill with 
Oklahoma voters.  Murray endorsed Lester; in a rebuke of Murray, incumbents 
statewide were defeated for reelection.
32
  Lester was among the incumbents to 
fall, and Welch became a member of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in January, 
1933.  As a member of the Chickasaw nation, Welch became the first enrolled 
Native American to sit on any state's highest court.
33
 
 There is no evidence of extraordinary spending by Welch in his early 
years on the court.
34
  In the late 1940s, however, Welch began an intimate 
relationship with Ruby Myers, and Justice Welch became the primary, if not sole, 
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source of financial support for Ruby.  Ruby rented an apartment next to her sister 
and brother-in-law, Ophia and W.S. Taylor, on North Robinson in Oklahoma 
City.  Welch was a frequent visitor to Ruby's apartment; although Ruby had no 
employment or other source of income, her rent was always promptly paid.
35
  In 
1953 Ruby and the Taylors bought a home in that same neighborhood; Welch had 
looked at the home with the potential buyers and later attended the closing on the 
property.
36
  Taylor paid $6,000 down for the home, although the retired airline 
employee's income was only $76.80 per month from social security.  Ruby Myers 
also paid about $1,800 as a down payment, the money having come from an 
unexplained source.  During the late 1950s, the Taylors moved to Arizona for two 
years; despite their absence, Ruby, although she was unemployed, was able to 
make the payments on the home.
37
 
 In December of 1958, Fern and Earl Welch divorced.  On June 27, 1959, 
one week after the divorce became final, Welch and Ruby Myers married in Las 
Vegas.
38
  Investigators later learned that during the late 1950s, Ruby spent 
approximately $3,800 at Balliet's, a fashionable Oklahoma City women's clothing 
store.  Most of the bills were paid personally by Ruby's sister, Ophia Taylor, in 
one hundred bills, with no explanation being provided for the source of the 
money.
39
  Suspiciously, for many years Welch had kept a safety deposit box at the 
First National Bank of Oklahoma City.  Between 1956 and 1960 Welch entered 
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the safety deposit box ten to twelve times per year, activities which Welch could 
not explain several years later.
40
 
 In 1962 the Internal Revenue Service began looking into Welch's finances.  
An investigator scheduled an interview with Welch for May 17th.  Bank records 
later revealed that Welch entered his safety deposit box on that very day.  The 
agent made another appointment with Justice Welch on August 29th; Welch 
opened the box on the next day, August 30th.
41
  Like the unusual number of 
entries into the safety deposit box, Welch later had no explanation for his entries 
into the box at times so closely related to his appointments with the IRS.   
 Welch's criminal trial, which began in Muskogee on October 5, 1964, was 
a strange event, which became more notable for the evidence which the jury did 
not hear, rather than what the jury heard in court.  Everyone knew the true issue:  
the government believed Welch had been supplementing his income by accepting 
bribes, including in the Selected Investments case.  He had been using the bribe 
money, according to the government, to maintain both his households in a 
relatively comfortable, although not elaborate, way.  However, the jurors never 
heard any testimony to prove this theory. 
 The prosecution's case had serious flaws.  Hugh Carroll, fearful of further 
prosecution, had made a complete statement to the authorities regarding his role 
in the Selected bribery.  However, Carroll had never dealt with Welch; his only 
knowledge of Corn's purchase of Welch's vote came from Corn.  Carroll could 
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testify that he had bribed Corn; he could not testify that he had bribed Welch, only 
that he had ultimately received Welch's vote.  As for Corn, he had been sentenced 
to prison after his no contest plea to tax evasion; he had admitted only to the tax 
improprieties, not bribery.  Corn had not been charged with accepting the bribes, 
nor had he yet made any admission to law enforcement authorities on that subject.   
 The case against Welch which the jurors heard amounted to this: Welch 
had overspent his income without a valid explanation,  had given misleading 
statements to investigators,  had suspiciously entered his safety deposit box, and 
had made an inordinate number of expenditures in cash, especially one hundred 
dollar bills.  The government's case was methodical and tedious, going all the way 
back to Welch's opening his law office in 1911, using business records to 
demonstrate the extent to which Welch had overspent his income.
42
  V.P. Crowe, 
Welch's tough and capable lawyer, implied that Welch had earned large sums of 
cash dealing in the unethical and immoral business of early Oklahoma Indian land 
titles.  According to Crowe's theory, Welch had simply taken the cash with him 
when he moved to Oklahoma City in 1932, leaving it in his safety deposit box and 
taking some of the money from time to time.  
 Outside of the jury's hearing, completely different issues arose.  On the 
fifth day of the trial, the government called Corn, who had been returned to 
Muskogee from the federal prison in Springfield, Missouri to testify.  Judge 
Harper sent the jury out of the courtroom and heard Corn's testimony by himself.  
The feeble and disheveled Corn, who had not been prosecuted or charged directly 
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for any bribery case, invoked the Fifth Amendment seventeen times.
43
  The next 
day Hugh Carroll, the former president of Selected Investments, testified, also 
outside the presence of the jury.  For the first time, the story of the Selected bribe 
came out publicly in the words of a participant.  However, since Carroll had not 
dealt directly with Welch in any way, Judge Harper ruled his testimony 
inadmissible against Welch. 
44
   
 On October 19th, after deliberating less than two hours, the jury convicted 
Welch on all counts.
45
  When he appeared for his sentencing three weeks later,  
Welch strongly denied taking any bribe at any time in his career and pleaded for 
leniency on behalf of his wife and his disabled son.  Judge Harper sentenced 
Welch to three years imprisonment on each case, with the sentences to run at the 
same time, and to pay fines totaling $13,500. Harper authorized prison authorities 
to parole Welch at any time they deemed appropriate and allowed Welch to 
remain free on bond pending his appeal of his conviction.
46
   
 The judge took the opportunity to blast Welch's supporters, who had been 
contacting the jurors in an attempt to obtain information with which to impeach 
the jury's verdict.  Curiously, Harper stated from the bench that he had "never 
seen a simpler tax case" or "seen one with less actual defense."
47
  Unfortunately, 
Harper did not require Welch to resign his judicial post in order to remain free on 
                                                          
43
 Citing Corn's precarious health, Harper allowed Corn to stay in a hotel, rather than being 
housed in jail.  Oklahoman, October 10, 1964, p.1.  
44
 Oklahoman, October 13, 1964, p.1. 
45
 Oklahoman, October 20, 1964, p.1  
46
 U.S. v. Welch, 27158-CR, Eastern District of Oklahoma, sentencing hearing, November 13, 
1964.   
47
 McAlester News-Capital, November 13, 1964, p.1.   
98 
 
bond, which would have avoided considerable expense and misery for 
Oklahoma's legislature.  
 
THE FAILURE OF STATE QUESTION 415 
 On October 21st, the day after Welch's conviction, Governor Bellmon 
announced that he was considering calling a special session of the legislature to 
impeach Justice Welch, who, despite having been found guilty of a felony, 
remained a duly elected member of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
48
   Bellmon 
qualified his remarks by endorsing State Question 415, the proposed 
constitutional amendment establishing a court on the judiciary, which was set to 
be voted on by the electorate on the November 3rd general election ballot.
49
  The 
governor indicated that the special session would not be necessary if the voters 
passed the constitutional amendment. 
 Supporters of the state question establishing the court on the judiciary had 
reason to be cautiously optimistic.  Bellmon spoke strongly in favor of it.
50
  
Almost every newspaper in the state heartily endorsed the measure, with the 
powerful Daily Oklahoman and Tulsa Tribune being particularly forceful in 
backing the amendment.  The Tribune, the newspaper which probably most 
enthusiastically supported the measure, entitled one editorial, "If Not Now, 
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  Smaller papers, like the Norman Transcript and the Daily Ardmoreite, 
also urged their readers to vote in favor of SQ 415.
52
  The Cleveland County Bar 
Association sent speakers to civic clubs urging the amendment's passage, with 
one local trial judge pointing out to his audience the logic of a reform which "is 
free," the only expense to taxpayers being mileage and meal expense.
53
  The 
Garfield County Bar Association purchased a full page advertisement in the Enid 
newspaper endorsing the proposal.
54
  It was difficult to find a good reason to 
support the idea of retaining convicted judges in office, so SQ 415 encountered no 
significant opposition from the general public or the statewide press. 
 However, SQ 415's backers also recognized two significant problems with 
its passage.  The first roadblock, which proved to be overwhelming, was the silent 
vote.  All political pundits predicted a heavy turnout for the 1964 election, which 
featured the presidential election between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater 
and a hotly contested U.S. Senate contest between Democrat Fred R. Harris and 
Republican Bud Wilkinson.
55
  Oklahoma's constitution provided that any 
amendment must pass by a majority of all votes cast, not simply those voting on 
that particular measure.  If a voter voted for president or U.S. senate and failed to 
vote on SQ 415, that vote therefore counted as a "no" vote.  In a year like 1964, 
this "silent vote" could kill the state question.  
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 SQ 415 also happened to have been placed on the ballot with six other 
state questions.  The questions appeared on the ballot in numerical order, with 415 
appearing just behind a spectacularly unpopular proposal to increase legislative 
salaries.  Two controversial education measures also appeared, strongly endorsed 
by the Oklahoma Education Association and Speaker McCarty and vociferously 
opposed by Governor Bellmon.  In order to secure approval of SQ 415, its backers 
would have the burden of educating voters about the pressing need to remove 
corrupt judges and to navigate through the minefields of the federal elections and 
the distraction caused by the other state questions. 
 Oklahoma's 1964 general election turnout was indeed very high.  
Oklahoma voters voted 56 percent for Johnson; Goldwater only narrowly carried 
traditionally Republican Tulsa County while losing conservative Oklahoma 
County.  Johnson's margin of victory in the state, which exceeded 110,000 votes,  
helped carry the young and energetic Fred R. Harris, who had campaigned on his 
close relationship to the White House, to a victory over Bud Wilkinson, the 
articulate and popular former Oklahoma Sooner football coach.
56
 
 State Question 415 failed.  Although 397,823 voters approved the measure 
and 370,604 voted against it, the high turnout and the silent vote defeated SQ 
415.
57
  Since 949,330 Oklahomans went to the polls, 474,666 votes had been 
necessary in order to obtain a majority of all votes.  State Question 415, although 
it did better than all the other state questions on the ballot and won majorities in 
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nineteen counties, including the most populous ones, therefore came nowhere 
close to passage.    
 The failure of SQ 415 also illustrates the instinctive and inherent 
opposition of Oklahomans to political change.  Even in the midst of an enormous 
judicial  scandal and without organized opposition, forty-eight percent of those 
who actually voted on the proposal cast their ballots against it.  A combination of 
Oklahoma's anti-reform constitutional structure and general public skepticism 
killed State Question 415, and the court on the judiciary was not approved.  
 After the election, the Tulsa Tribune, the newspaper which had pushed so 
hard for 415's enactment, blamed the proposal's defeat on the confusing nature of 
the ballot and on the silent vote, reasonably arguing, "Who could possibly have 
opposed State Question 415?"  State Senator Dewey Bartlett, who was to be 
elected governor in 1966, also advocated the elimination of the silent vote.
58
  
Oklahoma voters finally abolished the silent vote in 1974.
59
 
 Governor Bellmon, frustrated by the fact that Justice Welch remained in 
office and on the public payroll, strongly considered convening a special session 
of the legislature for the purpose of impeaching and removing Welch.  Both 
McCarty and incoming Senate Pro Tempore Clem McSpadden opposed the idea, 
pointing out that by the time the special session could be called the regular session 
would be only six weeks away.  In this case McCarty and McSpadden proved to 
be the cooler heads, and Bellmon did not call the legislature into special session.  
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The future of Justice Welch as a member of the court would become the 
reapportioned 1965 legislature's problem.
60
 
 On December 10th the Oklahoma Supreme Court took the symbolic, if 
superfluous, step of suspending Welch's law license, finding that Welch's felony 
conviction barred him from practicing law.  As Welch himself pointed out, he had 
been legally barred from practicing law since 1927 by the fact of his holding 
judicial office.   Under Oklahoma law, therefore, even though Welch was no 
longer even a licensed attorney, he remained a member of the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, the same body which had suspended his license.  He received his salary 
and remained a full, if inactive,  justice.
61
 
 Meanwhile, N.S. Corn was using his testimony as a bargaining chip for his 
release from prison.  On December 2nd, at the suggestion of IRS attorney Willard 
McBride, outgoing Oklahoma County Attorney James Harrod and an assistant 
drove to the federal prison for infirm inmates in Springfield, Missouri to speak to 
Corn about the possibility of Corn's making a statement to the authorities.  Corn 
told Harrod he would cooperate on the conditions that his statement remain 
confidential with no copies made, and that his family be protected.  Harrod agreed 
to those conditions, although he almost certainly had no legal authority to agree to 
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the confidentiality provision and would prove to have trouble living up to that 
commitment.
62
   
 On December 9th, U.S. Attorney B. Andrew Potter, Harrod, several 
government attorneys, Corn's attorney Dick Fowler, and a court reporter traveled 
to Springfield.  Corn gave the lawyers an exhaustive, eighty-two page statement, 
in which he outlined the details of the bribery scandal.  Nine days later, having 
served only four months in prison, Corn was released on parole.  In exchange for 
Corn's statement and anticipated testimony, Harrod, who was leaving office in 
three weeks, assured Corn of immunity from state prosecution.
63
   
 While the fact that Corn had given a statement to law enforcement soon 
became public, the authorities originally honored their confidentiality agreement 
with Corn, and the specific contents of his confession remained undisclosed and 
unavailable.
64
  On January 5th, Corn testified before a closed Oklahoma Bar 
Association committee investigating the scandal.  This testimony also remained 
private.
65
  Harrod later considered his confidentiality promise to be moot when a 
law school classmate employed by O.A. Cargill showed him a letter Corn had 
written Cargill, which said in part, "Dear O.A., Don't mess with my family.  I've 
told them everything."  Corn, who had demanded the confidentiality, had violated 
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the requirement himself. 
66
  As it happened, Corn's statement remained 
confidential for only a few weeks.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 By the end of 1964, therefore, the story of the scandal was gradually 
unfolding, and it was now obvious Oklahoma had a serious problem with the 
integrity of its judiciary.    Corn and Welch had been convicted.  Carroll had told 
authorities about his part in the Selected Investments bribery.  Corn had also given 
a statement to the authorities, although its contents remained secret.  Those voters 
who had chosen to vote on State Question 415 had narrowly approved the 
measure, although the silent vote had assured the defeat of the proposal for a court 
on the judiciary.  Although no one realized it at the time, the 1965 legislative 
session would prove to be critical in exposing the extent of Oklahoma's problems 
with its judicial system.  
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THE REAPPORTIONED LEGISLATURE 
 
 On January 5th, the 1965 Oklahoma legislature convened.  Governor 
Bellmon delivered his State of the State address, proposing a program he called 
Operation Giant Stride, which included an extensive list of proposed reforms, 
including highways, education, mental health, welfare, congressional redistricting, 
and public safety.  Bellmon, who only two months earlier, had wanted to call a 
special session for the express purpose of impeaching Justice Welch, for some 
reason did not mention Welch's curious status, nor did he give any attention to the 
state's court system.
1
  Bellmon may have been trying to avoid early conflict with 
Speaker McCarty, who had predicted tough sledding for the movement to 
impeach Welch, noting that Welch's case remained on appeal and citing a general 
lack of legislative enthusiasm for the project.
2
 
 Because of recent rulings from the United States Supreme Court, the 
makeup of the Oklahoma legislature differed drastically from previous 
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legislatures.  As the country became more and more urbanized in the mid-
twentieth century, state legislatures, which were dominated by rural areas, had 
become less representative of the population.   Although many states, including 
Oklahoma,  had constitutional or statutory requirements that the legislature 
reapportion itself periodically, state legislators tended to ignore those mandates, 
which would diminish the power of rural legislators and, in many cases, reallocate 
their seats to urban areas.   By the 1940s, legislative reapportionment had become 
a major issue in American politics and law. 
 In 1946 the United States Supreme Court considered the matter in 
Colegrove v. Green, which involved a challenge to the apportionment of the 
Illinois legislature.
3
  The Court determined that apportionment of legislatures was 
a political issue to be determined by the states and not an issue which could be 
determined by the courts.  Justice Felix Frankfurter, the conservative author of the 
opinion, famously declared, "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket."  
Sixteen years later the Supreme Court entered the thicket with a vengeance.  
 By 1962 the political times had changed, as had the makeup of the Court.  
The 1960 election of John F. Kennedy also meant that a more liberal Department 
of Justice took an active and aggressive role in challenging failure to reapportion; 
the Department of Justice assigned future Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox to 
take the lead for the government.  The case at issue was Baker v. Carr, in which 
well-financed and aggressive attorneys for the plaintiffs challenged the makeup of 
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  Following the precedent of Colegrove, the district 
court and the circuit court of appeals had ruled that the courts had no jurisdiction 
in the matter.   Under the U.S. Supreme Court rules, four justices were required to 
accept the case for argument in order for it to be heard at that level.  When liberal 
Justices Earl Warren, Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and William Brennan 
voted to accept the case, the subject of reapportionment was again before the 
Court. 
  Baker v. Carr proved to be extremely controversial and saw bitter 
infighting within the Supreme Court itself, with Justice Frankfurter forcefully 
lobbying his colleagues to rule the courts did not have jurisdiction.  The Court 
was so divided that at the request of Justice Potter Stewart, who was undecided, 
the Court heard oral argument twice.  The pressure grew so great that Justice 
Charles Evans Whittaker, who had been suffering from severe depression, entered 
the hospital and retired from the Court before the vote.  Justice Tom Clark told 
Frankfurter he would prepare an opinion denying jurisdiction, then changed his 
mind about the case and voted for the plaintiffs.  Eventually, in an opinion written 
by Brennan, the Court ruled that legislative apportionment involved the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the law and was 
therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.
5
 
 As Frankfurter had predicted, Baker v. Carr opened the floodgates to 
Supreme Court litigation, and the Court received petitions from cases involving 
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several states, including Colorado, Delaware, Alabama, Maryland, New York, 
and Virginia.
6
  In 1964 the Court considered a resolution to these cases with the 
Alabama case, Reynolds v. Sims.  On June 15, 1964, Chief Justice Warren read 
the Court's opinion.  Warren compared malapportionment to the practice of 
allowing some residents to vote five or ten times, then famously stated 
"Legislators represent people, not trees or acres.  Legislators are elected by voters, 
not farms or cities or economic interests."  According to the Supreme Court, the 
Fourteenth Amendment required that state legislatures be apportioned according 
to population.  The opinion also barred the practice of some states, including 
Oklahoma, of guaranteeing at least one representative per county.
7
 
 The Court's decision forcing reapportionment of state legislatures met with 
considerable resistance from those who objected to the expansion of federal 
power, especially judicial power, at the expense of the states.  Presidential 
candidate Barry Goldwater vociferously objected to the ruling.  The Republican 
Party registered their objection to the ruling in the party's 1964 platform, 
endorsing the idea of a constitutional amendment allowing states to apportion one 
house of bicameral legislatures "on bases of their choosing, including factors 
other than population."
8
   A proposal to support the Court's decisions in the 
Democratic Party platform was killed by Representative Carl Albert, the majority 
leader of the U.S. House, who represented elected a rural Oklahoma district.
9
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 The leader of the opposition to the apportionment decisions was Illinois 
Senator Everett Dirksen, the minority leader of the U.S. Senate.  At considerable 
political cost, Dirksen had just helped end a filibuster to the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and negotiated the successful passage of the civil rights bill which was acceptable 
to most Senate Republicans.  However, to a native of the small town of Pekin, 
Illinois, the reapportionment cases constituted a threat to the political power and 
autonomy of rural America.  The issue also provided Dirksen an opportunity to 
mend fences with the Goldwater wing of the Republican Party.   
 Dirksen introduced a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
allowing each state to apportion one house of their legislatures in a manner they 
deemed appropriate.  He also proposed a bill to delay the implementation of the 
reapportionment decision, a constitutionally dubious move which came very close 
to passage but was eventually killed by a filibuster led by liberal Democrat Paul 
Douglas, Dirksen's fellow Illinois senator.
10
  Dirksen then proposed new 
legislation which would allow state voters to decide the composition of their own 
legislature, a bill which also nearly passed the Senate.
11
  Eventually Dirksen 
refocused his efforts on states calling for a constitutional convention to remedy 
the problem, an effort which came within one state of ratification of adoption.  
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 Oklahoma's experience with legislative apportionment had been bitter.  
Although the state's constitution required the legislature to be reapportioned every 
ten years, the House of Representatives had not reapportioned itself since 1921, 
and the Senate had never done so.
13
  Political scientists ranked Oklahoma forty-
seventh of the fifty states in terms of malapportionment, leaving only three states 
more unrepresentative.
14
  In 1956 the legislature considered reapportionment, but 
its passage was blocked by the rurally-oriented Governor Raymond Gary.  Gary's 
successor,  J. Howard Edmondson, favored reapportioning one legislative house 
on area and the other on population, but the proposal did not become law.   
 In the early 1960s two separate reapportionment measures were submitted 
to Oklahoma voters; both proposals failed.  Until ordered to do so by the courts, 
the State Election Board, led by an Edmondson appointee and a Republican, 
refused to accept legislative filings for the 1962 election, claiming the 
unconstitutionality of the body's makeup.  In the general election of that year, 
Edmondson submitted a proposal creating an administrative commission to 
handle reapportionment.  Edmondson had planned to call a special election for the 
reapportionment proposal, but the idea of a special election was killed by the 
courts. Although a majority of voters cast their ballots in favor of the proposal in 
the general election, the measure was killed by the silent vote. 
  The pressure from the U.S. Supreme Court finally led to reapportionment 
in Oklahoma. The federal court ordered the Oklahoma legislature to reapportion 
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itself equitably by March 8, 1963, a deadline the legislature met with a half-
hearted effort which still allowed for disproportionate representation and was 
overturned by the federal courts.  The state Supreme Court then issued a plan, 
which deviated only slightly from the original legislative plan.  In May, 1964, the 
state voted for legislators running for office under the Supreme Court's plan.  
  The next month the United States Supreme Court upheld the power of the 
federal court to supervise reapportionment in Oklahoma.  The federal court 
vacated the May election results and ordered a new election for September under 
districts apportioned under a plan it approved.
15
  The urban districts in the plan 
were drawn by Patience Latting, a future Oklahoma City mayor who had an 
advanced degree in statistics and had been active in the reapportionment 
movement through her involvement with the League of Women Voters.
16
 This 
plan prevailed, and the 1965 legislature was composed of these districts.    
 As a result, the 1965 legislature differed drastically from its predecessors.  
More than half of the 1963 legislature did not return for the next session.
17
  The 
guarantee of one representative per county in the House of Representatives was 
gone, replaced by numbered districts which often included more than one county.  
The previous legislature had been composed of 119 members of the House of 
Representatives and 36 senators; the 1965 version contained 99 members of the 
House of Representatives and 46 senators.  In 1963 Oklahoma County and Tulsa 
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County had been represented by only one senator each, with Oklahoma County 
having seven members of the House.  The 1965 version had nine senators from 
Oklahoma County and seven from Tulsa.  Eighteen members of the House of 
Representatives represented Oklahoma County, with fifteen from Tulsa.  For the 
first time since 1910, the legislature contained African-American members.   
 From the standpoint of representation by political party, the legislature 
barely changed.  The 1963 session had been composed of 86.4 percent 
Democratic Party membership in the Senate and 79.8 percent in the House.  The 
30th legislature convened in January of 1965 with 85.4 percent Democratic 
membership in the Senate and 77.8 percent Democratic affiliation in the House.  
In a 1987 study political scientists Gary W. Copeland and Jean G. McDonald 
studied the effects of reapportionment on the Oklahoma legislature.  Copeland 
and McDonald concluded that although Republicans entered more races, became 
more competitive, and garnered more votes in 1964, their efforts did not result in 
a significant increase in wins for Republicans.
18
  In a 1972 study, another scholar, 
Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, expressed surprise that urban legislators did not have a 
more immediate impact on the legislative process, attributing this to the fact that 
most legislative leadership remained in rural hands.
19
 Nevertheless, the 
conclusion is inescapable: the legislature had become more urban and less 
friendly to rural interests.   The entry of new membership into both houses, who 
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by the fact that they had obtained seats in the legislature had benefited from 
change, enlarged the constituency for reform. 
 
PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE THE LEADERSHIP 
 Although it was clear the Democratic legislative leadership wanted 
nothing to do with the issue of Justice Welch's removal from the Court, events 
were moving beyond leadership's control.  On January 4th, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court had begun its new term.  Although he had not been participating 
in court business since his indictment, Earl Welch appeared in the Court's 
conference room and cryptically announced, "I don't think I had better attend the 
conference, but I will tell you how you can dispose of cases where you won't need 
my vote."  Welch's unsolicited appearance and breezy attitude infuriated Justice 
William A. Berry, who had defeated Lon Carlile for the Oklahoma County seat on 
the court six years earlier.  Berry stormed out of the meeting, announcing that he 
would not participate in conferences attended by Welch.  A reporter for the 




 On the evening of January 12th, eight days after the incident with Welch, 
Berry received a telephone call at his home from U.S. District Judge Stephen 
Chandler, the eccentric judge who had heard the Selected Investments bankruptcy 
case and had heard the preposterous Pierre Laval testimony from Hugh Carroll.  
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Chandler, whom Berry considered an acquaintance but by no means a friend, 
asked Berry to come to Chandler's home in northwest Oklahoma City 
immediately.  When Berry arrived, he found a nervous Chandler waiting for him.  
Upon Berry's entering the residence, Chandler, known for being obsessed with 
security, bolted several locks, then handed Berry a copy of the eighty-four page 
statement N.S. Corn had given to U.S. Attorney B. Andrew Potter and Oklahoma 
County Attorney James Harrod the previous month.  Although the statement's 
existence had become public knowledge, its contents had remained undisclosed.  
Chandler did not explain where he had received a copy of Corn's statement, but it 
was obvious to Berry that it was indeed from Corn.  Corn's statement included his 
involvement with O.A. Cargill, his solicitation of the bribe in the Selected 
Investments appeal, and his acceptance of a bribe in Marshall v. Amos.  He also 
described his sharing the bribe money with Welch and Justice N.B. Johnson, who 
was still sitting on the court and whose name had not yet been linked to the 
scandal. 
 After Berry had read and digested Corn's claim, Chandler asked Berry 
what he intended to do about the statement.  Berry responded with the obvious, 
asking the judge why Chandler himself couldn't do something.  Chandler told 
Berry that as a federal judge his hands were tied; the federal court had no 
jurisdiction, and that any action would have to come from the state courts.   This 
explanation was nonsense.  Not only did the federal courts have jurisdiction over 
the scandal, the federal courts had been asserting it all along; both Welch and 
Corn had been convicted in federal court of evading federal income taxes.  The 
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prosecutors, most of whom were federal employees, had taken Corn's statement at 
a federal correctional facility from a federal prisoner.
21
 
 A question not addressed by Justice Berry in his memoir on the scandal is 
how and why Chandler obtained the statement in the first place.  It was 
extraordinary that a sitting judge had obtained, much less accepted, a sensitive 
document from a prosecutor's file.  Chandler was no friend of prosecutors, and 
whoever had leaked the statement to him had done so surreptitiously and in 
violation of government policy.  Although it is hard to decipher the unusual mind 
of Stephen Chandler, it seems probable that he passed the statement on to Berry in 
order to remain anonymous and to protect the source of the document.  It also 
seems logical that he picked Berry because of Berry's well-publicized antipathy 
toward Welch. 
 Having been handed a hot potato, Berry now debated what to do with the 
statement.  He decided that if the statement were to be made public knowledge, 
the person releasing it must be someone who had legal immunity from a libel 
suit.
22
  This led Berry to the legislature, whose members were immune from suit 
for any statement made on the floor during a legislative session.  After the first 
legislator failed to return his calls, he turned to G.T. Blankenship, a Republican 
legislator-attorney from Oklahoma City.  Berry called Blankenship and asked him 
to come to his home.  Blankenship read the statement; astounded and horrified, 
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Blankenship immediately agreed to announce its existence on the House floor and 
to summarize its contents. 
23
 
 On Thursday, January 21, 1965, after the House Rules Committee had 
again announced a delay in the Welch impeachment, Blankenship rose and asked 
for the floor for a matter of personal privilege.  Blankenship began his remarks by 
stating his concerns as a legislator and lawyer for what he was going to say.  Next 
to a house of worship, he said, courtrooms were the epitome of sacred institutions.  
He declared that honest judges deserved to have the tarnish to their reputations 
removed and outlined the importance of public confidence in the judicial process.  
Blankenship then told the House he had seen a copy of Corn's statement, that 
Corn had admitted to accepting bribes in Selected Investments and Marshall v. 
Amos, and that Welch and N.B. Johnson had also been involved.  Blankenship 
did not name O.A. Cargill, instead stating that "a certain lawyer" he called "Mister 
X" had been involved in the illegal relationship with Corn.  While Blankenship 
did not vouch for the truth of Corn's statement, he pointed out that there was no 
question that Corn had made these claims.  It was therefore, according to 
Blankenship, the duty of the legislature to investigate, renew the public's faith in 
the court, and clear the innocent. 
 G. T. Blankenship had made a great speech at enormous personal risk.  
Legislative immunity notwithstanding, a practicing attorney had just accused 
three Supreme Court justices and a lawyer of paying and accepting bribes.  In 
addition to their other duties, the Oklahoma Supreme Court handled lawyer 
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licensing matters.  Although the situations were admittedly different, Blankenship 
would have been aware of the fate of Harlan Grimes, who had questioned the 
integrity of the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Amos and had been disbarred.  
Governor Bellmon, worried about Blankenship, summoned him to his office and 
warned him of stormy seas ahead.
24
 
 Blankenship's speech stunned the Democratic House leadership and ruined  
Speaker McCarty's plan to let the Welch matter die a natural death.  One minority 
member of the legislature, armed with an explosive statement from a corrupt 
judge, had changed the entire legislative session.  As Justice Berry later put it, 
"The genie was out of the bottle."
25
  Oklahoma County Attorney Curtis Harris, 
who had held the statement since assuming office from Harrod on January 4th, 
was furious with Blankenship, calling  him a "yellow belly" for not naming 
Cargill publicly.
26
  U.S. Attorney B. Andrew Potter also criticized Blankenship, 
citing the "inordinate curiosity" of "certain people" and claiming Blankenship's 
speech had jeopardized the investigation.
27
 
 Blankenship's disclosure also marked the first public identification of 
Justice N.B. Johnson as a suspect in the briberies.  The next morning Chief Justice 
W.H. Blackbird called a meeting of the Supreme Court.  All of the justices, 
including Welch and Johnson, attended.  Welch, whose tax returns were already 
in the record in his criminal case, for some reason objected to Berry's suggestion 
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that all justices release their income tax returns.  Justice Johnson seemed stunned, 
shaking his head and cursing an unnamed person.  It was unclear to Berry whether 
Johnson was referring to Corn or Blankenship.
28
  Publicly, Justice Johnson denied 
the charge, calling it "false, positively false."
29
 
 Had Blankenship indeed jumped the gun, as the prosecutors claimed?  
Corn had only made his statement the month previous to Blankenship's speech, so 
law enforcement authorities had had little time to verify it; Harris, the new 
Oklahoma County Attorney, had only been in office since the first of the year.  
Corn had provided the first hard evidence against N.B. Johnson, with whom Hugh 
Carroll had never dealt.  In order to prosecute Johnson successfully, testimony 
coming from a doubtful source like N.S. Corn would have to be corroborated and 
supported by documentary evidence.  This would take time, so the reluctance by 
law enforcement to make the matter public is understandable.   
 On the other hand, Oklahoma was faced with the completely unacceptable 
situation of having one former justice making claims of bribery and a second 
justice, now a convicted felon and named bribery suspect, still on the bench.  An 
allegation of bribery against Justice Johnson, also still in office, had been made by 
Corn.  The fact that Corn had made a statement was already in the public realm; 
the only question was what the statement contained.  On the whole, it was 
probably unrealistic for Potter, Harrod, and Harris to expect to be able to keep 
Corn's statement confidential.  The information the statement contained was so 
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sensational that its disclosure was inevitable.  A political emergency existed; two 
sitting Supreme Court justices were accused by a former justice of accepting 
bribes.  Blankenship and Berry would have been derelict not to bring the facts to 
the public's attention.   
 On February 15th, a federal grand jury, which had heard O.A. Cargill's 
testimony ten months previously, indicted Cargill on three counts of perjury, 
ending Blankenship's poorly kept secret of the identity of Mr. X.  Cargill's 
indictment spelled out the incidents in which it said he had lied.  Cargill had told 
the grand jury that he did not know where the unexplained $150,000 Selected 
Investments expenditure had gone, and that he had no idea Pierre Laval was a 
fictitious person.  When asked whether he had had any financial transactions with 
any member of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Cargill had coyly responded, 
"None that I know of at all."
30
  By their indictment of Cargill, the grand jurors had 
indicated their disbelief of all of these statements.  On February 19th Cargill 
appeared for his initial hearing in front of Judge Harper.  Astonishingly, even 
after all that had occurred, Cargill had not hired a lawyer, so his son and law 
partner Buck represented him at the initial hearing.
31
 
 Cargill should never have allowed himself to be in this sort of legal peril.  
Even in April of 1964, he had known he was required to appear before a federal 
grand jury.  He would have either known or suspected that his former client, Hugh 
Carroll, was cooperating with the government.  He knew he, Corn, and Welch 
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were suspects.   An objective lawyer with even minimal criminal law experience, 
given this situation, would have advised his client to take advantage of the Fifth 
Amendment.  If he had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, Cargill would not 
have been required to testify, and thus would not have committed perjury.  As a 
former prosecutor and experienced criminal defense attorney, Cargill would have 
known this.  Even talented attorneys are subject to error, though, when it comes to 
their own legal problems; Cargill's hubris and overconfidence had worked to his 
disadvantage.  
 On February 22nd, Oklahoma County Attorney Curtis Harris announced a 
grand jury investigation into the activities of the Supreme Court, issuing 
subpoenas for Carroll, Corn, various associates of O.A. Cargill, former justice and 
attorney Wayne Bayless, and nearly everyone involved in Marshall v. Amos.  
While it was difficult to understand why another investigation was necessary, this 
was the first official law enforcement inquiry since Corn's statement had become 
public knowledge.  At Harris's recommendation, the district court gave immunity 





 In the meantime, legislative efforts to impeach Justices Welch and 
Johnson were gathering steam.  On March 10th, Welch testified for four hours in 
an overcrowded conference room before the House impeachment committee, the 
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first time he had told his story in public.  Appearing confident, Welch 
emphatically denied taking bribes from anyone.  He refuted Corn's statement, 
stating simply Corn was a "sick man," who must have wanted "out of that place 
(prison) in the worst sort of way."  Welch engaged in a double-talking sparring 
match with Representative Burke Mordy of Ardmore regarding Welch's 
willingness to take a polygraph test; Welch repeatedly insisted he would only take 
a polygraph approved for use in the courts, knowing in fact the results of 
polygraphs were not admissible in court.
33
  Welch did make the offer to resign if 
his conviction were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, an empty 
offer since Welch would then be headed to prison.
34
 
 On March 16th the committee went to the home of R.O. Ingle, who had 
been Johnson's legal assistant for twelve years.  Ingle, who was suffering from a 
serious respiratory illness and awaiting admission to a hospital, testified while 
wearing his bathrobe and lying on a sofa.  Ingle claimed that in 1956 he had seen 
Pat O'Bryan, then the attorney for Selected Investments, and another man, 
possibly Hugh Carroll, enter Johnson's office.  After the conversation ended, 
according to Ingle, Johnson, who had apparently been drinking, placed a brief on 
Ingle's desk and suggested the case be reversed.  Generally, Ingle spoke highly of 
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 It is hard to know what to think of Ingle's account.  This was the only 
direct link between Johnson and Selected Investments; all other testimony clearly 
showed the bribes were handled strictly between Hugh Carroll and N.S. Corn.  
Ingle, a native of Spiro in Welch's eastern Oklahoma district, had unsuccessfully 
run against Welch three years earlier, and had no great regard for Welch.
36
  
However, Ingle obviously liked Johnson, had worked for him for twelve years, 
and had no apparent reason to harm him.  The ailing Ingle did not testify in 
Johnson's impeachment trial before the senate the next month, so the accuracy of 
Ingle's story therefore was never verified or tested in court. 
 O.A. Cargill had finally employed nationally prominent criminal defense 
attorney Percy Foreman from Houston.  Appearing by telegram, Foreman 
predictably and appropriately instructed his client to invoke the Fifth Amendment 
before the House impeachment committee.  Cargill's side of the story therefore 
went temporarily untold. 
 The House investigations committee was set to recommend impeachment 
and removal of both Welch and Johnson on the afternoon of March 21st.  That 
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morning Earl Welch finally resigned his post on the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 
submitting a lengthy, self-serving letter to Governor Bellmon.  The resignation 
made Welch's impeachment moot.  The investigations committee recommended  
the impeachment of Justice Johnson and outlined for the record the evidence it 
had gathered against Welch.
37
  On March 24th, the House of Representatives, by 
votes of 90-6 and 88-8, voted to impeach Justice Johnson on two counts.   
 The articles of impeachment accused Johnson of taking a $7,500 bribe in 
the Selected Investments case and a $2,500 bribe in Oklahoma Company v. 
O'Neil, the oil and gas case which involved O.A. Cargill's daughter and son-in-
law.  The other cases in which the parties suspected corruption were not 
mentioned.  Johnson, who still had not retained a lawyer, immediately moved to 
suspend himself.  Although Johnson's authority to suspend himself was doubtful, 
the Senate accepted his offer and formally suspended Johnson from office 
pending his impeachment trial.
38
  Two days later the Oklahoma County grand jury 
indicted Cargill, Welch, and Johnson in state district court, charging them with 
bribery.  Cargill took advantage of his initial hearing on the bribery charge to 
proclaim his innocence and call the grand jury a "star chamber."
39
 
 In the meantime, the Senate, which had never expected to be sitting as a 
court of impeachment, had taken its job very seriously.  Each senator had 
solemnly raised his right hand and sworn to perform his duty as a member of the 
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court.  The Senate named Roy Grantham, an attorney from Ponca City, as the 
trial's presiding officer and enacted rules for the impeachment proceedings, by 
and large adopting Oklahoma's district court rules on admissibility of evidence.  
After considerable debate the members decided to allow television into the 
chamber, so long as the lights did not interfere with the dignity of the 
proceedings.  Under the rules, the Senate as a body had the right to overrule the 
chair on evidentiary issues.
40
 
 No one had much experience in the matter of impeachments, although this 
had not been the case in previous generations. The first years after Oklahoma's 
1907 statehood had seen fifteen impeachment trials.  Four early-statehood 
officeholders, including two governors, had been removed from office.  The 
chaotic year 1929 alone had seen efforts to impeach six officials, including 
Governor Henry S. Johnston, four members of the supreme court, and the 
president of the state board of agriculture.  While the four justices and the board 
president had either had their cases dismissed or been acquitted, Johnston had 
been convicted and removed.
41
  After the bloodletting of 1929, however, public 
and legislative enthusiasm for impeachment had dwindled.  Since 1929, only one 
serious effort at impeachment, an unsuccessful 1945 attempt to remove the state 
superintendent of public instruction, had occurred.
42
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 Like Cargill, N.B. Johnson had waited until the last minute to hire an 
attorney.  Even after Corn's conviction and statement, the grand juries, 
Blankenship's speech on the House floor, the impeachment committee, and 
Carroll's testimony, Johnson had hidden his head in the sand.  Only three days 
before his first mandatory appearance before the senate, Johnson finally hired 
attorneys George Bingaman from Purcell, a former justice, and Fred Green from 
Sallisaw, a respected lawyer active in Democratic politics.
43
  Green and 
Bingaman would be opposed by the House-appointed members of the Board of 
Managers: Representatives Lou Allard of Drumright, Burke G. Mordy of 
Ardmore, James W. Connor of Bartlesville, Phil Smalley of Norman, and Nathan 
S. Sherman of Oklahoma City.  After appearing before the senate and entering his 
plea of not guilty, Johnson told the press "the most important thing is to clear my 
name."  At Green's request, the trial was continued until May 6th.
44
 
 Like Corn, Welch, and Cargill, Napoleon Bonaparte Johnson, a member of 
the Cherokee nation, had grown up on the frontier.   Born in 1891, Johnson 
moved in early childhood from his father's home near Locust Grove, a 
mountainous, wooded area with only Cherokee cabins and few white people 
present, to the home of his mother's family in present-day southern Oklahoma.  
Since there were no public schools in the Chickasaw Nation, Johnson attended a 
Presbyterian school for underprivileged children in Anadarko.  He graduated from 
the ninth grade, went into the navy for a short time, then attended college.   After 
a few years working for the United States Indian Service, he decided to become a 
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 Johnson and his family settled in Claremore, where he worked as a 
prosecutor and practiced law.  In 1934 Johnson was elected district judge, where 
he served for fourteen years.  Johnson became very active in Native American 
affairs, serving on various boards supporting Native American interests.  In 1948, 
supported by Senator Elmer Thomas and Governor Robert S. Kerr, he became a 
serious candidate for appointment as U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
46
  
When President Truman eventually named another candidate, Johnson ran for the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court against the incumbent, Wayne Bayless.  He narrowly 
defeated Bayless and became a member of the Supreme Court.  From all 
appearances N.B. Johnson represented the American Dream: he had risen from a 
mission boarding school to the Supreme Court of his native state and a national 
leadership role among Native American people.
47
   
 The senate constituted a unique group of jurors.  Approximately half of 
them were lawyers, some with years of courtroom experience.
48
  All were men.  
One, E. Melvin Porter of Oklahoma City, was African-American.
49
  By virtue of 
their being in the senate at all, they had achieved high office, were competitive, 
and were politically astute.  All felt a responsibility to their constituents and knew 
they would have to explain their votes.  Most would have had at least a casual 
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acquaintance with Justice Johnson, who had worked for sixteen years in the state 
capitol, the same building which housed the senate.  
 Under the body's rules of impeachment, a majority of the members could 
overrule Grantham, the presiding officer, on evidentiary or procedural issues.
50
 
This rule was put to the test almost immediately, after Grantham barred the 
prosecution from alluding to the other cases in which the authorities suspected 
corruption.  The senate supported the chair by a vote of 27 to 19, so evidence of 
those cases would not come before the senate.
51
   Under the senate procedure 
individual senators also had the right to submit questions to the chairman, who 
would then relay the question to the witness. 
 The prosecution's first significant witness was Hugh Carroll.  Carroll 
related his shared northwest Oklahoma background with Corn, the potential 
disastrous effect the Oklahoma Tax Commission ruling would have had on the 
company, his dinner with Corn in which they made the arrangement for the 
$150,000 bribe, the favorable ruling, and his eventual payment of the money to 
Corn.  In his cross-examination, Bingaman implied that Carroll had subsidized 
Corn's small loan company in the 1940s, inquired about the fictitious Pierre Laval 
testimony in bankruptcy court, and alluded to Carroll's extravagant withdrawals 
from his various companies.  Bingaman was unable to cause Carroll significant 
damage, although he did point out Carroll's previous contradictory stories.
52
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 Corn's testimony also did Johnson considerable harm.  Under questions 
from Representative Burke Mordy from Ardmore, Corn calmly relayed the stories 
of the briberies in Selected Investments  and Oklahoma Company v. O'Neal.  He 
outlined his bribery proposals with both Welch and Johnson, his delivery of the 
bribe money to each of them at their offices in the capitol, and Johnson's counting 
the money.  Grantham, the presiding officer, severely limited Bingaman's cross-
examination of Corn, but Bingaman was able to establish Corn's colon cancer at 
the time of the bribes, his hostility toward O.A. Cargill, and his insistence on 
immunity from prosecution at Welch's Muskogee trial.  Corn also admitted he had 
told Floyd Rheam, who had accepted Corn's letter of resignation from the bar, that 
no other justices had taken a bribe.  Corn did point out that Welch was in his 
home and able to overhear his conversation with Rheam.   
 The questions from the senators primarily involved why Corn had thought 
Welch and Johnson could be bribed.  Corn's answers to these questions were 
evasive, and the senate voted not to force the witness to be more specific.  Corn 
simply stated that his reasons for approaching the two justices would be based on 




 Like Corn and Welch, Johnson's financial records proved to be his 
undoing.  Johnson had banked at two banks in Claremore and had accounts and a 
safety deposit box at Citizens National Bank (earlier Citizens State) in Oklahoma 
City.  Johnson's Oklahoma City banker testified Johnson had entered his safety 
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deposit box eleven times between December of 1959 and March of 1962.  He had 
also purchased about $6,900 in cashier's checks, which he used to pay various 




 On May 10th, the most important witness of the trial, Johnson himself, 
began his testimony.  In Johnson's direct testimony, Bingaman went into 
considerable detail about Johnson's background, his professional awards, and his 
success as an attorney.  Bingaman largely avoided the elephant in the room: his 
client's votes in Selected Investments and Oklahoma Company v. O'Neil.  Instead, 
he simply asked, without elaboration, whether Johnson had taken bribes from 
Corn on the two cases; Johnson simply said, "That testimony was false."
55
  
Bingaman's strategy was dangerous: the only reason for the trial was to determine 
whether Johnson had accepted bribes from Corn.  Bingaman's failure to elicit 
Johnson's side of the story from his client simply left the door open to force the 
witness to tell it in unfriendly and unsympathetic cross-examination.  
 Under Representative James W. Connor's questioning, Johnson denied 
directing his legal assistant, R.O. Ingle, to draft an opinion reversing Selected 
Investments.  Connor forced Johnson to admit having had several friends contact 
their senators on his behalf before the impeachment trial, stating all he wanted 
was a "fair deal."
56
  Johnson testified he had kept large amounts of cash, often 
about $2,000, hidden at his home, which he had obtained from cashing routine 
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checks and keeping leftover money.  Johnson admitted he had opened a safety 
deposit box at his Oklahoma City bank on June 10, 1957 and had entered the box 
on September 10th, September 21st, November 13th, December 19th, and 
December 27th of the same year.  Connor was able to prove Johnson had 
purchased nineteen cashier's checks totaling $3,400 on the same dates he entered 
the box.  Johnson had stopped this practice after April of 1961, when he had 




  In total, between July of 1956 and March of 1962, Johnson bought 
cashier's checks totaling $6,909.89 from Citizens National Bank of Oklahoma 
City, the same bank in which he had the safety deposit box.  This established the 
prosecution's argument that Johnson had put the $7,500 Selected Investments 
bribe into the box, removing cash and buying cashier's checks when he needed the 
money.  He had made seventeen house payments with cash. 
 Johnson had no valid explanation for his frequent entries into the box, 
where he admitted keeping about $800 in cash.
58
  Justice Johnson simply could 
not account for his financial expenditures and had no valid or comprehensible 
explanation for the source of the money.  Questions from senators repeatedly 
asked Johnson to explain the financial discrepancy, but Johnson did not have 
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  By failing to provide a reasonable hypothesis other than guilt, Johnson had 
harmed himself with his testimony. 
 After seven days of trial and closing arguments, on May 13th the senate 
went into private session to discuss the evidence.
60
  After four hours behind 
closed doors, Grantham called for a vote, and the clerk began to call the roll, 
which was conducted in alphabetical order.  Under the rules, the prosecution was 
required to obtain a two-thirds majority of the senate in order to oust Justice 
Johnson from office.  With three votes left, the count stood at 29 to 15 in favor of 
conviction; unless all three of the remaining senators voted to convict, Johnson 
would be acquitted.  Senators Al Terrill from Lawton, G.W. Williams from Gore, 
and John Young from Sapulpa all voted in favor of conviction; Johnson had been 
removed from office by one vote.  The vote on the now superfluous second count, 
the bribe in Oklahoma Company v. O'Neil, was identical.  Johnson became the 
first supreme court justice in Oklahoma to be removed from office.
61
 
 More than a half-century later, the case against N.B. Johnson appears to 
have been overwhelming.  Corn, who seemed to have no particular grudge against 
Johnson, had testified he had personally bribed Johnson and handed him the 
money on both occasions.  Hugh Carroll had confirmed most of Corn's story, 
although he had never dealt with Johnson personally.  Johnson's own financial 
records had proven he had outspent his income, he had hoarded inordinate 
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amounts of cash, and that, although he had a checking account, he had often 
visited his safety deposit box and inexplicably paid his bills with cashier's checks.  
Both direct and circumstantial evidence pointed to Johnson's guilt, and very little 
evidence exonerating him had been presented.   
 Nevertheless, Johnson still received fifteen votes for acquittal.  Of the 
fifteen, all but Richard Romang of Enid were Democrats.  All four of the senators 
from overwhelmingly Democratic southeastern Oklahoma voted to exonerate 
Johnson.
62
  Clem McSpadden, the powerful president pro tempore of the senate, 
was from Johnson's hometown of Claremore and supported Johnson.  E. Melvin 
Porter of Oklahoma City, the first African-American to serve in the senate, voted 
for acquittal, as did Charles Pope from Tulsa.  The other eight senators from 
Oklahoma County and six from Tulsa County voted to convict.
63
  It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that if the 1965 legislature had not been reapportioned and 
had remained disproportionately rural, the result may have been different for N.B. 
Johnson.  
 On July 22nd, having been delayed by congressional redistricting and the 
Johnson trial, the second-longest legislative session in Oklahoma history finally 
limped to a close.  Although it was criticized for its slow and cumbersome work, 
the session generally received good marks.  In the legal world, the legislature had 
removed Johnson and replaced the county attorneys with a district attorney 
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system.  It had failed, however, to address the subject of judicial reform, including 
justices of the peace.
64
  The next legislature and next governor would have to deal 
with that issue. 
 
THE O. A. CARGILL PERJURY TRIAL 
 The perjury trial of  O.A. Cargill began on June 1, 1965 before Judge 
Harper.  Percy Foreman, the nationally-known  and flamboyant criminal defense 
attorney representing Cargill, immediately irritated Judge Harper, alluding to his 
busy schedule and telling him at an April 30th pretrial hearing that he "to this 
good hour" had not devoted any time to Cargill's case and had filed "canned 
motions" prepared by his secretary .
65
  Harper expressed surprise that a lawyer 
would admit to filing boilerplate motions.
66
  Harper and Foreman would continue 
to clash throughout the trial. 
 Cargill had been charged with three counts of perjury; the grand jury 
claimed he had lied when he denied knowing anything about the Selected 
Investments bribe, when he denied authoring the phony Pierre Laval story in 
bankruptcy court, and when he denied having financial dealings with any 
Oklahoma Supreme Court justices.
67
  After the jury had been selected, Harper 
immediately ordered the jurors sequestered in an Oklahoma City hotel, where 
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 Hugh Carroll became the prosecution's first significant witness.  Carroll 
related his story of meeting Cargill at Corn's insistence in the days before his 
bankruptcy hearing in March of 1958.  Carroll described his conspiracy with 
Corn, his payment of the $150,000, Cargill's comment that Cargill could have 
bribed the judges for less money, and Carroll's obvious reluctance to reveal where 
the $200,000 Selected expenditure had gone.  Carroll testified that he had planned 
to take the Fifth Amendment when asked about the $200,000, but Cargill 
persuaded him to testify to the Pierre Laval story instead, which Cargill 
apparently made up on the spot after learning Carroll had a cabin in Canada.
69
  
Carroll told the jury he had finally told the truth to federal investigators and 
County Attorney James Harrod in April of 1964 and had received immunity from 
prosecution.  
 On cross-examination George Miskovsky, a former senator now helping to 
represent Cargill, repeatedly quizzed Carroll on his memory but was unable to 
shake Carroll's basic story of what had occurred seven years previously.  
However, Miskovsky did establish that Carroll had also told others he had needed 
the money to buy stock in Selected Investments and to pay lobbyists to resist tax 
measures pending in the legislature which were unfavorable to Selected.  Carroll's 
wife Julia testified as well, verifying her husband's testimony about Cargill's 
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invention of Pierre Laval and relating her disapproval of Cargill, his forceful and 
overbearing manner, and his invention of such a preposterous lie.
70
 
 Corn began his testimony on June 4th.  Corn described his long and 
corrupt relationship with Cargill, his accepting small amounts of money over the 
years from Cargill, Cargill's calls telling him to "get your pencil out," and his 
belief that Cargill had similar relationships with other justices.  Corn told the jury 
about his hiding $97,000 in his golf shoes in his locker, in fruit jars in his 
backyard, and in filing cabinets.  He admitted that when Carroll asked for the 
return of the money after the company had gone into receivership, he only 
returned $33,000, even though he still had more of the bribe money left.  Corn 
also testified he had received $4,000 from Cargill in Marshall v. Amos, the 
Cleveland County oil and gas case, and $2,500 in Oklahoma Company v. O'Neil, 
the case involving Cargill's daughter and son-in-law.  He admitted that because of 
his previous payments from Cargill, he would have voted Cargill's way regardless 
of the extra bribe.  Corn testified Cargill had told him he had "taken care of" the 
other justices in Marshall v. Amos.
71
  He then described his break with Cargill 
over Corn's tax troubles in February of 1961.
72
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 In his lengthy and detailed cross-examination, Foreman meticulously 
pointed out many cases in which Corn had voted against Cargill's clients.  
According to Foreman, of a dozen cases involving Cargill which he had lost, Corn 
did not vote in five, voted against Cargill in four, and authored the opinion against 
him in yet another case.  Corn explained that Cargill often had similar 
arrangements with opposing attorneys to lose cases, and that sometimes Cargill 
did not call him at all.  Foreman also noted that Corn, while he was still 
incarcerated in Springfield, received immunity from further federal prosecution 
from Acting Attorney General Nicholas D. Katzenbach and also received an oral 
promise of immunity from state prosecution from James Harrod, Oklahoma 
County Attorney.
73
  Corn, turning toward the judge, said "I violated my oath and I 
ruined myself...I ruined myself completely, disgraced my family, disappointed my 




 H.G. Marshall, the former Oklahoma City oilman at the center of Marshall 
v. Amos, related his background with Cargill, stating that he had known Cargill 
since 1928, had been a friend of Cargill's daughter and son-in-law, and had talked 
to Cargill about his case.  Although Cargill had not done any legal work on 
Marshall's case, Cargill, according to Marshall, told him he had a "dangerous 
lawsuit," and that he could guarantee a win "with the boys on the hill" for 
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$30,000.  Titus Haffa, Marshall's Chicago colleague, then prepared a letter 
guaranteeing Cargill $30,000 upon reversal of the case.   
 On cross-examination Foreman was able to harm Marshall's credibility 
significantly, exposing him as a prevaricating, profane man, who had more than 
forty judgments against him and had been prosecuted for driving under the 
influence and bogus checks.  Foreman forced Marshall to admit he had told 
Ardmore attorney Earl Grey, who was investigating the matter for the Oklahoma 
Bar Association, that he had hired Cargill solely for his legal ability.  Foreman 
also noted contradictory stories Marshall had told to private investigators and 
mentioned other cases in which Cargill had represented Marshall, implying the 
$30,000 was for past services, not a bribe.
75
  Titus Haffa followed Marshall to the 
stand; Haffa did so badly that Harper warned him of the penalties for perjury.
76
 
 Foreman began the defense case with Merle Zwifel, who had been 
convicted of mail fraud and been assigned to Carroll's cottage at the federal 
penitentiary in Seagoville, Texas.  Zwifel testified Carroll had been extremely 
worried about money and about pending charges in state district court.  Carroll 
allegedly told Zwifel he had $150,000 stashed at a secret location near his cabin 
in Canada.  The next day Cargill's wife testified, recalling the visit Hugh and Julia 
Carroll had made to their ranch prior to the federal court hearing in March of 
1958.  She remembered driving with the Carrolls to see the ranch's buffalo but 
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denied that there had been any discussion of Pierre Laval.
77
  Foreman then 
presented a succession of justices and attorneys who had prevailed in cases 
against Cargill; all denied having any financial dealings with him. 
 It now became Cargill's turn to testify.  Appearing nervous initially, 
Cargill related his biography to the jury, telling them of his background in 
Arkansas, his migration to Oklahoma, his becoming an attorney and mayor of 
Oklahoma City, his religious work, the death of his daughter, and his successful 
law practice.  With the exception of small campaign contributions, Cargill denied 
any financial dealings with Justice Corn or any other member of the court.  He 
denied receiving $2,500 from Corn for securing Lon Carlile's vote in the Selected 
Investments case and insisted the $30,000 he received from Haffa was for his 
earlier representation of Haffa and Marshall in a Noble County case.   
 On the subject of Selected Investments, Cargill admitted meeting the 
Carrolls at his home but denied concocting the Pierre Laval story.  Cargill claimed 
he had anticipated receiving a continuance from "Steve" (Judge Chandler) and 
was stunned when the judge denied his request.  He said he had heard the name  
Pierre Laval for the first time in court.  As to N.S. Corn, Cargill claimed he had 
not been particularly cordial with Corn since the early 1940s, when Cargill had 
backed Corn's rival Ben Arnold for Chief Justice.  Cargill said he had offended  
Corn by suing Corn's small loan companies in the 1940s.
78
  He denied meeting 
Corn on the street with money, denied ever being in Corn's office in the capitol, 
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 In his cross-examination of Cargill, Assistant U.S. Attorney David Kline 
established Cargill's familiarity with the business affairs of Selected Investments 
at the bankruptcy court hearing.  He also pointed out that Hugh Carroll, Julia 
Carroll, and N.S. Corn had all given similar testimony.  According to Cargill, 
Hugh Carroll had actually employed Ned Looney to represent him but made the 
check for $25,000 to Cargill.  Kline established the lack of logic of receiving a 
$25,000 fee from Carroll, then hearing about Pierre Laval for the first time in the 
courtroom. 
80
  In rebuttal, the prosecution called James Nance, a former legislator 
and publisher from Purcell, who testified Cargill had offered him $10,000 to 
obtain Justice Floyd Jackson's vote on the Meadors will case.  Nance admitted, 
however, that he did not share this information with Justice Jackson for two or 
three years.  The government also called Laura Fleming, who accused Cargill of 
trying to purchase an oil and gas lease from her, claiming he had the Supreme 
Court fixed against her.
81
 
 After lengthy closing arguments, in which Foreman attacked the 
credibility of the government's witnesses, the case went to the jury.  After nine 
hours of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict at 1:00 a.m.: guilty on all 
counts.  On his way out of the courtroom, Cargill ironically told the press he had 
been "convicted on perjured testimony."  The next month Judge Harper sentenced 
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Cargill to five years imprisonment and a $3,000 fine.  As he had done with Corn, 
he ordered him to be immediately eligible for parole.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In 1965 Oklahomans had learned the sordid details of corruption at the 
highest levels of their court system.  Prosecutors had done their jobs, bringing 
Corn, Welch, Johnson, and Cargill to justice.  All had been disgraced; three had 
been sentenced to prison.  The prosecutions had ended; what remained was to 
change the system, so that something like this would not occur again.   
 Why did it take so long to expose the scandal, and what allowed it to occur 
in the first place?  One factor was Oklahoma's lack of a viable two-party system, a 
political trait which Oklahoma has had for most of its history.  As we have seen, 
the Democratic legislative leadership ignored the scandal, and it was only through 
the intercession of the minority Republicans that the scandal came to public light.  
Without court-ordered redistricting and the greater empowerment of the minority 
party, it is doubtful whether the enormous scope of the crimes would ever have 
become known, and whether court reform would have come to Oklahoma.   
 In 1949, writing before most of the Oklahoma court scandal had even 
occurred, political scientist V.O. Key illustrated how one-party rule made 
governments exceptionally vulnerable to favoritism, with shared loyalty between 
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the officeholder and the business seeker. 
82
  The Supreme Court scandal 
uncovered Oklahoma's version of what Lyndon Johnson biographer Robert Caro 
describes as having occurred in Texas at approximately the same time:  "the role 
and significance of favoritism in a democratic government."
83
  In the case of the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court scandal, outside forces had brought the extent of the 
extent of the corruption to public attention, and the responsible parties had been 
brought to justice.  In the next two years, 1966 and 1967, Oklahomans would 
learn whether their broken judiciary would be reformed. 
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THE FALL OF MCCARTY, THE SNEED PLAN, AND THE 
ELECTION OF 1966 
 
 In 1966 three events occurred which helped lead to enactment of reform 
the next year.  First, J.D. McCarty, the conservative Speaker of the House, 
astoundingly fell from power.  Second, Senator Dewey Bartlett, a state senator 
from Tulsa friendly to the idea of reform, unexpectedly became the state's second 
Republican governor.  Third, the state's judiciary, bar, and political establishment 
continued to embarrass itself with scandal and impropriety.  
 
THE FALL OF MCCARTY 
 As we have seen, Speaker  McCarty had ruled the Oklahoma House of 
Representatives with an iron hand.  Tough, smart, and energetic, he almost 
singlehandedly determined the passage or failure of legislation.  A generation 
later, a still-frustrated Henry Bellmon described his feelings about Speaker 
McCarty, calling him the "Oklahoma prototype of the worst kind of politician...As 
Speaker of the House, he became loud, fat, power-mad, and heavy-handed in his 
dealing with those over whom he could exert either influence or authority."  
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According to Bellmon, McCarty's control over the House of Representatives "was 
absolute.  Anytime he took the rostrum and pointed his thumb upward, the matter 
under consideration passed with a huge majority.  Anytime he made the opposite 
gesture, the measure failed."
1
  Little or nothing in Oklahoma's state government 
took place without McCarty's approval.   
 Although he represented an Oklahoma City district, McCarty had an 
ability to "think rural," which meant being able to protect the members of his rural 
Democratic caucus.
2
  McCarty generally allied himself with Democratic, 
conservative legislators, many of whom came from the southern half of the state.  
He tended to see issues, including judicial reform, along party lines and dragged 
his feet on proposals which changed the status quo.  The legislature's huge 
Democratic majority allowed him to avoid accountability from the questioning of 
a strong minority party.  As judicially-mandated reapportionment changed the 
legislature's demographics to allow greater urban participation, McCarty remained 
loyal to his rural, conservative power base. 
 In late 1964 and early 1965 McCarty considered running for governor or a 
seat on the Corporation Commission.  He also considered abandoning politics 
altogether and entering private business full time.  Eventually, he decided instead 
to run for a fourth term as Speaker of the House.  Even before he had definitely 
made up his mind whether to seek to remain as Speaker, he had pledges of 
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seventy votes, well more than he needed for re-election.
3
  Although McCarty 
stated he favored "modernizing, streamlining, and updating" the court system, he 
reiterated his strong opposition to tampering with the system of electing judges.
4
  
Barring an unforeseen event, Bellmon's successor would have to deal with 
Speaker McCarty on all issues, including court reform. 
 The first rumblings of trouble for McCarty appeared in September of 
1964.  Muriel Luther "Jack" Woosley, a pilot with a minor criminal history, 
claimed to have flown two legislators, not yet identified as McCarty and Senator 
Everett Collins, a lawyer, and a state crime bureau agent to Memphis, where 
proponents of dog racing had allegedly bribed the legislators to sponsor a bill 
legalizing dog tracks in Oklahoma.  Woosley had told the story to his next door 
neighbor, who was an assistant county attorney, who then arranged for Woosley 
to meet with County Attorney James Harrod.  When Harrod did not react with the 
speed Woosley thought appropriate, Woosley contacted the Oklahoma Journal, a 
daily newspaper founded by wealthy 1962 Democratic gubernatorial candidate 
Bill Atkinson, who blamed the Daily Oklahoman and Oklahoma City Times  for 
his loss to Bellmon and had therefore begun a competing daily paper. 
 The Journal printed the story but did not name any names, leaving the 
reader to guess the respective identities of the parties.
5
  After the story came out, 
the Daily Oklahoman published the fact that Woolsey had made the complaint, 
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insinuated that Woolsey had ruined the investigation by failing to cooperate with 
Harrod, and included  Woosley's arrest record.
6
  The matter might have died on 
the vine, but the next day Woosley sued the Oklahoman for two million dollars, 
claiming he had been defamed by the article. 
7
 Woosley's lawsuit, although it was 
frivolous, forced the newspaper to defend itself in court and to inquire into 
Woosley's claims.  The discovery process in the lawsuit would help lead to the 
end of McCarty's political career. 
 The attorneys for the Oklahoman had sent written inquiries to Woosley's 
lawyer.  After normal courthouse business hours on July 28, 1965, the last 
permissible day to respond,  Woosley's attorneys filed their client's response to the 
newspaper's questions.  Woosley claimed under oath that in late 1960 he had 
flown Whit Pate, a former Howard Edmondson aide and an attorney practicing in 
Poteau and Oklahoma City, and Forest Castle, a former head of the Oklahoma 
Crime Bureau to Memphis, Tennessee. The trip's purpose was for Pate to pick up 
$30,000 from Tennessee racing interests, who were seeking legalization of horse 
and dog racing in Oklahoma.  After the group returned to Oklahoma, Pate called 
McCarty and Collins, who met Pate in Pate's Tulsa hotel room.  Pate then 
delivered $10,000 each to McCarty and Collins, kept $5,000 for himself, and paid 
the other $5,000 to Castle.  According to Woosley, in January of 1961 Pate 
returned to Memphis, this time by commercial plane and without Woosley.  Pate 
then reportedly returned with another $30,000.  After his return to Oklahoma, 
Pate, Collins, and McCarty met at the Turner Turnpike gate, where McCarty took 
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$10,000, Collins took $10,000, and Pate kept the other $10,000, later giving 
$5,000 to Castle.  
 Woosley also claimed he had learned that an individual named Bob Lewis 
had paid McCarty $5,000 to kill the horse and dog racing legislation, with a 
promise of another $45,000 to the speaker when the bill was finally killed.  When 
he was asked about this, McCarty had reportedly told Pate he had indeed taken 
the $5,000 from the opponents of racing.  McCarty allegedly had said that this  
had simply been an easy way to make $5,000, and that Pate and the others had 
nothing to worry about. 
8
 
 Woosley's story was indeed alarming.  Assuming the truth of what 
Woosley was saying, the Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives and 
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate had accepted $20,000 each to influence 
the passage of important legislation.
9
  McCarty had also accepted $5,000, with the 
promise of $45,000 more to kill that same legislation, thus accepting large sums 
of money from both sides of the issue.
10
   However, there were significant 
problems with Woosley's story.  First, even according to Woosley, he had seen 
very few of the events firsthand.   He had flown the plane to Memphis with Pate 
and Castle and returned with the money.  He had had little or no interaction with 
McCarty and Collins; almost all of his information had come from Pate.  
Moreover, Woosley had little credibility.  He admitted misleading Harrod about 
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the source of the bribe money, telling the county attorney the money came from 
dog breeders, not gamblers.
11
  If prosecutors were to prove a bribery case against 
McCarty and Collins, the information would have to come from Pate and Castle.  
 Pate was having a highly publicized, if not overly productive, career.  
After graduating from law school at the University of Arkansas, Pate began 
practicing law in Heavener.   Pate campaigned for the 1958 election of Governor 
J. Howard Edmondson and became the governor's first legal aide after 
Edmondson's inauguration.   Pate, whose political ties were to the conservative 
forces in southeastern Oklahoma, was a poor fit in Edmondson's office, and he 
resigned after three months.
12
  Pate then opened a law office in Oklahoma City 
and was a law partner of former governor Johnston Murray for a few months in 
1960.
13
  Pate ran unsuccessfully for the Corporation Commission twice, coming 
in third in the Democratic primary in 1960 and second in 1962.
14
  He acquired a 
reputation for mercurial conduct; as an acting county judge in Leflore County, he 
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  Pate told a bar investigating committee that he and Senator Gene Stipe 
had split a $150,000 bribe from industrial firms wanting inside information on a 
water pipeline being built between Oklahoma City and Lake Atoka, calling the 
day they received the money as "the day we shot the elephant."
16
 Weeks later, he 
signed an affidavit denying that very claim.  Pate was constantly in debt and was 
often sued by his creditors.  In trouble with the Oklahoma Bar Association as a 
result of his contradictory affidavits, in March of 1965, Pate ignored a subpoena 
from the OBA committee investigating his fitness to practice law.
17
 Whit Pate, in 
short, was unreliable and not credible.
18
  He was certainly not appropriate 
company for the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate to be keeping. 
 The Oklahoman story caused public outrage and demands for 
investigation into the conduct of McCarty and Collins.  Curtis Harris, the 
Oklahoma County District Attorney, announced his office would investigate the 
claim and, if necessary, request a grand jury.
19
  Within a few days two Oklahoma 
City women, asking help only from their friends and neighbors, had obtained the 
necessary number of signatures to form a grand jury.   Oklahoma City radio 
                                                          
16
 Oklahoma City Times, June 8, 1965, p.1. 
17
 Oklahoman, March 11, 1965, p.10. 
18
 Pate also probably was impaired by drugs.  In 1971 Pate sued a New Jersey drug manufacturer, 
claiming that an arthritis drug caused him to behave bizarrely.  Among other things, he claimed 
he could not remember why he left the employ of Governor Edmondson and could barely 
remember the events of 1966.  The arthritis drug trial ended in a hung jury. Oklahoman, February 
29, 1972, p.29. 
19
 Oklahoman, August 3, 1965, p.3. 
149 
 
station  KTOK joined the drive for signatures, soliciting its listeners to visit the 
station to sign the petition for a grand jury.
20
 
 The grand jury began to investigate the McCarty issue on November 8th.  
The first subpoenaed witness was Whit Pate.  Curtis Harris, the prosecutor,  
wanted to ask Pate about the affidavit he had given to a reporter confirming the 
payoffs, then retracted with another affidavit prepared by an Oklahoma City 
lawyer representing McCarty's interests contradicting denying the events had ever 
occurred.  Harris had evidence that the lawyer obtaining Pate's second affidavit 
had paid Pate $2,500 in exchange for his signing the document.   
 Pate could not possibly reconcile his stories.  He refused to testify, citing 
the Fifth Amendment.  Judge Jo Ann McInnis, at Harris's request, granted Pate 
immunity from prosecution.
21
  Pate, despite being granted immunity and being 
ordered to testify, still refused to do so.  McInnis ordered Pate to jail for contempt 
of court, but the sentence was stayed pending Pate's appeal to the Court of 
Criminal Appeals; eventually the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Pate's 
conviction.  Harris also subpoenaed Pate's tax records from the Oklahoma Tax 
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 McCarty and Collins each appeared before the grand jury, each testifying 
for about three hours.  Although the testimony remained secret, presumably each 
of them denied any involvement in legislative bribery.  Eventually, with their 
statutory time for grand jury investigation expiring, the grand jury indicted only 
Pate for evading state taxes.  The grand jury decided, absent Pate's testimony, that 
it did not have sufficient evidence with which to indict McCarty or Collins.  The 
grand jury did issue a scathingly critical report on the Oklahoma legislature, 
pointing out the existence of what it called "money bills."  The grand jury said it 
was "not at all uncommon for funds to be gathered for the purpose of passing or 
killing legislation."  They also found that "in many of our business community the 
payment of money to secure passage or defeat of legislation has come to be 
considered a normal business expense." 
23
 
 Although the dog racing incident had resulted in no indictments of 
officeholders, the grand jury had exposed a serious defect in Oklahoma 
government.  Like some members of the appellate judiciary, the votes of certain 
members of the legislature appeared to be available to the highest bidder.  
Moreover, this system had become such an integral part of the political fabric that 
buying  influence or votes was taken for granted by many of those who wanted to 
accomplish anything requiring government approval.  In 1966 the voters would 
have the opportunity to demonstrate their displeasure with their state government. 
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PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 In May of 1966, voters decided that 1966 would be the last year in 
Oklahoma history without a session of the legislature.  In a constitutional 
amendment placed on the runoff ballot, Oklahomans unexpectedly approved a 
constitutional amendment requiring the body to meet annually.
24
  In the absence 
of a legislature, reform forces took advantage of the year to prepare plans to 
change Oklahoma's judiciary.    
 The most ambitious of these was the Missouri plan, which became known 
in Oklahoma as the Sneed plan.  The Missouri plan, which that state had enacted 
in 1940 as a response to the excesses of the Pendergast machine, called for 
judicial vacancies to be filled by the governor from a list of three submitted by a 
judicial nominating commission, then a retention ballot to determine whether the 
judge remained on the bench.  The American Bar Association had supported 
judicial nominating commissions for many years.   
 By 1966 several states had demonstrated considerable interest in some 
form of this mechanism.  Kansas, reacting to an event in which the governor 
resigned in order to be appointed chief justice by the lieutenant governor, enacted 
a nominating commission in 1958.  The next year Alaska constitutionally 
established its commission with its admission to the union.  Nebraska and Iowa 
established their versions in 1962.  Colorado followed suit in 1966, and Utah, 
Idaho, and Vermont established their procedures in 1967.  By 1977 nineteen states 
                                                          
24
 Oklahoman, May 25, 1966, p.1. 
152 
 
had established some form of the Missouri plan, although some of those states 
used judicial nomination commissions only for appellate judgeships.
25
 
 Earl Sneed became the leading voice in Oklahoma for adoption of the 
Missouri plan, and the proposal for Oklahoma took his name.  For fifteen years, 
Sneed had been deeply interested in reforming Oklahoma's judiciary.   Sneed had 
graduated from the University of Oklahoma Law School of Law in 1937.  After 
graduation he worked for the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce until World War II 
service interrupted his career.  After the war and with OU's law school expanding 
to accommodate returning servicemen, acting Dean Maurice Merrill invited Sneed 




 The next year OU's law review published a study of the Oklahoma judicial 
system.  As has been mentioned in an earlier chapter, using American Bar 
Association standards, the study found Oklahoma's system wanting and endorsed 
the Missouri plan, eventually adopted by Sneed.  In 1954 Sneed asked his student 
Fred Harris, later a United States senator, to prepare a short synopsis of 
Oklahoma's confusing and overlapping court system.  Harris came up with seven 
single-spaced pages just to describe Oklahoma's byzantine judicial setup.  Sneed 
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was particularly outraged by the fee-based nature of the JP system; in Sneed's 
mind JP stood for "judgment for the plaintiff."
27
   
 Sneed began to look at entering electoral politics.  He served from 1960 to 
1964 as mayor of Norman and considered running for governor in 1962, 
eventually deciding not to run.  In October of 1964, he told the press he would 
announce his political plans by February of the next year, strongly indicating that 
he would enter the 1966 gubernatorial race.
28
  In September of 1965, Sneed 
resigned from OU, taking a position with Liberty National Bank in Oklahoma 
City.
29
  Although he opted not to run for governor, he was a serious figure in 
Oklahoma's political and legal community.
30
  
  Rather than becoming a candidate himself, Sneed apparently decided to 
pursue his passion of reforming Oklahoma's judiciary. After the Supreme Court 
scandal broke, Governor Bellmon appointed a commission to study judicial 
reform.  He named Sneed as the chairman and also appointed Representative John 
McCune of Tulsa.
31
  Sneed and McCune had very different ideas on the subject 
and would later clash over which path judicial reform should take. 
   The central feature of the Missouri plan involved the selection of judges 
by a judicial nominating commission.  When a vacancy occurred, a commission 
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composed of lawyers and lay persons would consider the application and 
nominate three candidates.  The governor would appoint one of the three.  The 
appointed candidate would then be subject to a retention election, in which the 
voters were allowed to vote whether or not to retain the judge in office.  Judicial 
elections, whether partisan or nonpartisan, would be abolished, with the exception 
of the retention vote.  
 At the insistence of Representative McCune, the legislative council had 
undertaken a comprehensive study of judicial reform, with an eye toward 
presenting a substantive and cohesive plan to the 1967 legislature.   The council 
was originally composed of all fifty-two legislators who were also lawyers and 
three laymen.
32
  Some were more active than others, and eventually thirty 
legislators remained on the subcommittee through its conclusion.
33
  The council 
took its job very seriously, holding numerous hearings and meetings and even 
traveling to Illinois, whose structure utilized nonpartisan election, to study the 
judicial structure there.
34
   
  The Sneed plan forces, who had little legislative support and were 
therefore required to get their proposal before the people by initiative petition,  
struck first.  On June 15, 1966, Sneed, Oklahoma Bar Association president Leroy 
Blackstock, and Oklahoma City Times editorial writer Clarke Thomas announced 
the formation of Judicial Reform, Inc., an organization dedicated to the adoption 
of the Sneed plan, and stated they would file an initiative petition calling for a 
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vote on their proposed constitutional amendment on August 26th.
35
  The petition 
drive began with a sputtering and embarrassing start.  On July 29th Blackstock, 
on behalf of Judicial Reform, Inc., obtained official numbers from the Secretary 
of State for an initiative petition and state question amending the state constitution 
with the Sneed plan, an action which proved to be a serious mistake.   
Blackstock's intention had been merely to obtain numbers; however, under 
Oklahoma's initiative petition procedure the act of receiving a number 
automatically began the ninety day period for obtaining the 140,000 signatures 
necessary to put the petition on the ballot.  The plan had been to organize, then 
file the petition on August 26th, so Blackstock's error might have cost the 
reformers a month of organizational time.
36
  Eventually, however, after consulting 
with the Attorney General,  Secretary of State James Bullard allowed Judicial 
Reform to withdraw its petition, which the group re-filed on August 23rd.  
Although the organization's competence came into temporary question, no 
permanent harm came to the petition drive.
37
 
 The Sneed plan proposed major changes to the judiciary.  It called for four 
levels of courts: the Supreme Court, an intermediate-level appellate court, district 
courts, and appointed magistrates.  The appellate judges and district judges would 
be selected by a judicial nominating commission, which would select three 
candidates.  The governor would then appoint one of those three candidates to the 
position.  With the exception of funding, the legislature would take little or no 
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role in the judiciary.  Decisions on personnel, assignments, and rulemaking would 
be made by the chief justice.   Justices of the peace would be abolished, as would 
the Court of Criminal Appeals.  After six years, the appointed judge would be 
subject to a retention vote, in which the voter would answer the question, "Should 
Judge John Doe be retained in office?" 
 The Sneed plan signature drive immediately ran into trouble.  Despite 
enthusiastic participation by the League of Women Voters, by mid-October it 
became obvious the petition drive was stalling at substantially less than the 
required 140,000 signatures.  Over the next month, urban Oklahoma's 
newspapers, led by the Daily Oklahoman and Oklahoma City Times, launched 
editorial onslaughts urging voters to sign the petition.  On October 19th, the 
Oklahoman, in a front page editorial entitled "Have We Forgotten?",  the editors 
reminded its readers of the humiliation of the scandal and urged the adoption of 
the "well thought out" Sneed plan.
38
  Two days later, the paper quoted Clarke 
Thomas, its own editorial writer and secretary-treasurer of Judicial Reform, Inc., 
as tying the plan to industrial growth, claiming Oklahoma's demonstrating that it 
had abolished "justice for sale" would help attract new industry to the state. 
39
  
The next week, in an editorial entitled "We Need Best Judges," the paper heartily 
endorsed the Sneed plan, pointing out the need for taking judges out of politics.  
The writer, probably Thomas, argued that until 1846 judges were selected by 
appointment, not election, and therefore judicial appointment is the traditional 
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American way.  Dramatically, the author told the readers  that only two countries 
elect judges: "the United States and Communist Russia."
40
  Other newspapers, 
including those from Tulsa, joined in the campaign for signatures.  
 One of the problems was the high number of signatures required by 
Oklahoma's constitution for a constitutional amendment to be placed on the 
ballot, a number which had been established by the delegates of Oklahoma's 
constitutional convention.  In the early twentieth century the concepts of initiative 
petition and referendum were relatively new; in 1898 South Dakota had become 
the first state to enact this reform, so at the time of statehood the concept had been 
law in any of the states for less than a decade.  Initiative petition and referendum 
became important ideas in  Populist and Progressive movements of the 1890s and 
early 1900s.  Populists, generally rural and provincial,  distrusted corporate 
control over farmers and workers.  The more urban, educated, and affluent 
Progressives co-opted many of the Populists issues, in their desire, as Woodrow 
Wilson put it, "to let the majority into the game."
41
  As Richard Hofstadter states 
in The Age of Reform, his classic work on the Progressive movement, "By 1900 
Populism and Progressivism emerge, although a close student may find in the 
Progressive era two broad strains of thought, one influenced by the Populist 
inheritance, the other mainly a product of urban life."
42
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 The Populist influence had an enormous effect on Oklahoma's 
constitutional convention. The largely self-educated and agrarian delegates, most 
of whom had emigrated to the area in the last few years, had little in common 
with urbane Progressive political figures like Woodrow Wilson or Theodore 
Roosevelt.  Instead, the convention's rural Democratic leadership, including its 
chairman William H. Murray, was advised by William Jennings Bryan.  The 
Democratic platform for the convention stated, "We endorse the plan of 
legislation known as the Initiative and Referendum and agree with the Honorable 
William J. Bryan when he says,' The principle of the Initiative and Referendum  is 
Democratic.  It will not be opposed by any Democrat who endorses the 
declaration of Jefferson that the people are capable of self-government.'"
43
  
Oklahoma's enactment of initiative and referendum was also the first plank in the 
Shawnee Demands, a document which resulted from a coalition of the new state's 
farmer and labor organizations.
44
 
 The use of initiative petition eventually passed the constitutional 
convention by the vote of eighty-one to five.  The measure required the signatures 
of eight percent of the voters in order to initiate legislation but required fifteen 
percent of the eligible voters to sign a proposal amending the state constitution.
45
  
This higher requirement for constitutional amendments, which exceeded the 
requirements in the Oregon law backers used as a baseline, seems to have drawn 
little public attention at the time, nor did it receive criticism from progressive 
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historian Charles A. Beard in his 1909 article on Oklahoma's constitution. 
46
  
Instead, the agrarian Democrats were excited to have enacted this procedure, 
which they believed allowed citizens to bypass the legislature and corporation 
interests.  The historical evidence indicates that the relatively high number of 
signatures required by Oklahoma's constitutional framers was probably a 
coincidence and was not intended to deter citizen participation.  Instead, it was in 
all likelihood a good faith mistake.  
 Even with the assistance from the metropolitan press, the Sneed plan 
signature campaign struggled.
47
  On November 4th, with twelve days left before 
the deadline, Sneed announced the petition had between 40,000 and 50,000 
signatures, much less than one-half of the required number.  Sneed announced a 
massive push to obtain the signatures.  Judicial Reform, Inc., assisted by the 
League of Women Voters and PTA groups, put 7,000 petitions in the hands of 
circulators, with 8,000 more to be supplied.
48
   
 Despite the distraction of the November 8th general election, the final 
days before the petition's deadline saw a tremendous increase of public interest in 
the petition promoting judicial reform.  In the relatively small city of Chickasha, 
fourteen volunteers from the League of Women Voters obtained six hundred 
signatures in one day.
49
   In Oklahoma City and Tulsa, members of the PTA 
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conducted a door-to-door petition drive called "Light Up for Justice," which urged 
homeowners wishing to sign the petition to leave their porch lights on, so that a 
volunteer could easily identify a potential signer.
50
  Eventually, the petition's 
backers presented the Secretary of State's office with 142,377 signatures.
51
   
 Although backers of the Sneed plan did not know it then, it would be 
nearly two years until their judicial reform plan went to the voters for their 
consideration.  Under Oklahoma's  demanding procedure for initiative petitions, 
backers of a petition were required to obtain signatures from fifteen percent of the 
"last" general election vote.  Once the petition was turned in, Oklahoma Secretary 
of State John Rogers had the duty to verify the signatures and to determine if the 
requirement had been satisfied.  The Sneed plan petition had been begun before 
the 1966 election but been turned in after the election.  The 1966 election had 
drawn a considerably smaller turnout than the 1964 election, which had featured a 
presidential election as well as the hotly contested U.S. Senate election between 
Fred R. Harris and Bud Wilkinson.  If the "last" general election meant 1964's 
election, the petition drive had fallen twenty-three votes short.  If "last" were 
interpreted as the 1966 election, the petition would go to the voters.
52
   
  Rogers obtained an opinion from Attorney General Charles Nesbitt, who 
advised him to follow the numbers in the 1966 election.  On April 25th, Rogers 
approved the petition; opponents immediately appealed this decision, which put 
the election on hold pending an appellate ruling.  In the meantime, 1967 was an 
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off-year for elections, and Governor Bartlett did not call for a special election.  
The Sneed plan was not to go before the voters until 1968, nearly two years after 
its being turned in to the Secretary of State. 
 In the meantime, the legislature had taken advantage of the time between 
sessions to study and debate the issue.  As the 1966 election approached, the 
legislative subcommittee came up with the bare bones of a plan to be presented to 
the entire legislature in January.  By August, the council had agreed on a proposed 
reorganization of the trial courts.  Under the legislative proposal, municipal, 
county, and justice of the peace courts would be abolished.  The position of 
associate district judge would be created as an elective post, guaranteeing one 
judge for each of the seventy-seven counties.  The associate district judge would 
have general jurisdiction, meaning that judge had authority to hear any type of 
case. The plan also included the creation of the post of special district judge, who 
would be appointed by the district judges, to handle smaller civil cases, 
misdemeanors, and preliminary felony matters.  Courts of common pleas and 
special sessions would be abolished, as would the positions of county judge and 
juvenile judge.  In an issue of enormous importance to the legislature, control of 
the creation of courts, allocation of judicial resources, and the number of judges 
would be decided by the legislature, not the chief justice, as in the Sneed plan.
53
  
The committee rejected the idea of placing near-total control of the courts in the 
hands of the chief justice.
54
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 In September the subcommittee revealed its proposal for reforming the 
appellate courts.  Although most states did not have an appeals court specifically 
for criminal cases, the legislature proposal retained the Court of Criminal 
Appeals, which would be abolished under the Sneed plan.  It also created 
intermediate civil courts of appeal and the office of court administrator, as well as 
directing that the office of clerk of the Supreme Court be an appointed, rather than 
elected, position.
55
   
 At the suggestion of Senator Anthony Massad of Frederick, the committee 
decided to submit the proposal to the voters in two separate questions: one on 
streamlining the court system and the other on judicial selection.  Massad thought 
court reorganization would probably pass easily, unless it were to be tied to 
judicial selection.  The two questions would therefore be submitted separately.  
On October 28th, only eleven days before the general election, the committee 
approved its plan for judicial selection, which called for non-partisan election of 
judges at the appellate and trial levels; the only exception would be the newly 
created special district judges, who would be appointed by trial judges.  Two 
senators,  Massad and Roy Grantham, dissented; each preferred some version of a 
system in which appellate judges were appointed and trial judges elected. 
56
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 Oklahoma now had two competing court reform proposals on the table, 
either of which would constitute a vast improvement over the existing structure.   
Both plans fixed the state's confusing and contradictory jurisdictional issues by 
establishing one district court.  Both abolished partisan judicial elections and the 
justice of the peace system.  Each called for administration of the courts by a 
court administrator.  Only the legislative plan called for a separate Court of 
Criminal Appeals, while only the Sneed plan authorized the continuation of 
municipal courts. 
 Although both plans called for substantial reform, there were substantial 
differences between the proposals.  The first involved how judges would be 
selected.  The cornerstone of the Sneed plan was appointment of judges.
57
  Under 
Sneed's plan all judges would be appointed, with all judges except magistrates 
being screened by the judicial nominating commission, then selected by the 
governor.  The legislative plan called for all judges but special district judges to 
be elected on a nonpartisan ballot.   
 The second difference was irreconcilable.  With the exception of 
appropriations, the Sneed plan gave entire authority for creation of judgeships, 
creation of judicial districts, and assignment of personnel to the chief justice.  The 
legislature's plan specifically reserved that right to itself.  It seems unlikely that 
Oklahoma's legislature would ever have voluntarily  surrendered that right.   
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 Under the legislative plan, the Oklahoma constitution would provide for 
the office of one associate district judge for every county, regardless of the 
county's population.  The concept of not having at least one judge per county was 
anathema to rural voters, who were already apprehensive about their diminishing 
role in state politics with the state's increasing urbanization.  The legislative plan 
therefore guaranteed that every courthouse would have a judge.  The Sneed plan, 
which provided for judicial assignments from Oklahoma City, had little to offer 
rural voters. 
 Debating the merits of the two plans overlooked another question about 
court reform.  Oklahoma law required any change to its constitution to be 
approved by the electorate.  Nobody knew whether conservative Oklahoma voters 
would support any sort of serious change to their legal structure.  The respective 
merits of the Sneed plan and the legislature's plan were moot if voters did not see 
the need to change the system at all.   
 
THE 1966 CAMPAIGN 
 Republican Henry Bellmon's gubernatorial victory in 1962 was widely 
seen to be an aberration, and the governor's race drew intense interest, especially 
from Democrats.  Thirteen Democrats, including former governor Raymond Gary, 
Attorney General Charles Nesbitt, Oklahoma City attorney Preston Moore, Tulsa 
District Attorney David Hall, Oklahoma state senator Cleeta John Rogers, and 
Oklahoma City publisher J. Leland Gourley filed for the party's nomination.  
165 
 
Three Republicans filed; Tulsa state senator Dewey F. Bartlett and Waukomis 




 We now know that 1966 was a year of enormous progress for the 
Republican Party, in the South and nationally as well, showing the party's 
recovery from the 1964 debacle.  Signaling the change was the reemergence of 
former Vice-President Richard Nixon and the unexpected landslide election of 
former actor Ronald Reagan as governor of California.  In the South, U.S. Senator 
John Tower from Texas, whose surprise 1961 victory had been seen as a fluke, 
was reelected, and Howard Baker of Tennessee defeated a former governor for a 
seat in the U.S. Senate.  The political scene in Oklahoma conformed with these 
national trends. 
 The Oklahoma judiciary and bar received another black eye when Judge 
Kirksey Nix, who was serving on the Court of Criminal Appeals, filed for the 
Democratic nomination as Attorney General.
59
  Nix refused to give up his seat on 
the Court of Criminal Appeals, completely ignoring an Oklahoma statute which 
clearly required a judge running for a non-judicial office to resign.  The 
Oklahoma Bar Association, at the instance of OBA president and judicial 
reformer Leroy Blackstock, took Nix to the Supreme Court, which then referred 
the matter back to the OBA.
60
  Nix explained his refusal to resign by explaining 
that Governor Bellmon would fill a vacancy with a Republican.  Judge Nix 
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remained on the ballot; he came in second in the Democratic primary, then 
withdrew before the runoff.
61
 
 Most of the gubernatorial candidates favored some version of court 
reform.  Of the Democrats, Nesbitt and Rogers favored the Missouri plan.  
Several other Democrats, including Gary, supported appointment of appellate 
judges and non-partisan election of judges at the trial level.  Moore opposed an 
appointive system and favored continued election of all judges.  On the 
Republican side, Bartlett favored the Sneed plan, while Camp supported 
continued election of judges. 
62
 
 In the May 3rd primary, former governor Gary took a substantial lead, 
which eventually grew to 56,000 votes.  Oklahoma City attorney Preston Moore 
narrowly made the runoff, set for three weeks later, against Gary, edging out 
Tulsa prosecutor David Hall.  Bartlett narrowly led Camp in the voting for the 
Republican gubernatorial nomination, but the race was so close the few votes for 
a third candidate forced Oklahoma's first Republican gubernatorial runoff.
63
 
 Voters in the May 3rd election also approved the establishment of a Court 
on the Judiciary, finally providing a practical vehicle to remove corrupt, 
incompetent, or infirm judges from offices.  State Question 431 had met with little 
or no opposition, and it passed easily.   The formidable and time-consuming task 
of removing judges by impeachment would not happen again.  Oklahoma voters 
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also approved a constitutional amendment allowing governors to serve two terms, 
ending the requirement that a governor leave office after four years.
64
 
  In the Democratic runoff,  Gary's campaign, which was based almost 
solely on his appeal in rural Oklahoma, lost steam.   Moore, helped by low pro-
Gary rural turnout, easily overcame his 56,000 vote deficit in the primary and 
defeated Gary by about 30,000 votes. 
65
  Thanks in part to a huge majority in 
Tulsa County, Bartlett defeated Camp for the Republican nomination. 
 A veteran of the Pacific theatre in World War II, Preston Moore was a 
lawyer.  His real interests, however, were politics and the American Legion.  
While he was still in law school, Moore became the Legion's  state commander in 
1948 and then national commander in 1958.  His Legion work allowed him access 
to national politics, and in 1960 he directed Lyndon Johnson's presidential 
campaign in Oklahoma.   Two years later he became a Democratic gubernatorial 
candidate, finishing third to Bill Atkinson and Raymond Gary.
66
  Moore endorsed 
Atkinson in the runoff, a decision which caused bitter feelings with Gary.  This 
fact would become significant four years later.  
 Moore's legal career had not taken the traditional path.  He never really 
developed a large private practice, nor did he have the patience for developing 
clientele, drafting documents, and the tension of litigation.   Instead he 
concentrated on labor-management railroad arbitration.
67
  In the 1966 
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gubernatorial campaign,  Republicans were able to use this against him, running 
ads cryptically asking "What does Preston Moore really do for a living?" 
68
 
 Dewey Bartlett was a fitting representative of a more urban and urbane 
postwar Oklahoma. He had grown up in Ohio, then graduated from Princeton 
University in 1942, then served in the Marine Corps during World War II.  After 
the war Bartlett moved to Tulsa, joining his father's oil company.  He successfully 
ran for the state senate in 1962 and had served one term when he entered the 
governor's race.  A Roman Catholic, he would become the first person of that 
religion to become governor of Oklahoma.  Unusually for a politician, Bartlett 
was a publicly solemn, shy man with little small talk.
69
 
 Moore entered the general election campaign with a huge lead, and it 
became obvious that his strategy was, in the words of an Oklahoma City Times 
reporter, "Don't rock the boat."
70
  An aggressive Republican campaign quickly 
became a serious problem for Moore.  Moore became his own worst enemy, as he 
repeatedly evaded being pinned down on issues, therefore allowing Bartlett to 
portray him as a flip-flopper.  As the Tulsa Daily World put it, "Republicans say 
they are attacking Preston Moore on all the firm stands he took before he wised 
up and changed them."
71
 
 This was true of court reform. On that subject, Moore clearly established 
himself as an advocate of judicial elections and an opponent of the Missouri plan; 
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other than that, it was hard to tell what Moore's position was.
72
   Moore vaguely 
said he was for "modernization and streamlining of the courts," but he never 
explained exactly what he had in mind.
73
  He took the vague, indecisive, and 
evasive action of appointing his own committee to study the court reform issue.
74
   
In early October, Moore sent his Oklahoma County campaign chairman to a 
meeting of justices of the peace; the purpose of the meeting was to discuss defeat 
of the Sneed plan.  He also tried to persuade the legislative committee to back 
away from the idea of abolishing JPs and wrote the JP organization a letter telling 
them he would use his power as governor to retain them.
75
  Moore's only specific 
proposed reform was to abolish the JP fee-based compensation system.
76
  On the 
whole, although Moore said he was for court reform, his actions stated otherwise.  
Without the abolition of the JP system, no meaningful reform was possible. 
  Bartlett strongly endorsed the concept of appointment of appellate judges.  
He impractically suggested that "local units" could decide on the appropriate 
system for selecting trial judges.
77
  This led Oklahoman columnist Ray Parr to 
comment that Bartlett was "neither for nor against the Sneed plan," while Moore 
was "all for judicial reform as long as we don't change anything."
78
 
 As the campaign progressed, Moore began to lose ground to Bartlett.  
Gary, avenging Moore's endorsement of his opponent four years earlier, declined 
                                                          
72
 Oklahoman, May 10, 1966, p.1. 
73
 Oklahoman, October 14, 1966, p.8. 
74




 Tulsa Daily World, November 3, 1966, p.3. 
77
 Oklahoman, October 14, 1966, p.9. 
78
 Ray Parr, "Parr for the Course," Oklahoman, September 11, 1966, p.12. 
170 
 
to endorse Moore, stating simply that he and Moore didn't "see eye to eye on 
governmental problems."
79
  Republicans were able to tie Moore's campaign to 
questionable efforts by the nursing home lobby to persuade nursing home patients 
of dubious competence to vote for Moore.
80
  The Daily Oklahoman and 
Oklahoma City Times  ran strong editorials opposing Moore, calling him a 
"political backslapper" and an "arranger."
81
   Bartlett also exploited the declining 
popularity of the Democratic Party nationwide, asking voters, "If my opponent is 
elected governor, who will really be the governor-LBJ or J.D. McCarty?'
82
  
Republicans also repeatedly questioned Moore's qualifications to be governor, 
challenging voters to ask themselves exactly what they knew about Preston 
Moore. 
 In the meantime, J.D. McCarty was having his own problems with his 
reelection campaign.  A Republican, Oklahoma City funeral director Vondel 
Smith, had entered the race for McCarty's seat in the legislature.  
Reapportionment had changed McCarty's district; instead of being largely 
confined to Capitol Hill in southwest Oklahoma City, it now included parts of 
Midwest City and Del City, municipalities which had barely existed when 
McCarty entered the legislature. The remapped district was near Tinker Air Force 
Base and contained many newer voters and homes.
83
  Eager to get rid of McCarty, 
Republican activists used crisscross directories for the entire district, drawing up 
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lists of every family, where they worked, what church they attended, how many 
children they had, and other pertinent information.  They then made personal  
contact with every voter they could find.
84
  In his advertisements, Smith chose not 
to name McCarty or mention his legal difficulties, simply running his own 
photograph, name, and the legislative district he sought to represent.
85
  By the 
week before the election, Smith claimed to have contacted everyone in the 
district, and Republicans were very optimistic about their chances of ousting 
Speaker McCarty from the legislature. 
86
  Although little or nothing was said 
publicly, the unresolved grand jury investigation into McCarty's financial dealings 
with the racing interests was undoubtedly in the back of many voters' minds. 
 Always the astute political strategist, McCarty realized that he was in 
trouble and had expressed his worry to his political allies.
87
  No friend of the 
Oklahoma City daily newspapers, he nevertheless heavily advertised in them, 
describing his political and philanthropic accomplishments and telling readers, 
"When there's work to be done...J.D. McCarty is Oklahoma's Man of Action."
88
  
The Saturday before the election, McCarty ran a full-page ad in the Oklahoma 
City Times, citing his awards for contributions to mental health and cerebral 
palsy, claiming "McCarty gets things done for his district and all Oklahoma 
too."
89
  McCarty also arranged for a train carrying Democratic candidates from 
Oklahoma City through southern Oklahoma to stop in his district, where those 
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attending heard from Senator Fred Harris, Moore, Congressman John Jarman, and 
other Democratic candidates.
90
  McCarty told his audience, "Those boys in their 
ivory tower at Fourth and Broadway (the Oklahoman and Times) have stayed up 
nights trying to do two things--slanting the news columns and writing editorials to 




 Election Day featured good weather, and voter turnout was heavy.  The 
1966 Oklahoma election resulted in overwhelming victories for Republicans and a 
debacle for Democrats, making the result the best for Oklahoma Republicans 
since 1928.
92
  Bartlett, aided by huge majorities in Oklahoma and Tulsa Counties, 
easily defeated Moore by a final total of 377,078 to 296,328.
93
  In Tulsa County, 
Bartlett's margin was an overwhelming 67,080 to 28,673 for Moore.
94
  G.T. 
Blankenship, who had exposed the scandal on the House floor, became the first 
Republican Attorney General in Oklahoma history.  Blankenship had campaigned 
on a slogan of "He uncovered the court scandals," publishing a cartoon of 
Blankenship pointing his finger at three fleeing judges in robes.
95
  Republicans 
also elected the state labor commissioner, making three statewide victories for the 
party. 
 U.S. Senator Fred Harris, who had expected a huge victory against token 
Republican opposition, struggled but was reelected, although by a much closer 
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margin than he had expected.  Over the next six years, Harris would move sharply 
to the left, even in relation to the national party and certainly far away from his 
conservative constituents in Oklahoma.  He found himself  unable and unwilling 
to stand for reelection in 1972, opting for a short-lived and quixotic campaign for 
the Democratic presidential nomination.  In southwestern Oklahoma, Republican 
James V. Smith unseated Democratic Congressman Jed Johnson.  Republicans 
picked up seven seats in the state legislature.   
 One of those seven legislative seats changing parties was McCarty's.  
After McCarty's thirteen terms in the legislature, Vondel Smith overwhelmingly 
defeated the speaker by almost a two-to-one margin.  McCarty had indeed been an 
ironfisted speaker with a fearsome temper and a fierce resistance to change.
96
  
However, as Travis Welsh, the state government writer for the Tulsa Daily World 
pointed out, McCarty also had his good points.  McCarty had an encyclopedic 
knowledge of state government and state politics.  He could get things done.  He 
had been a friend to Oklahoma's schools and colleges and had demonstrated 
enormous empathy for Oklahoma's mentally ill people, mentally challenged 
children, and children suffering from cerebral palsy.
97
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 It is tempting to speculate on what might have happened to court reform if 
McCarty had remained speaker.  McCarty had declared his implacable hostility to 
Sneed's plan for appointed judges and his unwavering support for judicial 
elections.  On the other hand, with McCarty as speaker, the legislative council had 
for two years publicly studied the issue.  While McCarty had not publicly 
participated in the council, there is no evidence that he interfered with their work 
or tried to stop the meetings.  Had McCarty intended to kill court reform outright, 
he had no reason to allow the legislature to give the issue momentum.  He also 
had the referendum on the Sneed plan, which he hated, hanging over his head, 
pending the outcome of litigation.  McCarty would have wanted to deflect Sneed's 
plan.  If McCarty had remained in office, he probably would have allowed some 
sort of court reform, probably nonpartisan election of all judges, to be submitted 
to the people.   
 Had Moore been elected governor, his embrace of the justices of the peace 
would have made court reform more unlikely.  Abolition of the office of justice of 
the peace, with its inherent amateurism and conflicts of interest, was the 
cornerstone of any meaningful improvement in Oklahoma's judicial system.  
Substantial change in the judiciary, therefore, would have had to have been 
enacted without the support of the governor. 
 As Oklahoma political writer Otis Sullivant noted at the time, the 1966 
election validated the Republican party in Oklahoma and proved that Bellmon's 
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1962 election was not a fluke.
98
  Oklahoma Republicans had capitalized on public 
satisfaction with Governor Bellmon's term and offered a better and larger slate of 
candidates than it had offered previously.
99
  The Oklahoma results were also 
representative of the 1966 election nationwide.  It is safe to say that national 
issues and disillusionment with the national Democratic Party contributed greatly 
to the Republican victories in Oklahoma.  
  During the two years after his landslide 1964 victory, President Johnson 
had seen his public support decline precipitously.  Americans recoiled from huge 
increases in public spending, the expansion of the federal government, the 
passage of civil rights legislation, the expansion of the Vietnam War, and 
enactment of social welfare legislation.   As noted previously, California elected 
Ronald Reagan as governor of California, who quickly became an icon for 
conservative Republicans.  The campaign also brought renewed legitimacy to the 
political fortunes of Richard Nixon, who campaigned tirelessly and effectively for 
Republican candidates across the country, acquiring political capital for his race 
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 With the removal of Johnson, prosecutions of those responsible for the 
Supreme Court scandal ended.  However, scandal and favoritism still existed in 
Oklahoma's state government; the allegations against McCarty led to his 
surprising defeat at the polls.  With their votes in the 1966 election, the electorate 
demonstrated its weariness with business as usual in state government and their 
desire for honesty and integrity in the capitol.  
 The election of Bartlett and the defeat of McCarty helped create a political 
climate in Oklahoma friendly to reform of the courts.  If either election had gone 
differently, it is almost certain that any change in Oklahoma's judiciary would 
have taken a different course.  The looming referendum on the Sneed plan 
weighed heavily on the Oklahoma legislature as it prepared for its 1967 session.   






THE ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND THE 
DEFEAT OF THE SNEED PLAN 
  
NEW LEADERSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROPOSAL 
 The Oklahoma electorate had signaled its desire to change from the rural 
conservative politics of the state's first decades.  With the elections of 
Edmondson, Bellmon, and Bartlett, Oklahomans had selected governors three 
times in succession who had no ties to the legislative establishment.  McCarty's 
defeat, coming amid the allegations of scandal, also indicated  that voters were 
fed up with their state government.  However, the growing public disillusionment 
with the state's politics should not be seen in terms of liberal versus conservative.  
Oklahomans in the 1960s remained very politically conservative and by their 
votes in 1966 had resoundingly rejected the big government politics of Lyndon 
Johnson.  Instead, the changing trend represented two themes: the state's changing 
demographics and voter resentment at being excluded from governmental 
decision making by special interests, who were meeting behind closed doors. 
 J.D. McCarty's defeat at the polls meant the position of Speaker of the 
House had unexpectedly opened.  Rex Privett of Maramec immediately became a 
candidate.  Although Representative Jerry Sokolosky of Oklahoma City claimed 
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to have obtained the support of younger, urban legislators for another candidate, 
Privett moved quickly and almost immediately clinched the position, securing the 
support of sixty-nine out of a possible seventy-four Democratic representatives.  
In his acceptance speech, Privett turned the page, saying, "I do not condemn the 
past speaker, but I realize that the past is gone and the future is ahead.  It is our 
duty to change the image of the legislature."   
 Privett quickly established his control of the House of Representatives, 
keeping some of McCarty's team but not consulting with McCarty.
1
  Promising a 
greater role for urban legislators, Privett outlined five problems the legislature 
need to address: education, court reform, congressional redistricting, penal 
reform, and improvements in mental institutions.
2
  On the subject of court reform, 
Privett expressed his preference for non-partisan election of all judges and the 
submission of proposed state questions on one ballot, not two ballots as proposed 
by the legislative commission.
3
   
 Dewey Bartlett was inaugurated as governor on January 10, 1967.  In his 
inaugural address, Bartlett stated, "I have prepared for introduction a 
constitutional amendment for the selection of appellate judges by appointment, 
rather than election."  Bartlett then showed his seriousness on the subject of a 
judicial nominating commission by announcing his own voluntary judicial 
nominating commission to make recommendations on vacancies occurring during 
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his term under the existing law.  Bartlett's voluntary plan called for a commission 
consisting of six attorneys elected by the Oklahoma Bar Association and seven 
lay people, four from one party and three from the other, to nominate three 
candidates for judicial openings.  Bartlett would then select one of those three 
candidates for the position.
4
  One of the first two bills Bartlett caused to be 
introduced during the session called for making appellate judges appointive.
5
 
 As the parties continued to negotiate judicial reform, the state government 
and the legal community faced yet another embarrassing and troubling scandal 
involving attorneys  and undue influence.  This one involved the Corporation 
Commission, a regulatory commission composed of three commissioners elected 
in statewide elections, which governs, among other things, utility rates and 
portions of the oil and gas industry.  In March and April, the legislature and 
public learned the late Clyde Hale, Sr., who had been an attorney and lobbyist for 
Oklahoma Natural Gas, had regularly paid fees to James Welch and William L. 
Anderson, fulltime attorneys for the commission, while the utility had rate 
increase cases pending before the commission.  Welch, during the time he was 
chief counsel for the Corporation Commission, had received more than $12,500 
from Hale.
6
  In one instance Welch, who was making $10,000 per year as a 
salaried attorney for the commission,  received a fee of $5,375 from ONG shortly 
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 Hale's son Clyde, Jr. also claimed that ONG had, through his father, made 
significant cash contributions to the campaigns of commissioners Ray Jones and 
Harold Freeman, a practice which violated Oklahoma's law barring corporations 
from giving political donations. The commissioners had also allegedly accepted 
lavish entertainment from ONG, including annual trips to the Oklahoma-Texas 
football game and trips to the horse race track at Hot Springs, Arkansas.
8
  
Attorneys practicing before the commission had routinely made cash 
contributions toward political campaigns, a policy which Freeman explained by 
arguing "if they all kick in, that must mean we are doing a good job."
9
   
 Freeman and Jones had also purchased shares in a Pauls Valley oilfield 
supply company. Freeman had then solicited and received business for the 
company from ONG and Sunray DX, both regulated by the Corporation 
Commission.
10
  A legislative committee headed by Senator Roy Grantham 
investigating the commission's affairs eventually found the testimony of the 
witnesses, including lawyers Welch and Hale, Jr., so unworthy of belief that the 
committee was unable to determine with precision exactly what had happened.   
The panel also found that Hale, Jr., Welch, Anderson, and a fourth attorney all 
had violated legal ethics and referred the matter to the Oklahoma Bar 
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  The scandal eventually  gradually drifted out of public attention, 
but the bar and the state government still suffered further damage to their 
reputations. 
 Since the legislature now met annually, legislators had personal financial 
incentive to minimize the length of the session.  As one legislator put it, "I used to 
have eighteen months to go home and make some money.  With annual sessions, 
we'll have to keep them short or we'll have to get out."  Senate President Pro 
Tempore Clem McSpadden announced a goal of adjournment by May 1st, which 
would mean the session would last less than four months.
12
 
 By the end of March,  judicial reform had stalled in the state senate.  The 
House of Representatives passed a bill abolishing justices of the peace and 
electing all judges on a non-partisan ballot.  The Senate expected to call for 
appointment of appellate judges.  Political prognosticators expected the process to 
take a few weeks.
13
 
 Both houses of the legislature were able to agree on some concepts, while 
others were more controversial.   Both agreed on reorganization of the courts, 
with the creation of district judges, associate district judges, and special judges. 
The houses agreed that each county would be guaranteed an associate district 
judge.  The Court of Criminal Appeals, a court which did not exist in most states,  
would continue to exist as an institution.  Oklahoma's common pleas courts, 
superior courts, and other specialized courts were to be abolished.   
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 The two houses were unable to agree on the process for selection of 
appellate judges.  The idea of a judicial nominating commission held very little 
appeal in the House of Representatives, which overwhelmingly favored direct 
election of all judges on a non-partisan ballot.  The concept of a commission had 
considerably more support in the Senate, but even in that chamber appellate judge 
appointment met serious opposition. 
14
  
 By late April, the idea of appointive appellate judges was in such trouble 
that the entire issue of court reform was threatened.  The House passed a package 
authorizing a vote on reforming the courts with all judges elected on a nonpartisan 
ballot.  Although McSpadden, the Senate's leader, favored appellate judge 
appointment, the Senate voted in favor of all judges being elected.  Speaker 
Privett was an opponent of the idea of the judicial nomination commission, and he 
declared that he had no reason to believe the House would ever vote in favor of it.  
Surprisingly, Bartlett, the leading proponent of the idea of the judicial nominating 




 The parties finally began to make progress when Bartlett, McSpadden, and 
Privett discussed the subject over breakfast on April 24th.  The constant threat of 
the Sneed plan made the formation of a legislative plan acceptable to the voters 
essential, which provided motivation to reach a solution.  The Sneed plan vote 
became even more problematic for legislators the next day, when Secretary of 
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State John Rogers upheld the validity of the signatures on the Sneed plan 
initiative petition, leaving an appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court as the last 
barrier to the plan's being submitted to the voters.
16
  Court reform was also the 
last remaining issue in the legislative session, so the desire to go home also added 
a sense of urgency.   
 Although the breakfast by no means settled the dispute, the leaders  
generally agreed to submit both issues, appellate appointment and non-partisan 
election of all judges, to the voters and allow the electorate to decide which 
proposal, if either, it wanted.
17
  The legislature's primary opposition to the idea of 
a judicial nominating commission was the governor's power to appoint six 
members of the commission.  Some legislators were reluctant to cede so much 
power to the governor, leading Senator Robert Gee to suggest that the governor 
appoint two members, with the other four to be named by the Speaker of the 
House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.   
 On Sunday, May 7th, the conference committees reached an agreement on 
most of the legislation.  Bartlett's insistence on a judicial nominating commission 
overcame the legislature's general distaste for the concept, and the commission 
remained in the proposal.   Privett's insistence on a quick election resulted in a 
special election date of July 11th, only two months away.  Bartlett agreed to 
nonpartisan election of trial judges and the three-tiered court system consisting of 
district judges, associate district judges, and special judges at the trial level, a civil 
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court of appeals, and a court of criminal appeals.  The Supreme Court would have 
the final word on civil appeals and court supervision.  The office of court 
administrator, which would administer budgets and manpower from Oklahoma 
City,  would also be created.  For the moment, however, the question of who 




 A final agreement on the proposal came from the conference committee 
and the governor the next day.  Court reform would be submitted to the people on 
colored ballots.  Court reorganization would appear on a white ballot, while the 
judicial nominating commission would be placed on a yellow ballot.  If court 
reorganization failed, the judicial nominating commission would automatically 
fail as well.  The nominating commission would be composed of thirteen 
members, six elected from the Oklahoma Bar Association and six appointed by 
the governor.  The thirteen commissioner would be appointed by the twelve 
existing members.
19
  Three days later the legislature adopted the proposal, 
authorized the July election, and adjourned.
20
 
  The passage of the proposed constitutional amendments reflected very 
well on the legislative process.  If the plan were approved by the voters, the 
legislature had abolished the antiquated and ethically suspect justice of the peace 
system.  They had modernized and centralized the court structure, as well as 
taking a strong step toward professionalizing the judiciary.  Despite the 
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differences in political parties, the legislature and the governor had successfully 
compromised and reached a workable proposal.  Bartlett had gotten his 
nominating commission, if only for appellate judges and mid-term trial court 
vacancies, while the House had been able to limit the use of the commission to 
those instances.  Representative McCune told his fellow conference committee 
members, "This is a better way to beat the Missouri plan...If both resolutions pass, 




THE 1967 SPECIAL ELECTION 
 One of the legislation's problems was its complexity.  With the broad 
nature of the proposal and the contingent nature of the yellow and white ballots, 
the danger of confusing and boring the electorate was very real.  Because of its 
lower number, State Question 447, the yellow ballot which was contingent on the 
passage of SQ 448, would appear on the ballot before SQ 448.  For the huge 
majority of Oklahomans not normally involved in the details of politics and law, 
the proposal was puzzling; only a motivated voter would take the time to analyze 
the issues.  The complicated nature of the proposals would prove to be 
problematic on July 11th. 
 Voters had less than two months in which to consider State Questions 447 
and 448.  This proved to be plenty of time for reform advocates.  The only really 
organized opposition to the questions came from the Oklahoma AFL-CIO, which 
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endorsed the idea of nonpartisan elections but strongly opposed the concept of the 
judicial nominating commission.   Jack Odom, the executive vice-president of the 
organization, stated he did not "trust the Republican administration" to name 
nonpartisan judges.  The state organization of the Oklahoma Democratic Party 
listened to Odom's request for assistance but took no action on SQ 447 and 448.
22
  
The Oklahoma League of Women Voters, leading backers of the Sneed plan, 
considered the legislative plan an improvement over the existing system, 




 In the days after the legislature's adjournment, the proponents debated 
what to do.  Bartlett had pushed for court reform, and he was seen as laying his 
prestige on the line for the issue.  The Oklahoma Republican party favored the 
reform,  but its leaders were unsure, considering their status as a minority party,  
about whether to campaign publicly for the questions.  The Oklahoma Democratic 
party was also unsure of what course it should take.  The Democrats were trying 
to shed their image of portraying, as Otis Sullivant put it, an "old guard, rural 
dominated opposition to progress" but had no wish to enhance Bartlett's standing 
with the state's voters.
24
 
 As the date for the election drew closer, the parties began to back away 
from the issue of court reform.  The campaign, such as it was, fell between the 
cracks.  State Question 448, which reorganized the courts and made judicial 
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elections nonpartisan, met virtually no organized opposition.  The only real 
exception came from some county officials, who feared a loss of revenue 
generated by the JP courts.  The legislative council quickly agreed to support 
legislation guaranteeing that counties would not lose revenue, and the public 
objections faded away.
25
   
 State Question 447, the proposal for the judicial nominating commission 
for appellate judges and for filling openings on the trial bench, drew considerably 
more fire than SQ 448.  Senator John Young of Sapulpa, a vociferous opponent of 
the commission, wrote,  "The vested interests in the name of reform are trying to 
sell the people on the yellow ballot, wherein they would be deprived of their right 
of electing judges...The judicial reformers are telling the people that the lawyers 
of the Oklahoma Bar Association and heavy campaign supporters of the 
Governor, who are named on the commission, are better citizens than the rest of 
us and should have the exclusive right of selecting the people's judges."
26
 
 For the most part, though, the campaign was very quiet.  With the 
exception of one sparsely-attended public meeting at the Oklahoma Bar Center, 
Bartlett, who probably had the most to lose if the state questions failed, remained 
out of the fray.
27
  On July 5th, six days before the election, Bartlett spoke at a 
large civic luncheon in Duncan, which was celebrating its 75th anniversary as a 
city.  His remarks centered persuading his audience to "sell Oklahoma"; the 
newspaper account of his speech did not mention the pending court reform 
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  Bartlett's absence from the nonexistent campaign was also noted by 
Oklahoman columnist Ray Parr, who noted in his folksy-styled political column , 
"I got to admire Governor Bartlett's technique in this campaign.  He is for 'em just 
enough so he can claim credit if they are adopted but is not out in front far enough 
that folks can claim he suffered a political defeat in case they lose."
29
  The co-
publisher of the Durant Daily Democrat, Bob Peterson, noted in his column, "The 
Governor says he's supporting it...although he hasn't been hollering too loudly the 
last few days.  As a matter of fact, none of its other supporters haven't been heard, 
either.."
30
  The Oklahoma Bar Association did hold at least the one public forum 
and provided speakers to civic clubs endorsing the state questions.
31
 
 It is unclear why Bartlett did not take a more active role in the campaign.  
Although Bartlett's papers are silent on the subject, it is obvious from the context 
that Governor Bartlett was very cognizant of his status as a Republican governor 
in a solidly Democratic state.  It is likely that Bartlett thought his taking the lead 
would make the issue more partisan, making its defeat more likely.  
 The state's press saw its role primarily as educating the public on the 
nature of the issues on which it was scheduled to vote.  Most newspapers printed 
articles explaining the state questions and the respective meanings of the yellow 
ballot and the white ballot.  Only in the few days just before the election did it 
receive editorial coverage.  The Oklahoman and the Duncan Banner urged their 
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readers to vote in favor of the issue while the southeastern Oklahoma Durant 
Daily Democrat, citing the complicated nature of the proposals, recommended 
against it.  In rural Grant County in northern Oklahoma, at the local legislator's 
suggestion the Medford Patriot-Star published a long story explaining the 
questions.  The author ended the article by commenting, "In summary, if you 




 Most of the news coverage revolved around the general lack of public 
interest in the special election.  The Duncan Banner reported, "Spot polls have 
indicated a majority of citizens do not even know there is a statewide election, let 
alone what will be on the ballot."
33
  In his column Parr expressed skepticism 
about the entire measure.  Referring to the lack of public interest, he wrote, "You 
suppose there is any chance of this judicial reform election ending in a scoreless 
tie?  Wonder whatever to all the indignation over our present system a while 
back?"  He added that "Not many legislators are going out on a limb for the 
amendments, on account they weren't very enthusiastic about 'em in the first place 
when they submitted 'em.  It was just something to get the people's mind off the 
Sneed plan. "  Finally, Parr expressed doubt about the wisdom of submitting 
constitutional amendments at a special election, when "such a small minority can 
change or refuse to change Oklahoma's fundamental law."
34
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 The frustrated Parr had overstated his case; legislators like McCune, Gee, 
and Massad had worked countless hours on the state questions and had given the 
subject enormous study and thought.  Although the questions were 
unquestionably designed as an alternative to the Sneed plan, the legislators and 
governor had a lot of which to be proud.  However, it was true that the plan, 
achieved through compromise, had no real author, thus no real champion to plead 
the proposal to the public.  
 In the last few days before the election, a small number of political 
advertisements appeared in some newspapers.  An unsigned ad, which appeared  
in the Marietta Monitor in southern Oklahoma and several other Oklahoma 
newspapers, argued, "If you are capable of electing your Governor, you are 
certainly capable of electing your judges...Do you want more taxes?  Would you 
like to support a system of courts that in all probability you will never use?...The 
so-called Judicial Reform plan will cost the taxpayers of Oklahoma $1,450,000 
per year."
35
  The day before the election, sixty Oklahoma County lawyers signed 
an advertisement opposing the state questions.  The attorneys objected both to the 
abolition of the justice of the peace courts and the appointment of judges.
36
 
 Predictions of a light turnout on July 11th proved to be correct.  Only 
about 165,000 Oklahomans voted in the special election.  Aided by huge 
majorities in the Oklahoma City and Tulsa areas, both state questions passed.  
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State Question 448 was approved with 55 percent of the vote, while State 
Question 447, the judicial nominating commission, received 52 percent approval.   
 Two facts stand out from the election returns.  First, the vote margin in 
favor of court reorganization, State Question 448, was surprisingly slim.  The 
legislature and governor had stacked the deck in favor of the measure, setting it 
for a quick special election in which the courts were the only issue on the ballot 
and providing a separate, contingent ballot for the judicial nominating 
commission.  Nevertheless, with these advantages, only fifty-five percent of the 
voters, all of whom had made a special trip to the polls just to vote on these 
issues, voted for it. 
 Secondly, the special election of July 11th illustrates the enormous fissure 
between the urban and rural areas of Oklahoma.  In Oklahoma County, out of 
nearly 29,000 votes cast, State Question 447 received 74 percent of the vote.  
Oklahoma County voters approved SQ 448 by 78 percent.  Tulsa County's 
numbers were similar.  Out of approximately 27,000 votes cast, about 75 percent 
of the voters approved SQ 447 and about 78 percent approved SQ 448.  SQ 448, 
the court reorganization question, carried only eleven counties: Canadian, 
Cleveland, Garfield, Muskogee, Oklahoma, Ottawa, Payne, Pontotoc, Stephens, 
Tulsa, and Washington.  SQ 447, the judicial appointment measure, passed only 
nine counties, as Canadian and Pontotoc County voters narrowly voted it down.  
SQ 447 failed in sixty-eight counties, while SQ 448 failed in sixty-six.  
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 Some of the vote totals are noteworthy.  In staunchly Democratic Love 
County in southern Oklahoma, sixty-two people voted in favor of SQ 448 and 642 
against it; only nine percent of Love County voters approved of court 
reorganization.  In Grant County, a northern Oklahoma county which tended to 
support Republicans, 370 people voted in favor SQ 448 and 945 against.  In 
neither case did the local newspaper take an editorial position.  Both measures 




 It is not clear why the questions did so poorly in rural Oklahoma.  The 
questions were complex and far-reaching; SQ 447, which had the lower number, 
was contingent on the passage of SQ 448.  No one had led an effective statewide 
campaign in favor of the questions, and Governor Bartlett had, for the most part, 
remained quiet on the issue in the month before the election.  Oklahomans 
obviously were skeptical about giving up their right to elect judges.  Proponents 
of the state questions simply had not made a convincing case for change to 
conservative rural Oklahomans. 
 Moreover, the period of the 1960s was a time of great concern for rural 
Oklahomans.  While the population of the state had  increased only slightly, from 
2,233,351 to 2,328,284 during the period from 1950 to 1960, the demographics 
had changed enormously.  Seeing opportunity in the cities, Oklahomans were 
moving to urban areas in enormous numbers.  Between 1950 and 1960, Oklahoma 
City grew 33.2 percent, from a population of 243,504 to 324,253; Tulsa 's 
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population grew from 182,740 to 261,685, an increase of 43.2 percent.  The 
Oklahoma City suburbs of Midwest City, Del City, and The Village, which did 
not exist until after World War II, now housed 36,058, 12,934, and 12,118 people 
respectively.  Smaller cities grew exponentially as well; Lawton grew 77.3 
percent, from 34,737 to 61,697 people, while the population of Altus increased 
from 9,735 to 20,184, an ten year increase of 118 percent.  Bartlesville saw an 
increased population of 45.1 percent.   
 Rural counties saw declines in their population, some of which were 
precipitous.  Cotton County, in southwest Oklahoma, saw a thirty percent 
decrease in its population between 1950 and 1960.  Grant County, located on the 
Kansas border, lost 22.2 percent of its population, while McIntosh County, in the 
eastern part of the state, saw a 30.6 percent decline.  Overall, rural Oklahoma's 
population declined 21.1 percent during the 1950s, while urban Oklahoma's 
population increased 28.6 percent.
38
  The same trend continued throughout the 
1960s.  Communities of less than ten thousand saw their population decline about 
ten percent, while cities of more than ten thousand saw a proportionate  
increase.
39
  Nearly every city above 10,000 experienced a substantial population 
increase, with some, especially suburbs of Oklahoma City and Tulsa, increasing 
dramatically.  Tulsa's population increased twenty-six percent, while the Tulsa 
suburb Sand Springs grew forty-eight percent in the 1960s.   
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 Rural Oklahomans, therefore, found themselves in crisis.  The state's 
urbanization meant that rural Oklahomans were losing businesses and access to 
medical care.  If they chose to sell their home, few buyers were available to 
purchase them.  Judicial reform had little to offer rural Oklahomans.  Further, as 
with the judicially-mandated reapportionment of the legislature, the centralization 
of judicial authority in Oklahoma City constituted another nail, however small, in 
the coffin of rural Oklahomans.   
 In small communities, abandoning the JP system also had limited appeal.   
The JP process, however flawed, was cheap and business-friendly.  In a small 
community,  a vote to abolish the JP system would also be a vote to put a 
neighbor and acquaintance out of a job.  Although the legislative plan guaranteed 
at least one judge per county, rural counties already had that with the county 
judge system.  For rural counties, therefore, the legislative plan was another step 
toward urbanization with little or no advantage for rural communities.  
 
THE 1968 LEGISLATURE 
 Despite the rural opposition, the state questions had passed, and the 
legislative reform had become part of Oklahoma's constitution.  It now became 
the duty of the 1968 legislature to enact the necessary statutes and make the 
necessary appropriations to implement the reform.  While the 1967 session had 
featured bipartisanship, the 1968 version quickly became rancorous.  
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 Public education, which had largely been ignored by the earlier session, 
became the focal point of the legislature's 1968 business.  Even as the previous 
session ended, McSpadden had criticized Bartlett for his lack of an educational 
funding plan.
40
  In the first days of the session, Bartlett, who had campaigned on a 
platform of opposing new taxes, proposed to raise teacher salaries by a total of 
$1,000 over three years, with the increase to be financed from funds then 
allocated from county road funds.  This proposal infuriated both teachers, who 
were angered by the paltriness of the proposal, and the county commissioners, 
who would be losing road revenue.
41
  Despite Bartlett's furious opposition to the 
idea, the political climate was ripe for a tax increase, with the legislature 
reluctantly supporting an increase and the Oklahoman editorializing in favor of a 
higher sales tax.
42
   
 At the end of February, the legislature passed a bill calling for a $500 raise 
for teachers in 1968 and a similar raise in 1969, with the increase to be financed 
by a rise in cigarette and liquor taxes.  Bartlett vetoed the measure.  Oklahoma 
teachers, on the verge of striking, called for a one-day statewide teachers rally to 
take place in Oklahoma City.  On March 5th, one day before the statewide 
meeting, the legislature and the governor agreed on a $1,300 teacher pay increase 
over three years, with the pay raise to be financed by a five cents per pack 
increase in cigarette taxes.  This temporarily settled the salary issue, but the 
problem of teacher retirement remained unresolved and a matter of hot debate 
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until the end of the session.  The rift with Governor Bartlett led Privett to tell a 
meeting of school administrators, "The chief executive thinks the school problem 
is solved for the next three years, but we legislators know better."
43
 
 Even with the distraction of the education crisis, the legislature still had to 
deal with other matters of governing the state, including legislation reestablishing 
a court system complying with the voter-mandated court reforms.  They set 
salaries for trial judges, establishing a pay scale for associate district judges which 
depended on the population of the county in which the judge sat.
44
  Some 
legislators were offended by the conduct of some of the justices of the Supreme 
Court, who personally lobbied legislators, especially those who were also 
attorneys, for pay raises for themselves.
45
   
 Legislators established the post of Special District Judge in counties with  
at least 24,000 people, lowering the requirement from 25,000 in order to 
accommodate the population of Canadian County.  Special judges served at the 
pleasure of the district judges, and their duties were limited.
46
  The legislature  
also established a six-member Court of Appeals, composed of two three-member 
panels, as an intermediate appellate court for civil cases.
47
  Since justices of the 
peace had been abolished, the legislature established a meaningful and efficient 
small claims procedure, authorizing court clerks to assist litigants with pleadings 
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in order to avoid the burdensome cost of attorneys on small cases.
48
  They barred 
judges from seeking any political office other than another judicial office, 
avoiding another incident like Judge Kirksey Nix's distasteful bid for elective 
political office a few years previously.
49
 
 At the end of the session, the progress made on court reform was 
jeopardized by party politics.  Bartlett, after pondering the issue for a week, 
vetoed a bill disabling straight party voting on voting machines.  The legislature 
had passed this legislation, purportedly to comply with the directive that judges be 
elected on a non-partisan ballot.  However, in 1968 only Oklahoma County and 
Tulsa County, both Republican strongholds, even had voting machines, so the 
effect of the bill was to weaken Republican candidates. 
50
 On the last full day of 
the legislature, both houses overrode Bartlett's veto.  It is unknown what would 
have happened to judicial elections without the veto override.  However, it was 
reckless of all parties to risk such great progress on such a small partisan issue.
51
 
 Terms for district judges did not expire until 1970, and the legislation had 
extended their terms until that time.  The newly-created position of associate 
district judge was open for election in 1968.  Sixty-nine county judges filed for 
election as associate district judge; of those, forty-four were unopposed.  Backers 
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of the Sneed plan claimed this development demonstrated an inherent weakness in 




THE SNEED PLAN SPECIAL ELECTION 
 On September 17th, four months after the 1968 legislature adjourned and 
more than a year after the submission of the initiative petition, State Question 
441, the Sneed plan, finally made the Oklahoma ballot.  Because of the number of 
state questions already on the primary election ballot, Bartlett had ordered SQ  
441 placed on the runoff ballot.  As it happened, a runoff was necessary only for a 
few races, the most significant being for the Democratic nomination for 
Corporation Commission.   Political forecasters therefore anticipated a light 
turnout. 
 Governor Bartlett, calling both plans "excellent," announced his neutrality 
on SQ 441.
53
  Elsewhere in the state, however, the question drew heated debate.   
The Oklahoman, whose chief editorial writer Clarke Thomas had been 
instrumental in the plan's petition drive, printed editorials supporting the measure.  
The Oklahoman writers recalled Corn and Cargill's specious claims that bribes 
were campaign contributions and argued that without judicial elections, no 
campaign contributions would be necessary.
54
  In a separate editorial, entitled 
"Lest We Forget," the author called the scandal "the worst black eye Oklahoma 
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ever had" and argued, "Courts must be established by laws that will absolutely 
prevent judges being bought like sheep."
55
  
 Endorsements for the Sneed plan came from newspapers and individuals.  
The Tulsa Tribune backed SQ 441, asking where the  "naysayer" lawyers critical 
of the question were when "the little old ladies in tennis shoes (the League of 
Women Voters and PTA)" were circulating petitions to put it on the ballot.
56
  
Urban newspapers like the Norman Transcript  and the Oklahoma Journal backed 
SQ 441, as did some rural newspapers like the Pawnee Chief , the Hughes County 
Times, and the Beaver Herald-Democrat. 
57
  Former OU coach and U.S. Senate 
candidate Bud Wilkinson endorsed the Sneed plan, as did former Governor and 
U.S. Senate candidate Henry Bellmon, who backed the plan despite his reluctance 
to offend Republican legislative plan opponents like James Connor and Denzil 
Garrison during his own senatorial campaign. Cleveland County District Judge 
Elvin Brown wrote a strongly-worded memo to the local bar favoring the state 
question, claiming increased judicial independence would make experienced 
lawyers more interested in a judicial career.
58
  Conservative Oklahoma County 
District Attorney Curtis Harris also backed the proposal, seeing it as a vehicle for 
abolishing the Court of Criminal Appeals, with which Harris was at odds.
59
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Victor J. Reed, the Roman Catholic bishop of Oklahoma City and Tulsa, endorsed 
SQ 441, as did the suffragen bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Oklahoma.
60
   
 The Sneed forces commissioned a poll, the results of which they released 
about two weeks before the election.  Out of a sampling of 600 voters, 50.7 
percent claimed to be in favor of the Sneed plan, with only 24.7 percent opposing 
the plan and the rest undecided.  In Tulsa 57.3 percent of the sampling claimed to 
support the plan, with 15.7 percent opposed and the rest unopposed.  In the rest of 
the state, including Oklahoma County, northern Oklahoma, eastern Oklahoma, 
and western Oklahoma, voters claimed to favor the Sneed plan by margins 
varying from 54 percent to 46 percent.  Only 39.6 percent of those sampled 
claimed to have voted in the last judicial election; only 30 percent of that number 
knew for whom they had voted.  Five percent felt their judge was "very honest," 
while another 52.7 percent felt their judge to be "somewhat honest."  Sixty-five 
percent claimed to be in favor of reform.  Based on their own poll, the backers of 
SQ 411 therefore had great reason for optimism.
61
 
 However, the Sneed Plan also encountered strong and vocal opposition.  
One of the leading critics was the Tulsa World, which editorialized against the 
plan several times.  A week before the election, the World told its readers the plan 
"would vest all the power over Oklahoma's judiciary in the hands of the Supreme 
Court and its Chief Justice.  That's too much power for any individual...In truth, 
the plan voted by the people last year provides checks and balances on the court 
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system, through the elected Oklahoma legislature."
62
  On the Sunday before the 
election,  an editorial appearing on page one told readers, "Reform isn't limited to 




 Republican legislators Denzil Garrison and James Connor, the Republican 
floor leaders of their respective houses, strongly campaigned against SQ 411.  
Garrison argued that rather than taking the politics out of the judiciary, the plan 
"merely concentrates the politics in a few hands."
64
  In Bartlesville, the hometown 
of both Garrison and Connor, the Washington County Republican and Democratic 
organizations purchased adjoining advertisements in the Bartlesville Examiner 
opposing the proposition.
65
  Four of Tulsa County's six district judges publicly 




 In drafting the plan, the Sneed forces had overlooked the state's Industrial 
Court, which heard workmen's compensation cases.  Adoption of SQ 411 
therefore would have abolished the Industrial Court and forced those cases back 
to the district courts.  Opponents of the Sneed plan gleefully jumped on this 
mistake, claiming the district courts would be overburdened.
67
  In a Tulsa debate 
with Leroy Blackstock, John McCune, the principal author of the legislative plan, 
mentioned this flaw in Sneed's proposal.  Blackstock emphasized the difficulty of 
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ridding the system of substandard rural judges, pointing out that Bryan County 
Judge Glenn Sharpe, who had become the first judge to be removed by the new 
Court on the Judiciary for accepting improper fees, had been unopposed.
68
 
 The Oklahoma electorate was voting for the second time in fifteen months 
on two remarkably similar proposals.  After all, the legislative plan had been 
specifically created to deflect SQ 441, and each greatly changed the system which 
had existed since statehood.  Although there were other differences between the 
plans,  the voters would be called upon to decide two major issues.  First, would 
the state's trial judges be selected by appointment or election?  Second, would the 
legislature or the judiciary itself allocate and assign judicial resources?  
 On September 17th the voters answered those questions.  Although they 
approved the four other state questions on the ballot, the electorate 
overwhelmingly rejected the Sneed plan by a margin of 115,650 in favor to 
171,620 opposed.  SQ 441 carried only three counties: Oklahoma, Cleveland, and 
Payne.  While Oklahoma County's support had been more than two to one in 
favor, the plan narrowly failed in Tulsa County.  In some counties the vote was as 
much as ten to one against the Sneed plan. 
69
  Sixty percent of the voters statewide 
voted against SQ 441. 
 Sneed blamed the defeat in part on the unpopularity of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, then in the midst of a series of liberal rulings on constitutional criminal 
procedure.  He also pointed out the progress made by the legislative plan, stating 
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"The legislative plan is so much superior to what we had in 1966." When asked if 
he would try to bring the matter back at a later time, Sneed replied, "Not at this 
time." 
70
  The Sneed plan was dead. 
 The Sneed plan failed for two reasons.  First, the legislative plan had 
preempted the field.  The electorate had, only fifteen months previously, adopted 
a new judiciary; it therefore made sense to see if it would work before scrapping 
it.  Second, conservative Oklahomans, skeptical of governmental authority, 
questioned the wisdom of turning over judicial assignments and personnel to a 
largely unknown central figure like the Oklahoma Supreme Court; the Supreme 
Court, of course, was the same entity whose scandal had begun the process for 
reform in the first place.   
 The primary reason for the failure of the Sneed plan was simpler, though.  
Oklahomans, who had a political tradition of a long ballot with many elective 
offices, simply were unwilling to give up the right to elect local judges.  The 
legislative plan, supported by nearly everyone in state government,  had nearly 
fallen victim to the same problem.  The electorate failed to see the correlation 
between electing judges and judicial corruption .   
 In September, 1968, Chief Justice Jackson appointed Marian Opala as the 
state's first court administrator.  Opala, a man of enormous intellect and energy, 
had quietly assisted Senator Roy Grantham in the N.B. Johnson impeachment 
trial.
71
  He now faced the formidable task of reorganizing the state's court system, 
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centralizing budgeting and personnel in Oklahoma City.  Opala compared his job 
to being the executive director of a large corporation, with the board of directors 
being the state's nine justices and judges as shareholders.  Opala later said, "When 
I took over as administrator there were 77 separate kingdoms, each independent, 
each comprising but one county, and it was difficult to recruit people for that new 
philosophy."  His plans met resistance from judges in Tulsa, some judges from 
rural Oklahoma, and from court clerks, who had not previously had to account to 
anyone but the taxpayers for the court's money.  He also met resistance from 
Republican officeholders, especially in northern Oklahoma, who rejected the non-






 The enactment of legislative reform had taken a circuitous route.  At any 
time reform could have failed, and its success was aided by several events.  The 
general public disgust with the court scandal certainly played a significant role, as 
did the embarrassing and obsolete justice of the peace system.  The defeat of 
McCarty was critical; it is hard to imagine a judicial nominating commission 
proposal passing the legislature with J.D. McCarty running the House of 
Representatives.  Governor Dewey Bartlett held his ground with the legislature 
and insisted on the appointment of appellate judges; this would not have happened 
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had Bartlett lost to Preston Moore in 1966.  Finally, the energy of the Sneed plan 
backers in getting their proposal before the voters forced the legislature to propose 
a stronger plan than the legislators otherwise would have passed. 
 At the time of the failure of Sneed plan, its backers saw the victory for the 
legislative plan as a win for the conservative legislature.  Over time, though, it has 
become clear how far Oklahoma's judiciary came from 1963 through 1968.  The 
question is not what Oklahoma could have done, but what it actually 
accomplished.  Oklahoma rid itself of the justice of the peace system.  The 
institution of the nonpartisan election of trial judges made the job more 
professional and less political.  The establishment of the office of court 
administrator centralized court funding.  The creation of the judicial nominating 
commission helped insure that only qualified lawyers, not just political 







CONCLUSION: OKLAHOMA AFTER COURT REFORM 
 
 Oklahoma's court reform system has now been in effect for nearly fifty 
years.  In two generations more than enough time has elapsed to examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of Oklahoma's reformed judicial system.  This chapter  
will outline some of those strengths and weaknesses, beginning with an 
examination of how the Court on the Judiciary, the mechanism created for 
removing corrupt, incompetent,  abusive, or disabled judges from the bench has 
operated.  
 
THE COURT ON THE JUDICIARY 
 In 1968, two years after its establishment, the Court on the Judiciary 
removed Glenn Sharpe, a Bryan County judge who was found to have accepted 
nearly $13,000 in exchange for approving marriage licenses.
1
  Sharpe fought his 
case all the way to the United States Supreme Court, unsuccessfully arguing that 
he was entitled to a jury trial, rather than the trial by eight sitting judges and one 
attorney authorized by the constitutional amendment.
2
  Sharpe's case established 
the authority of the Court on the Judiciary and ended any doubt about the 
legitimacy  of its existence. 
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 However, a flaw in the system quickly became apparent.  No statutory 
mechanism existed to investigate judicial complaints; a person with a grievance 
against a judge had no convenient agency charged with receiving the complaint 
and investigating its validity.  In 1974, Senator Grantham successfully authored a 
bill which established a Council on Judicial Complaints, which consisted of three 
attorneys.  The Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the state 
senate, and the president of the Oklahoma Bar Association each had the 
responsibility of appointing one member of the body.
3
  The Council on Judicial 
Complaints immediately became very busy; in the first year of its existence, the 
council investigated thirty-six judicial complaints, dismissing nineteen of them.
4
   
 Grantham's legislation also directed that the Council on Judicial 
Complaints should operate in secrecy, a practice which the Oklahoma legislature 
strengthened in 1998.
5
  In addition to requiring that any proceedings of the 
Council on Judicial Proceedings be held "in secrecy to the same extent as 
proceedings before a grand jury," Oklahoma's statute now directs a fine of up to a 
thousand dollars for witnesses or complainants who reveal any information about 
the complaint to the public, while judicial officers who reveal any information 
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 This level of confidentiality is a two-edged sword.  Demanding secrecy 
protects judges, whose credibility relies on public respect, from scurrilous and 
frivolous complaints.  It also provides comfort to lawyers, court personnel, 
litigants, or other interested parties who wish to complain about a judge without 
fear of public condemnation or intimidation.   However, there is something 
draconian about requiring fines or judicial reprimands for those people who are 
simply reporting facts about the investigation of a public official. 
 The Court on the Judiciary became very active in the 1970s and 1980s.  In 
1975 the Court undertook the difficult case of Judge Bill Haworth, a district 
judge, former legislator, and longtime political figure from Muskogee.  After a 
fierce legal battle, the Court found Haworth had operated a loan company from 
his judicial chambers, had tampered with jury selection, and had promised lenient 
treatment to a felon in exchange for political assistance to a candidate for district 
attorney.
7
  After Haworth was removed from the bench, he established a law 
practice with Gene Howard, the president pro tempore of the state senate.  He and 
Howard maintained a substantial criminal defense practice.
8
 
 In 1976 the Court heard the case of Judge Sam Sullivan of Durant, another 
longtime local political figure who had been elected to the district court bench.
9
  
Sullivan was accused of and ultimately found guilty of outlandish and abusive 
activities, including threatening to kill anyone who tried to have him disbarred or 
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removed from office, suggesting escaped prisoners should have been killed, 
suggesting a couple kill their son and throw his body into a lake, jailing a litigant 
for not knowing his social security number, and holding a contempt hearing 
against a bailiff and refusing to allow him to have an attorney.  After the Court on 
the Judiciary removed Sullivan and disqualified him from further judicial service, 
he unsuccessfully ran for election as District Attorney, even though he was the 
subject of a pending disbarment case.
10
 
 In that same year, the Court tried Gar Graham, an Associate District Judge 
from Oklahoma County.  Graham had publicly feuded with nearly everyone in the 
Oklahoma County courthouse, using the press to vent his complaints about other 
judges.  He also clashed with the legislature, eventually posting a sign outside his 
courtroom door banning lawyer-legislators from practicing  in his courtroom.  The 
Court suspended Graham for four months without pay and ordered him publicly 
reprimanded but did not remove him from office.  
 Not all cases resulted in conviction. In 1977 the Court on the Judiciary 
tried Judge Elvin Brown, a hardworking but autocratic district judge from 
Norman.  Brown was accused of using his office to oppress the prosecution in 
criminal cases, inappropriate language, and intimidating behavior.  Brown was 
acquitted, becoming to this date the only judge to come before the Court for trial 
not to be sanctioned in some way.
11
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 The common thread of the Haworth, Sullivan, and Graham cases is the 
continued participation in partisan politics by sitting judges.  Haworth, Sullivan, 
and Graham all saw their positions as judges as vehicles with which to wield 
political power, not to adjudicate disputes.
12
  The reforms of the 1960s had made 
it clear that judges were to act as independent interpreters of the law, not as 
advocates for themselves or other partisan or personal interests.   Eventually, 
cases of political interference by judges dwindled after the 1970s.  Litigants 
gradually came to see courthouses as places where they could expect fair 
treatment, regardless of who their lawyer was, their political persuasion, or their 
station in  life.   Judges who saw themselves as partisan political figures or saw 
the bench as a steppingstone for non-judicial political office began disappearing.   
The Oklahoma bench was no longer a place for political power-brokering.  
 The Court on the Judiciary also began to use its constitutionally authorized 
power of compulsory retirement to force judges off the bench.  By using this less 
onerous tool, which allowed the Court to retire judges with "a mental or physical 
disability preventing the proper performance of official duty, or incompetence to 
perform the duties of the office," the Court retired several judges whose health 
issues had clouded their ability to do their jobs.
13
  These included, in 1971,  
Kirksey Nix, the former state senator who had run for Attorney General without 
resigning his judgeship, and, in 1998, Joe Cannon, a former legislator and aide to 
Governor Edmondson who had served controversially as an Oklahoma County 
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district judge for a number of years.
14
  Cannon accepted the medical retirement 
shortly before facing trial before the Court on charges of gross partiality.  In 1994 
the Court approved the medical retirement of Judge Melinda Monnet of 
Oklahoma County, who, although she was only thirty-three years old, claimed 
numerous job-related illnesses, exhibited strange behavior, and had not appeared 
for work for several months.
15
 
 As of 2002, the Court on the Judiciary had removed six judges, suspended 
three, retired eleven, and one had resigned before trial.  Since that year, no judges 
have been removed by action of the Court on the Judiciary; no trials have even 
taken place. That does not mean, however, that judges have not been subject to 
discipline.  In 2004 Judge Donald Thompson resigned shortly before trial in the 
Court on the Judiciary after being accused of bizarre sexual behavior on the bench 
and in the courthouse.  Thompson later was convicted and sentenced to prison.   
In 2005 Judge Steve Lile of the Court of Criminal Appeals became the only 
appellate judge since court reform forced out of office by scandal.  Lile, who had 
filed false travel claims and abused his judicial authority in order to help his 
incarcerated son, was later disbarred.
16
   Two other trial judges, Tammy Bass-
Lesure and Wayne Olmstead resigned rather than face the Court on the Judiciary; 
both eventually pled guilty or no contest to crimes.
17
  Several Special District 
Judges have been terminated or forced to resign over the years; however, these 
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judges are appointed officials and are subject to firing by district judges, without 
the involvement of the Court on the Judiciary.  
 
THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION AND JUDICIAL SELECTION 
 In recent years the concept of the Judicial Nominating Commission has 
come under serious fire, especially from conservative Republican legislators.  In 
recent years the court has declared several legislative acts unconstitutional, 
including a tort reform act which had broad legislative support.  It also ordered 
the removal of a statue reciting the Ten Commandments removed from the capitol 
grounds.  These actions have angered some members of the legislature.   
 The legislature has repeatedly considered giving more power in judicial 
appointments to the Governor and legislature and less to the Judicial Nominating 
Commission.
18
  During the winter of 2010-2011, an incident involving a Supreme 
Court vacancy saw the relationship between the legislature and the committee 
deteriorate substantially.  In October of 2010, longtime Supreme Court Justice 
Marian Opala died.  In November voters approved changes to the makeup of the 
Judicial Nominating Commission and also elected Republican Mary Fallin to 
replace outgoing Democrat Brad Henry as Governor.  Fallin's term was to begin 
in January.  Over furious Republican protests, who wanted to fill the seat after the 
constitutional changes to the committee had been made and Fallin had been 
inaugurated, the Judicial Nominating Commission quickly took applications and 
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recommended three candidates to Governor Henry.  Three days before his term 
ended, Henry appointed Judge Noma Gurich to the post.
19
 
  The 2010 constitutional amendment changed the membership of the 
Judicial Nominating Commission to fifteen members.  Of those fifteen members, 
six are to be appointed by the Governor.  None of those six may be members of 
the Oklahoma Bar Association or have any immediate family members who are 
OBA members; those six gubernatorial appointees must be divided equally by 
political party.  Six lawyer members are elected by the Oklahoma Bar 
Association.  Three at-large members comprise the balance of the commission; 
one selected by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, one by the Speaker of 
the House, and one by at least eight members of the commission.  These three 
members may not be lawyers or have immediate family members who are 
lawyers, and no more than two of the at-large members may be members of the 
same political party.  At least nine of the fifteen members, therefore, must be non-
lawyers, and those members may not have a lawyer in the member's immediate 
family.
20
  This seems to this writer to be a necessary change; while input from 
lawyers is important in selecting judges, it is also vital that the qualifications of 
aspiring judges be viewed by impartial outsiders, and that the public not have the 
perception that judges are selected by an exclusive group of lawyers. 
 The purpose of this dissertation has been to provide a historical 
description of  the political and legal atmosphere which led to scandal and 
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subsequent reform of the Oklahoma's judiciary in the 1950s and 1960s.  Having 
said that, it is useful to discuss current thinking on the question of judicial 
selection.  In 2002, the United States Supreme Court changed the playing field for 
judicial candidates with its decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.
21
  
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that 
Minnesota's provision prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their 
views on disputed legal and political issues violated the candidate's First 
Amendment right to free speech.  This ruling opened the doors for candidates for 
elected judicial office to announce their views on issues which would come before 
them as judges.   
 Although admittedly it is now established law, Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White seems to this writer to be playing with fire.  Judicial 
candidates are now free to run for office on platforms such as being hard on drug 
offenders or taking a hard line against insurance companies or personal injury 
plaintiffs.   Assuming, for example, a judge has been elected on a platform of 
being favorable to defendants in personal injury cases, most plaintiffs would feel 
uncomfortable appearing in front of that judge and skeptical about the idea of fair 
treatment before the court.  This problem is exacerbated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court's ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which bars the 
government from restricting independent political expenditures, opening the door 
for those with a stake in judicial races to spend massive amounts of money on 
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  The U.S. Supreme Court, composed of the nation's highest 
judges, has ironically proven to be a barrier to maintaining decorum and propriety 
in judicial elections.  
 In recent years the subject of judicial selection has become a subject of 
serious study by political scientists.  Distinguished political science professors 
James L. Gibson, Chris W. Bonneau, and Melinda Gann Hall all make forceful 
and persuasive claims in favor of partisan judicial elections, in which the 
candidates identify themselves by political party.  They argue that judges, like 
legislators, are public officeholders, whose decisions should reflect the values of 
the community in which they serve.  The candidate's party affiliation, according 
to them, gives the voter some information regarding the potential judge's ideas.  
To Bonneau, Gann, and Hall, the public benefits from expensive, partisan judicial 
races, which help educate the public on their judges and insure that judges rule as 
their constituencies expect.
23
    
 Professor Gibson, responding to an article entitled "Why Judicial 
Elections Stink" by Charles Gardner Geyh, colorfully compared judicial elections 
to anchovies on a Caesar salad, pointing out that this may ruin the salad for some 
people while enhancing its enjoyment for others.  Gibson concludes, "Still, for 
most constituents of courts, the predominant essence of judicial elections is not 
foul.  Because it is not, holding judges accountable, with its messiness and fuss, 
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still serves to make courts more legitimate and hence more efficacious, which 
cannot help but bolster democracy and the rule of law."
24
 
 These scholars make good points.  Within the boundaries of the law and 
reason, judges should reflect the values of the communities in which they serve.  
Also, to some extent a candidate's party affiliation can provide an indication of 
the potential judge's philosophy on political issues.   
 However, I argue that the disadvantages of partisan elections far outweigh 
their advantages.  Judges and legislators have entirely different governmental 
roles.  A legislator is expected to represent his or her district in the legislature, 
making sure that the best interests and desires of his constituents are represented 
and reflected in an entire state.  Judges, on the other hand, have a duty to analyze 
the facts of the case at hand and apply the law to those facts.  Judges should not 
make decisions based upon what is best for a locality or what results the judge's 
constituents want.  A judge who simply responds to public opinion without 
considering the facts and the law is not doing his or her job. 
 Advocates of partisan judicial elections should take careful note of what 
happened in a contested appellate judge election in West Virginia.  In 2002 a 
West Virginia jury had found A.T. Massey Coal Company, a huge local coal 
mining company led by Don Blankenship, liable for fraud and awarded the 
plaintiffs fifty million dollars in damages.
25
  Massey appealed to the West 
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Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.  In 2004 a partisan judicial election occurred, 
and Republican Brent Benjamin challenged the Democratic incumbent.  
Blankenship, whose case was pending before the court, formed a political 
organization entitled "And for the Sake of the Kids," and donated almost $2.5 
million to the organization, which endorsed Benjamin.  Blankenship also spent 
just over $500,000 on direct mailings and letters soliciting donations and 
television and newspaper advertising supporting Benjamin's campaign.  
Blankenship spent more on the election than the committees of the two candidates 
combined and more than three times the amount spent by Benjamin's own 
committee.   As Chief Justice Roberts points out in his eventual dissent, a group 
called "Consumers for Justice," which received large contributions from plaintiffs' 
attorneys, spent about $2 million in support of Benjamin's opponent, who was the 
incumbent.   Benjamin won the election and became a member of West Virginia's 
five member Supreme Court of Appeals. 
 The plaintiff asked Justice Benjamin to recuse from hearing the case.  
After deliberating for about six months, Benjamin denied the motion but stated 
that he found "no objective information" that he had prejudged the case, had a 
bias for or against any litigant, or that he would be anything but fair and impartial.  
In 2007, by a three to two vote, the court reversed the case, setting aside the $50 
million verdict; Justice Benjamin voted with the majority, in favor of Massey.  
Shortly thereafter photos surfaced of one of the two other justices who had voted 
in Massey's favor, Justice Elliott Maynard, vacationing on the French Riviera with 
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Blankenship, an activity Maynard had not previously disclosed.
26
  The court 
granted a rehearing.  Maynard recused, as did another justice who had been 
publicly critical of both Blankenship and Benjamin, leaving two slots out of five 
open.  Benjamin, who by then was the court's chief justice, appointed two judges 
to fill the vacancies and rehear the case. In April of 2008, the West Virginia court 
again reversed the jury's verdict, once again by a three-to-two decision in which 
Benjamin provided the deciding vote in favor of Massey.
27
   
 The case eventually went to the United States Supreme Court.   In a five-
to-four decision, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, 
held that Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself violated the Due Process clause of 
the Constitution.   Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Alito, 
Thomas, and Scalia.  Justice Roberts argued the majority had opened a Pandora's 
box on the question of judicial recusal, listing forty separate questions now raised 
by the majority decision with which judges may now have to deal.  Scalia also 
wrote a separate opinion, accusing the majority of continuing "its quixotic quest 
to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution" and 
agreeing with Roberts that the majority had simply added confusion to the issue.   
 The Massey case embodies all that is wrong with partisan judicial 
elections.  In a race for the highest court in a relatively small state, two non-profit 
corporations spent $5 million attempting to get their candidate into office.  One of 
those corporations was financed by someone with a direct interest in a case 
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pending before that court, while the other was funded by attorneys with regular 
business there.  When Justice Benjamin won, he twice cast the deciding vote in 
favor of the party who had donated $3 million to his campaign.  It took a five-to-
four decision by the United States Supreme Court to correct such an obvious 
miscarriage of justice. 
 This trend of pouring enormous sums of partisan money into appellate 
judicial races continues.  As of April 2016, approximately $2.6 million, much of it 
from ads sponsored by out of state groups from both the left and right, had been 
spent on a Wisconsin supreme court campaign.  Television spending on two seats 
in Arkansas reached $1.2 million, with candidates being defeated who were seen 
as too cozy with trial lawyers.  In Pennsylvania labor unions and plaintiffs' trial 
lawyer groups spent about $2.9 million on television advertisements which helped 
elect Democratic candidates to three supreme court seats.
28
  
 If we are to have judicial elections, especially at the appellate level, it is 
worth discussing how they will be financed in a political and legal climate in 
which the freedom to spend money is equated with free speech.  As this 
dissertation has discussed,  judicial elections are "down ballot," meaning that they 
do not draw the public interest that races for governor, attorney general, and other 
high-profile offices have.  Other than friends and family members of the 
candidate, there are four likely sources of donations: insurance companies,  
plaintiffs' personal injury attorneys, large businesses, and other attorneys, 
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especially large law firms.  All these sources have considerable business before 
the courts, creating inherent conflicts for judges who have received contributions.  
When one of the attorneys or parties has contributed to a judge's campaign, it is 
hard to see how the judicial playing field can be level; it is even harder to imagine 
a litigant who has lost to a contributor thinking he has received fair treatment.  In 
this writer's view, the drawbacks to partisan judicial elections far outweigh the 
advantages outlined by Hall, Bonneau, and Gibson.  
 
THE RETENTION BALLOT AND NON-PARTISAN TRIAL JUDGE 
ELECTIONS 
 As we have seen, Oklahoma voters adopted the retention ballot for 
appellate judges in 1967.  Since that time, no Oklahoma judges have been 
unseated by the voters; all have been retained.  In the first judicial retention 
election in 1968, the Oklahoma Bar Association endorsed the retention of the 
three Supreme Court justices on the ballot but opposed a new term for the 
controversial Judge Kirksey Nix of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Nix bought 
advertising and responded in the press and was retained by the voters.
29
  Since 
then, the bar has taken a hands-off approach to retention of specific judges. 
 In 2014 nine justices and appellate judges were on Oklahoma's retention 
ballot.  The lowest-performing judge, Justice John Reif, received fifty-nine 
percent of the votes to retain him; the highest-performing judge, Justice Tom 
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Colbert, received sixty-two percent.  In 2012 twelve justices and judges appeared 
on the retention ballot.  With a higher turnout because of the 2012 presidential 
election, no judge received less than 65.6% of the retention vote.  In 2010 the 
favorable votes ranged between 61.60% and 65.02%.
30
 
 Nationwide,  judicial retention remains very high, and Oklahoma's 
experience is relatively consistent with other states with the same system.  
Between 1936 and 2009, 637 state supreme court justices faced retention votes; 
only eight lost.  However, in 2010, Iowa voters, disgruntled by a Supreme Court 
decision which made Iowa the first state to legalize same-sex marriage, voted 
three judges who supported the decision out of office.
31
  In that same year hotly 
contested judicial retention votes took place in Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, 
and Michigan, with all the incumbents being retained in office.
32
   
 The issue therefore is whether the judicial retention ballot is an effective 
tool with which to judge judicial performance.  In Oklahoma voters have no frame 
of reference with which to determine the performance of a particular judge.  The 
average voter, who has little to no experience with the courts and even less with 
appellate courts, simply has no information with which to vote.  While some 
states have some sort of mechanism for judicial evaluation, Oklahoma does not.  
Certainly over a half-century Oklahoma has had some appellate judges who did 
not deserve to remain on the bench, but the electorate has no way to know 
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whether judges are doing a good  job.
33
 The state should develop a meaningful 
tool for assisting voters in determining which judges do their jobs effectively. 
 Oklahomans now have approximately fifty years of electing trial judges on 
a nonpartisan ballot.  Although there have been some exceptions, for the most part 
the system has run smoothly.  In rural areas of the state, it is relatively common 
for judges, especially incumbents, to be unopposed; after all, the potential talent 
pool is limited to lawyers living in the judicial district, which may be a relatively 
low number.  In contested elections the incumbent unquestionably has a 
significant advantage, although this is probably no more true in judicial elections 
than legislative or Congressional elections.  In the 2014 election ninety-eight 
percent of all incumbent judges in Oklahoma retained their office.  One hundred 
eight candidates were unopposed.  Three judges were voted out.
34
  Two of those 
three defeated candidates had been appointed to the bench after a vacancy 
occurred during the term and thus faced the voters for the first time.  In 2010 at 
least three long-serving incumbent judges were unseated. 
35
 
 This writer served for twenty-eight years as Associate District Judge for 
Carter County, Oklahoma, a county which has a population of approximately 
50,000.   I served seven terms and was never opposed for election until I opted not 
to be a candidate for re-election in 2014.  I can therefore claim some expertise in 
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the field of nonpartisan judicial elections, although admittedly my objectivity is 
compromised by my experience.  In my view Oklahoma's establishment of 
nonpartisan elections for trial judges was then and still remains a healthy thing.  
Like any other office-holder,  judges must be accountable to someone for the way 
they conduct their office.  It is unfair and unacceptable to tie judicial decisions to 
partisan political parties; as I have argued earlier, legislators and judges have 
completely different duties.  However, everyone, including judges, should have 
someone to whom he or she must answer. 
  From my observation most Oklahomans respect their state judicial system.  
Most people do not expect every case to turn out the way they think that it should, 
and they realize that every case is different.  They understand that judges are 
bound by the law.  However, they also believe they have the right to be treated 
courteously and respectfully by judges and their staffs, that cases should move 
expeditiously, and that judicial decisions should be made openly and not behind 
closed doors or for political reasons.  Most litigants understand that, unlike 
legislators, judges are barred from discussing their cases with them without the 
other side being present.  A prudent Oklahoma judge should explain controversial 








THE RESULTS OF REFORM AND THE FACTORS IN ITS PASSAGE 
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court scandal exposed significant deficiencies in 
Oklahoma's judicial framework.  First, the system encouraged favoritism and 
doing business through the back door.  Litigants were in danger of having their 
cases decided on who their lawyer was, not the merits of their case.  In the last 
half-century the legal industry has become considerably more professional in this 
aspect; although some ex parte communication no doubt occurs, it now is the 
exception, not the rule.   
 Second,  judges have become considerably more professional.  Judges are 
no longer identified by political party, so they are not seen as just another political 
office-seeker.  Most judges see their jobs as separate from other political jobs.  
While they may seek to move up the judicial ladder, it is a rare judge who sees his 
or her job as a gateway to non-judicial political office.   The existence of the 
Judicial Nominating Commission for appellate judgeships and mid-term trial 
vacancies also increases the professionalism of the judiciary and increases public 
faith in the courts.  
 The absence of a meaningful way to discipline judges certainly helped 
contribute to the scandal.   Until it was finally exposed, corruption in the Supreme 
Court had been rumored for years.  However, no convenient or practical 
mechanism for investigating or removing judges had existed.  The establishment 
225 
 
of the Court on the Judiciary cured this problem.  In addition to accountability to 
the voters, judges know that they can be held accountable for their actions.   
   In writing the state's constitution, Oklahoma's  founders relied on their 
Southern and Populist roots, which led to the creation of an inordinate number of 
elected offices.  This philosophy, along with the state's relative poverty and the 
limiting of office-holding to white and Native American men, led to a government 
on the cheap which was not responsive to the needs of its citizens.  Oklahoma's 
legal structure of the first fifty years featured a lack of prosecutorial resources, the 
ineffective county attorney system, a dearth of statewide law enforcement 
investigative officials, the scandalous justice of the peace system, and the 
confusing and incomprehensible trial court framework.  It also led to appointment 
or election of at least three, and almost certainly more, corrupt Supreme Court 
justices who accepted  bribes and allowed undue, backdoor influence by 
dishonest, power-brokering lawyers and businessmen.  Once the corruption had 
been exposed, no mechanism existed to investigate or prosecute the offenders.   
 A number of factors led to the exposure of the scandal and the reform. The 
huge amount of money offered by Hugh Carroll and accepted by N.S. Corn 
involved so many people and was so suspicious that discovery of the crime 
became easier, if not inevitable.  Although corruption on the court had been 
rumored for many years, the Selected  Investments case simply was too big and 
complicated to keep quiet forever.  Nevertheless, without the persistence of 
determined authorities who continued to look into Corn's tangled finances and the 
Selected Investments bankruptcy, the scandal may never have been exposed.  
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 The scandal occurred at a time when the Republican Party was finally 
gaining a foothold in Oklahoma politics.  Although their numbers in the 
legislature were still small, those Republicans who were in office consistently 
advocated for reform.  Without G.T. Blankenship's courageous publication of 
Corn's statement on the House floor, it is hard to say what would have happened, 
but the chances of  Democratic legislators choosing to challenge Speaker 
McCarty publicly on such an incendiary issue seem slim.  Governor Bellmon 
made sure the scandal remained in the public eye and helped force Welch and 
Johnson from the bench.  Governor Bartlett remained steadfast in his advocacy of 
the Judicial Nominating Commission.  Without Bartlett's tenacity, the commission 
and retention voting for appellate judges would not have become a reality.     
 The electorate also played a significant role.  Since the election of J. 
Howard Edmondson in the 1958 gubernatorial election, voters had signaled their 
impatience with the insider-oriented politics of the state's first half-century.  The 
next two elected governors were Republicans; one of the issues in Bartlett's 1966 
campaign against Preston Moore had been court reform.  Against all odds, the 
voters in J.D. McCarty's reapportioned district unseated the powerful Speaker, 
who was encountering legal troubles of his own.  Had McCarty remained 
Speaker, court reform, if it had occurred at all, would have taken a completely 
different form.  The reapportioned legislature of 1967 was considerably different 
from legislatures of previous years and less entrenched in the politics of the past.   
 In their development of the court reform plan in 1967, the state's leaders 
demonstrated leadership, political skill, and ability to compromise.  Spurred by 
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the necessity for court reform but wary of the far-reaching Sneed Plan, the 
legislative leadership and governor created a plan palatable to the state's 
conservative voters.  They then set the matter for a special election, which drew 
voters educated on the issue and motivated to express their opinion.  Even with 
the advantages the authorities gave to the propositions, they still only narrowly 
met with the approval of the voters, demonstrating the political acuity of the 
authors of the reforms.   
 Finally, the Oklahoma bar deserves credit for helping create the 
atmosphere for the institution of reform.   Humiliated and mortified by the 
scandal, most lawyers pitched in to try to insure that something like the Supreme 
Court scandal would not happen again.  The federal officials who doggedly 
pursued the original investigation were lawyers. The principals in the legislature's 
movement to impeach Welch and Johnson and the  judicial reform plan were 
lawyer-legislators.  The leadership of the Oklahoma Bar Association took a very 
active role in investigating the scandal, preparing the reform plan, and persuading 
the voters to adopt it.  Although his reform proposal was not adopted, Earl 
Sneed's activism on the issue of court reform gave urgency and energy to the 
crisis in the court system.  Without pressure from the Sneed plan, legislative 
reform would have been far less extensive. 
 Oklahoma is once again a one-party state.  As of 2016, all statewide 
offices and overwhelming majorities of both houses of the legislature are 
occupied by Republicans. Republicans hold both United States senate seats and 
all five congressional posts.  In the absence of a healthy Democratic party, the 
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state is in danger of falling victim to the same problems it had fifty years ago: 
factionalism, lack of voter interest, absence of a viable loyal opposition, and 
domination by incumbents.  As V.O. Key, Jr. put it in 1949, "A loose factional 
system lacks the power to carry out sustained programs of action, which almost 
are thought by the better element to be contrary to its immediate interests."
36
   
 Oklahoma's judicial system is by no means perfect.   Judicial decision-
making by definition is an inexact science subject to critical interpretation, and 
much of it is subjective and discretionary.   However, Oklahoma's reforms have 
led to an experienced, professional judiciary, in which a judge is no longer 
considered just another party official.  Instead, most Oklahomans consider their 
judges to be independent of special interests and seekers of appropriate results to 
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